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ALTERNATIVES TO CIVIL COMMITMENT
OF THE MENTALLY ILL: PRACTICAL GUIDES
AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES
David L. Chambers*
I.

INTRODUCTION

1930, Ford sold Fords only in black and states offered treatment
for mental illness only in public mental hospitals. Today, new
views of mental health care and mental health problems have begotten a galaxy of new treatment settings. Few cities can boast community-based programs sufficient to meet their needs, but almost
all cities of any size rely increasingly on outpatient programs. The
large public mental hospitals still stand, of course. Indeed, every
year more people enter public hospitals than entered the year before.
Over 400,000 Americans were admitted as inpatients to state and
county mental hospitals last year.1 Partly because of the new outpatient services, patient stays tend to be shorter than they once were,
but, short or long, a large portion of the 400,000 underwent anguish,
terror, and embarrassment in the sudden separation from home and
family and the sudden loss of privacy and self that accompanies confinement on a ward with fifty or a hundred strangers. Precisely what
portion of these 400,000 were involuntarily committed is not known,
but it is probably more than fifty per cent. 2 What portion of the
400,000 could have been treated and protected as well or better
outside the hospital is also unknown, but, as we shall see, the percentage also seems likely to have been high.
The most forthright suggestion for ending the undue reliance
N

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1962, Princeton University; LL.B. 1965, Harvard University.-Ed.
1. In the year ending June 30, 1971, there were 414,926 new admissions to state
and county mental hospitals, a 5V2% increase over 1970 and a continuation of a trend
of increasing admissions to these hospitals during the preceding 20 years. See H.
Bethel & R. Redick, Provisional Patient Movement and Administrative Data, State
and County Mental Hospital Inpatient Services, July 1, 1970-June 30, 1971, Statistical
Note 60, Survey and Reports Section, National Institute of Mental Health, at 2 (1972).
On the other hand, during this period there has also been a steady decline in the
total portion of mental health care treatment episodes in this country conducted in
such hospitals and a steady rise in the portion conducted on an outpatient basis.
See notes 42-43 infra and accompanying text.

2. A study completed in 1968 for the American Bar Foundation found that in 45
states, accounting for 88% of hospital admissions, only 40% of admissions were
voluntary. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 17 (S. Brakel & R. Rock rev. ed.
1971) [hereinafter S. BAKE & R. ROCK]. See also R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL,
HosPIrALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENrALLY ILL 4143 (1968) (another study
sponsored by the American Bar Foundation).

[1108]
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on compulsory hospitalization has been to forbid it altogether. Two
of the functions states seek to serve through hospitalization-protecting the individual from himself and providing him care and treatment-are commendable as bases for offering help but questionable
as bases for forcing help on someone who does not want it. A third
function-protecting the community from dangers posed by the ill
person--does justify compulsory intervention for certain kinds of
dangers, but such grave difficulties are posed in accurately predicting
dangerousness that most people held will in fact prove harmless.
Moreover, only the most tenuous justification exists for retaining
two forms of commitment, one labeled civil and resting on a concept of "mental illness" and another labeled criminal and resting on
an equally shaky concept of "responsibility." To date, however,
courts have proved unwilling to curtail civil commitment, and in
truth courts are no more likely to force an end to compulsory hospitalization than they are to force an end to prisons.
This article does seek to encourage the movement away from
inpatient hospitalization but more gently-through approaches and
doctrines that seek to allay rather than kindle the anxieties of the
public about mental illness. It is my belief (backed, I hope to demonstrate, by a growing body of research) that even if we concede
that governments may hospitalize an ill person to protect him from
himself, or to protect others from him, or simply to treat or care
for him, these goals can generally be better served by keeping him
in the community than by removing him.
This perception that care in a public hospital is less satisfactory
than outpatient care for serving the state's own goals provides a
basis for statutory and constitutional arguments for curtailing the
current level of reliance on forced hospitalization. State commitment
codes do not compel the hospitalization of all mentally ill persons
and most could sensibly be construed to permit hospitalization only
when the state's purposes are best served by doing so. Similarly, the
United States Supreme Court and other courts, when confronted by
regulations that encroach on important constitutionally protected
freedoms or interests (for example, free expression, the flow of interstate commerce, or the right to travel), have often insisted as a minimum condition for sustaining the regulations that the government
serve its purposes by employing the means least restrictive of the constitutionally protected interest. The rights most severely curtailed by
civil commitment-the rights of association and travel and the more
elusive, less well established, but no less respectable, constitutionally
based concern for freedom from physical confinement-should sim-
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ilarly be held to require the use of less restrictive alternatives to
hospitalization whenever the state's interests can be served. Indeed, a
few lower courts have already indicated support for this position.3
Even if appellate courts do hold that community alternatives
must be preferred over hospitalization whenever state goals can be
served, obstacles will still remain to reliance by judges on community treatment. Even the most willing judge will be unable to
assure that an adequate inquiry for alternatives occurs without the
aid of professional advice currently unavailable in most states. Probation officers provide advice on community placement to judges
in criminal and juvenile courts. Functionally similar advisers need
to be available to commitment judges. If necessary, the Constitution
can supply the force to compel states to establish some sort of system
to ensure that an adequate inquiry into alternatives occurs.
My development of these and other points fills a wastebasket
full of pages. In partial defense, I can only point out that, in terms
of procedural and substantive rights, the mentally ill stand today
where the criminal defendant stood in 1935 and the juvenile offender
stood in 1960. Indeed, so far as I can find, the Supreme Court has
decided only three cases in its entire history dealing with any aspect
of civil commitment and two of these,4 and perhaps even the third,
can be seen as reflecting primarily the Court's concern for persons
convicted of crimes. The Court has itself recently expressed surprise
at the paucity of cases. 6 Thus, if the Court did decide to hear a case
3. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dixon v. Attorney General,

325 F. Supp. 966, 971 (MD. Pa. 1971). See text accompanying notes 198-205 infra.
4. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (holding unconstitutional under the
equal protection clause New York's practice of transferring to mental hospitals convicted criminals completing sentences without providing them the procedural protections given to others facing civil commitment); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705

(1962) (holding, by statutory construction, that the District of Columbia statute
providing for automatic hospitalization of those found not guilty by reason of insanity
cannot be applied to those who have not voluntarily raised the insanity defense). A
third case, dealing with the constitutionality of Maryland's procedure for civilly
committing repeated criminal offenders, "defective delinquents," has been argued

before the Supreme Court, 40 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. April 4, 1972), and is presently
awaiting decision. Tippet v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.), cert. granted sub nor.
Muriel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 404 U.S. 999 (1971). Cf. Humphrey v. Cady,
40 U.S.L.W. 4324 (U.S. March 22, 1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (each
dealing with special provisions for extended confinement beyond normal sentences
for sex offenders and involving procedures partly resembling civil commitment),
5. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (upholding
statute permitting involuntary commitment of sex psychopaths, the basis for whose
commitment could, and usually does, rest on prior convictions for sex offenses).
6. In Jackson v. Indiana, 40 US.L.W. 4615, (U.S. June 7, 1972), the Court held unconstitutional open-ended confinement of a person found incompetent to stand trial.
Justice Blackmun, speaking for a unanimous Court, said, "Considering the number of
persons affected [by commitment statutes] it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive
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dealing solely with civil commitment and did require state courts
to explore alternatives before committing people to hospitals, 7 such
a decision might well be "one of those bridge decisions that open up
new terrain by connecting it with familiar ground."8 Traveling the
unfamiliar terrain of civil commitment, the Justices would find
open-ended commitments without counsel years after Gideon and
Gault. They would stumble through acres of hazy, ill-defined commitment standards like "dangerous to self or others" or "in need
of care and treatment" and learn of commitment hearings unattended by the doctors seeking the allegedly ill person's commitment
(or even by the allegedly ill person himself) and so cursory that
dozens can be conducted in a single morning. Contemplating a terrain so craggy, the Court might understandably wish to burn its
bridge before crossing it.
If a beginning be made, however, few better starting points exist
than the issue of alternatives to commitment. The principle of the
least restrictive alternative is a most limited and modest incursion
on a state's interests. It does not prevent the state from achieving
any of the objectives it seeks through commitment, but merely asks
courts to ensure that the state imposes no greater constriction of
freedom than necessary to serve the objectives. Equally important,
the recognition of the principle in this context might help lawyers
and judges perceive the mentally ill as human beings with problems
often possible of solution in the outside world. To demonstrate that
the schizophrenic with the frightened eyes and frightening beliefs
can survive at home may humanize lawyers, judges, and the public
generally in their dealings with the mentally ill over a broad range
of other issues. 1°
constitutional limits on this power have not been more frequently litigated." 40 U.S.L.W.
at 4622.
7. The Supreme Court has dismissed for want of a substantial federal question one
case raising the issue of the constitutional obligation of committing courts to employ
less restrictive alternatives. State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1968), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1969). For a discussion of the case and why it provides little indication of the Court's probable attitude toward the issue if fully argued, see text accompanying notes 150-55 and 189-97 infra.
8. P. FREUm,ON LAW AND JusT cE 4 (1968).

9. What I refer to as the "principle of the least restrictive alternative" is often
labelled by others as the principle of "less drastic means" (see, e.g., Note, Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YAIx L.J. 464 (1968)) or as the principle of
"reasonable alternatives" (see, e.g., Wormuth & Mirken, The Doctrine of Reasonable
Alternatives, 9 UTAH L.REv. 254 (1964)). The Supreme Court, to its credit, has never
used a single catchy phrase.

10. There is evidence that public attitudes toward the mentally ill are gradually
improving. See G.Crocetti, H. Spiro & I. Siassi, Are the Ranks Closed? Attitudinal
Social Distance and Mental Illness, 127 Ar. J. PSYCHIATRY 112 (1971) (summarizing
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VARIETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ALTERNATIVES

TO HOSPITALIZATION

Since the inspiration to require an exploration of alternatives
to hospitalization is likely to come to courts more from a recognition
of the potential the alternatives offer for serving the state's needs
than from the overpowering persuasiveness of the legal arguments
that will be advanced, let us begin by looking at the range and effectiveness of these alternatives. A great deal of medical and social science literature exists. Perhaps the discussion that follows can help
lead lawyers to it.
A.

The Range of Alternatives to Hospitalization

One hundred twenty years ago, many doctors prescribed hospitalization as the only acceptable form of treatment for the mentally
ill.11 In 1863, the celebrated Dr. Isaac Ray asserted unequivocally
in support of hospitalization that "[i]t is now a well-settled principle,
that.., the surroundings of the patient should be entirely changed,
so that he shall see no face nor other object familiar to him in the
previous stage of his disease .
*...
,12 Visits, even correspondence,
with family were to be discouraged.'8 The doctors would restore
order to the mind by housing the patients in an ordered environment-a hospital with long and straight corridors, firmly set schedules, and consistent, warmly administered discipline. Acting on this
principle, states erected hospitals in rural settings far from the
communities they served. 14
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the hospitals
became vastly overcrowded, re-creating the very disorder that their
founders had sought to avoid.Y Most patients suffered from chronic
research on public attitudes toward the mentally ill, much of it unencouraging, but
setting forth a recent study of attitudes of workers at an auto plant in Baltimore that
found high levels of optimism about the potential for treatment of the ill and high
levels of willingness to work with or live with an ex-mental patient).
11. For a thorough account of the enthusiasm of the medical profession for hospitalization in the mid-nineteenth century, see D. ROTHMAN, THE DIscovERY OF THE
AsyLUm

130-54 (1971). See also E. BOND, DR. KIRKBRIE AND HIS MENTAL HOSPITAL

(1947).
12. I. RAY, MENTAL HYGIENE 328 (1863). Dr. Ray was one of the founders of what
is now known as the American Psychiatric Association and an administrator of both
public and private hospitals.
13. Id. at 824-25.
14. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 141-42.
15. D. RoTHMAN, supra note 11, 265-87 (1971); Michigan Dept. of Mental Health,
The Development and Growth of Michigan's Mental Health Program: A History of
125 Years of Transition and Progress 7-12 (1962).
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illnesses and remained hospitalized until death. Today, seventy-five
years later, many of the same hospitals remain in use and the
median length of stay for older patients in many hospitals still exceeds ten years. 16 Despite recent ardent and praiseworthy efforts to
reshape these hospitals into places for treatment, success has been
limited. Few experts today recommend hospitalization, particularly
in the large public mental hospital, as the preferred setting for treatment to occur. Those who defend hospitalizationT do so in terms
that exclude most public mental hospitals, which generally remain
understaffed, overcrowded, and distant.' 8 The very ground on which
hospitalization was praised in the past-that it separated the patient
from the surroundings he found troublesome-emerged as a principal target for attack. Separation, it is now believed, impedes reintegration into community life; and the isolation of hospitalization,
coupled with other aspects of institutionalization, breeds further
withdrawal and deterioration. 9
Most writers on mental health today believe that mentally ill
persons generally respond best to care provided in the setting in
which the patients' problems have arisen.20 "Community mental
health care" or "community psychiatry," 2 ' the loosely used labels for
the new approach, is characterized at its best by flexibility, pragmatism, and accessibility. 22 Drawing on many more disciplines than
16. R. Redick, Length of Stay-State and County Mental Hospitals Selected States,
Statistical Note 20, Survey and Reports Section, National Institute of Mental Health,
Tables 1-2, at 4-5 (1970).
The median length of stay for patients residing in state and county mental hospitals
runs between 4.5 to 8.6 years for all age groups for the few states which publish
comparable data (California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Oregon, and
West Virginia). Id. at 2. The median length of stay increases with each older age group
through age 64.
17. On the potential for treatment in a well-staffed hospital, see Kubie, The Future
of the Private PsychiatricHospital, in CRosscURmRNs IN PSYCHITRY AND PSYCHOANALYsis 179, 184-86 (R. Gibson ed. 1967).
18. A study sponsored in part by the American Bar Foundation of twenty-two
representative state-operated mental hospitals found that "[all but a few of the
institutions studied operate at 20 to 50 per cent above their official bed capacity.
Further, the generally small size of medical staffs and the relatively small number of
trained psychiatrists in public hospital practice precludes care of all but a few patients
at anything above a bare minimum." R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, supra
note 2, at 69-70.
19. See notes 81-90 infra and accompanying text.
20. See Wedge, Changing Perceptions of Mental Health, 48 MENTAL HYGIENE 22
(1964) and articles and books Wedge cites.
21. For a discussion of the basic terms and the uses made of them, see Sabshin,
Theoretical Models in Community and Social Psychiatry, in ComrmuNrry PsYcHIATRY
15-30 (L. Roberts, S. Halleck & M. Loeb ed. 1966). See also Zuithoff, Community
Psychiatry and Social Action-A Survey, 126 Am. J. PSYCHIATY 162 (1970).
22. See, e.g., Folta & Schatzman, Trends in Public Urban Psychiatry in the United
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psychiatry and many more settings than inpatient care, it seek§ to
provide a diversity of approaches equal to the diversity of human
misfortune. It seeks to deal not simply with misfortunes labeled as
illnesses but also with problems of housing, employment, and public
assistance benefits; not simply with the treatment of the person labeled as ill but also with the family unit as a whole.
The development of alternatives to inpatient hospitalization began in this country in the early part of this century 23 but did not
spread rapidly until after World War 11.24 Imaginative mental health
programs developed by the military during the War and by the
British and the Dutch before and after the War25 inspired much of
the recent development. The English and Dutch, through programs
that successfully treated ill persons on an outpatient basis, reduced
sharply the number of patients residing in their hospitals. 20 (In fact,
Britain's Department of Health and Social Security has recently announced a plan to close all of the nation's 116 remaining mental
27
hospitals over the next fifty years.)
In this country, New York in 1954 enacted the first community
mental health services legislation to encourage the urban-based outpatient clinics. 28 Thirteen other states enacted similar legislation,
with limited funding, over the next ten years.29 Congress has since
provided much of the impetus-but too small a share of the fundsfor greatly expanded community mental health programs and facilities in the United States. In 1955, it established a commission to
study the state of mental health programs and facilities in the
United States.30 Six years later, the commission issued an influential
States, 16 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 60, 67-71 (1968); Freedman, Historical and Political Roots
of the Community Mental Health Centers Act, 37 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 487 (1967).
23. See Ewalt & Ewalt, History of the Community Psychiatry Movement, 126 AM. J.
PsYcmuTRY 43 (1969); Rossi, Some Pre-World War II Antecedents of Community
Mental Health Theory and Practice, in PERSPELrIVES IN CoMxuNrrY MENTAL HEALTH
9 (A. Bindman & A. Spiegel ed. 1969).
24. See Freedman, supra note 22.
25. See Margolis & Bonstedt, What Is Community Psychiatry?, 31 DIsEASES or THE
NEtvous SYSTEM 251 (1970); Yolles, Mental Health's Homoeostatic State: A New Territory, 7 INTL. J. PsYcHAuTRY 827, 330 (1970).
26. See Clark, The Emergence of Priorities in Psychiatry, 125 AM. J. PsYcHIATrY
1218 (1969) (describing the British effort); Querido, The Shaping of Community Mental
Health Care, 7 INTL. J. PSYCHITRY 300 (1970) (describing the Dutch effort).
27. TIME, Jan. 24, 1972, at 41.
28. See S. BRAE & R. RocK, supra note 2, at 9.
29. Id.
80. The Mental Health Study Act of 1955, ch. 417, § 3, 69 Stat. 882, authorized the

appropriation of 1.25 million dollars that was used to establish the Joint Commission
on Mental Illness and Health.
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report urging reduced emphasis on hospitalization and the rapid
development of outpatient clinics and services. 31
This report apparently helped persuade President Kennedy to
propose broad new federal legislation. In a frequently quoted message to Congress, the President declared that "[t]he time has come
for a bold new approach. .

.

. When carried out, reliance on the

cold mercy of custodial isolation will be supplanted by the open
warmth of community concern and capability."3 2 The President set
as a goal-which appears in fact largely to have been met 3 3 -a reduction by one half in the nation's mental hospital resident population
by the mid-1970's.
Responding to the President's call, Congress in 1963 enacted the
Community Mental Health Centers Act, authorizing substantial
sums of federal matching monies for community-based treatment
facilities.34 Between 1963 and 1968, forty-three states enacted enabling legislation to qualify them for funds under the Act. 35 By
1969, 350 community mental health centers were participating under
the Act.361 Under federal regulations, each federally supported center
must provide short-term inpatient, outpatient, part-time inpatient,
emergency and diagnostic services. 37 Although centers have not
opened nearly as quickly or provided as many services as had been
hoped,38 they have treated hundreds of thousands of persons, 39 many
31.

JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALuH, AcTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH

(1961). See especially the summary of recommendations at vii-xxiv.

32. MESSAGE FROM Tm PREsIDENT OF Tm UNrTr STATES RmATVE TO MENTAL HEALTH
AND MENTAL RETARDATION, H.R. Doc. No. 58, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1963).
33. At least as measured from its highest point-at the end of June 1955 when
resident population in public hospitals was 558,900-population is now down nearly
by half. It is also down nearly by half from its level at the time the President gave
his speech (504,600 in June 1963). At the end of June 1971, population had declined
to 308,000 and was declining at a rate likely to yield a total patient population
well below 300,000 by mid-1972. (See note 69 infra for source and for an explanation of
the reasons for the over-all decline in patient population.)
34. Pub. L. No. 88-164, tit. II, 77 Stat. 290, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2681-87 (1970).
In 1968, Congress established a new program to underwrite community treatment for
alcoholics and narcotics addicts (Alcoholic and Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-574, tit. III, §§ 301-03, 82 Stat. 1006, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2688e to 2688j (1970)) and, in 1970, authorized extra funding for mental
health programs in low income areas (Act of March 13, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-211, tit.
III, § 302, 84 Stat. 58 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2688f(b) (1970)).
35. See S. BRAX.L & R. RocK,supra note 2, at 10.
36. Id.
37. 42 C.F.R. § 54.212(a) (1971).
38. To those who have surveyed the community health movement, the state of community mental health today simultaneously encourages and disappoints. Though in
absolute numbers the scope of community-based programs is vastly greater than it was
a decade ago, it remains far short of the stated goals of Congress in 1963. S. BRAKEL &
R. RocK,supra note 2, at 10. Two thousand centers by 1973 was the original goal; today
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of whom would probably otherwise have been hospitalized. During
this past decade, there has also' been a comparable and even vaster
expansion of outpatient mental health services through general hospitals and other clinics not federally funded, 40 as well as a similarly
vast expansion of short-term inpatient care in psychiatric wards
within general hospitals. 41 Thus, in the thirteen years from 1955 to
1968, largely because of the expanded services and their accessibility,
the number of persons annually receiving some form of mental
health care in this country more than doubled.4 Outpatient services
and community mental health centers that in 1955 had accounted
for less than one quarter of patient-care episodes accounted by 1968
for more than one half.43
No less important than the development of community-based
facilities has been the development and diffusion of new tranquilizthe date for achievement has been pushed back to 1980. Id. Even as to centers that have
opened, many are unable to offer the full range of services the regulations require. Id.
at 11. Congressional authorizations and appropriations have been too low to meet the
aims. As one critic has pointed out, total funds appropriated under the Community
Mental Health Centers Act from 1964 to 1968 have been no more than the funds required to operate the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene for five months.
See R. GLAssCoTE, J. Sussmx, E. CUMMING & L. SMITH, Tnm ComMuNrrv, MENTAL HEALTH
Ca'r.nt: AN INEmam- APPRAIsAL 6 (1969). The states have in short remained saddled
with the vast bulk of costs. State mental health expenditures for the year ending June
30, 1970, exceeded two billion dollars. H. Bethel & R. Redick, supra note 1, Table 3,
at 7.
39. In 1969, at federally funded community mental health centers 312,000 persons
received outpatient services, 76,000 received inpatient services, and 24,000 received
partial hospitalization services. C. Taube, Distribution of Patient Care Episodes in
Mental Health Facilities, 1969, Statistical Note 58, Survey and Reports Section, National
Institute of Mental Health, Table A, at 4 (1972) [hereinafter Statistical Note 58].
40. Nonfederally funded outpatient clinics in general hospitals or elsewhere handled
379,000 cases in 1955 and 1,507,000 cases in 1968, a nearly fourfold increase. C. Taube,
Changes in the Distribution of Patient Care Episodes-1955-68-By Type of Facility,
Statistical Note 28, Survey and Reports Section, National Institute of Mental Health 3
(1970) [hereinafter Statistical Note 23].
41. "Today [general hospitals] admit more patients for the first episode of mental
illness than do all other mental hospitals combined ...." Ewalt 9- Ewalt, supra note
23, at 46. Between 1967 and 1969, the number of beds in psychiatric units of general
hospitals increased by 21%. C. Taube, General Hospital Psychiatric Inpatient Units,
1969-1970, Statistical Note 44, Survey and Reports Section, National Institute of Mental
Health, Table B, at 3 (1971).
42. From 1.7 million "patient-care" episodes (i.e., sum of residents at beginning of
year or on active rolls of clinics plus admissions during the year) in all facilities in
1955 to 3.65 million episodes in 1969. Statistical Note 58, supra note 39, at 2; Statistical
Note 23, supra note 40, at 2.
43. Statistical Note 23, supra note 40, at 2. The rate of inpatient hospitalization at
state and county mental hospitals declined from 505 per 100,000 population to 384
per 100,000. Total patient-care episodes in such hospitals declined slightly from 819,000
in 1955 to 767,000 in 1968. Statistical Note 58, supra note 89, Table A, at 4. Statistical
Note 28, supra, at 3.
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ing medications, such as thorazine.44 Since the mid-1950's, reliance
on these new medicines has become nearly universal in the treatment
of psychotic patients both inside and outside hospitals. These medicines have profoundly altered the atmosphere within the public
mental hospitals. More important for our concerns, they have permitted large numbers of persons who might previously have been
hospitalized to survive in the community.45 As stated in one important study of the community mental health movement, "[t]he drug
revolution has probably had a more profound effect on the mental
hospital as an institution and as part of a community care program
than all the other changes combined." 4 6
The range of community facilities and programs is suggested in
the sketch of the recent developments above, but a brief list of the
alternatives from least to most restrictive of freedom may be instructive. We will take a closer look at the effectiveness of these alternatives in a later subsection.47
The least restrictive alternative of all, of course, is no treatment
whatever. Given evidence of spontaneous remission of illness,48 a
judge might find that he could serve the goals of the state's commitment statute as well or better by forbearing altogether from ordering any treatment for some ill patients or by seeking to make
available to the patient services that fall outside what people generally consider the bounds of mental health care-aid in finding
better housing, working out social security problems, or obtaining
new false teeth. After all, recent studies have found that millions of
people who suffer from what psychiatrists would label as serious
mental illnesses survive in the community without governmental
intervention. 4 9 If some mental-health treatment appears necessary44. See DRUG AND SOCIAL THERAPY IN CHRONIC SCHIZOPHRENIA 44-54 (M. Greenblatt,
M. Solomon, A. Evans & G. Brooks ed. 1965).
45. See Englehardt, Freedman, Glick, Hankoff, Mann, & Margolis, Prevention of
Psychiatric Hospitalization with Use of Psychopharmacological Agents, 173 J. A.M.A.
147 (1960). See also M. GREENBLATr, R. MOORE, R. ALBERT & M. SOLOMON, THm PREVENTION OF HOSPITALIZATION: TREATMENT WITHOUT ADMISSION FOR PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS

(1963).
46. B. PASAMANICK, F. SCARPiTIT & S. DINrrz, SCHIZOPHRENICS IN THE COMMUNITY 17
(1967).
47. See pt. II. C. infra.
48. See, e.g., Eysenck, The Effects of Psychotherapy, 1 INTL. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 97,
126 (Jan. 1965).
49. See L. SROLE, T. LANGNER, S. MICHAEL, M. OPLER & T. RENNIE, MENTAL HEALTH
IN THE METROPOLIS: THE MIDTOWN MANHATrAN STUDY 138 (1962) (random sampling in
a densely populated area of New York City revealed that nearly a quarter of those sampled were or had been markedly impaired in their ability to function by reason of
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and it will be a rare judge who will feel comfortable in releasing altogether a person he believes seriously ill-a range of services may exist
that permit a person to continue to live satisfactorily at home. Psychiatric or psychological counseling of the individual or the family
unit or medication obtained through regular visits to an outpatient
clinic may be sufficient. If the person is living alone, a visiting nurse
or other home services may be adequate. 0
For those who require closer supervision, a variety of facilities
may exist that do not curtail freedom as drastically as commitment
to a state hospital. Day-hospital care, under which a person stays at
a clinic during the day but returns home at night, and its converse,
night-hospital care, are promising and, by now, standard components
of federally funded community mental health centers.5 1 The day
hospital can serve, for example, elderly persons who live with their
families but need help during the day when family members work;
the night hospital can accommodate persons able to work in the
community but unable to hold themselves together when alone at
night.52 The aged and others may be placed in foster homes or halfway homes that provide full-time residence but are located in the
community and generally permit the resident to come and go to
the extent he is physically able.5 3 And even hospitalization itself need
not entail a single degree of restriction. Inpatient care at a clinic or
at a general hospital may permit the patient to remain close to his
family and may inflict less damage to the patient's self-respect than
confinement in a distant state hospital. If commitment to a state hospital is necessary, a short-term order, which many state codes permit,54
mental illness); Pasamanick, Roberts, Lenkau & Krueger, A Survey of Mental Disease
in an Urban Population,47 Am. J. Pun. HREALTH 923 (1957) (study of randomly selected
households in Baltimore found 0.43% of the Baltimore population so seriously ill at
the time of the study as to be considered "psychotic").
50. See J. SHAPIRO, COMMUNITIES OF THE ALONE (1971) (a heartening account of
social workers providing services to residents of a single occupancy building, many of
the occupants suffering from alcoholism).
51. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
52. For a succinct description of the sorts of patients best served by day hospitals
and night hospitals, see Moll, The Day and Night Treatment Center, in THE PsyciiiATRIC UNIT IN A GENERAL. HosPrrAL 136-54 (M. Kaufman ed. 1965).
Although the number of day-care and night-care programs increased 300% between
1963 and 1967, relatively few patients participated. Of all admissions to mental health
facilities in 1967, only 1%were to these programs. C. Taube, Mental Health Day/Night
Treatment Programs-1967, Statistical Note 6, Survey and Reports Section, National
Institute of Mental Health, at 2 (1969).
5a. See the study by R. GLAsscoTE,
THE MENTALLY ILL

J. GUDEmAN

&

J.

ELPERs, HALFWAY HOUSES FOR

(1971). See also a highly critical appraisal of the current state of

nursing homes, C. TOWNSEND, OLD AGE-THELAsT SEGREGATION (1971).
54. S. BRAKEnr & R. RocK, supra note 2, Table 1.1, at 15-16, and at 45-49.
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is less restrictive of freedom (in a different but equally meaningful
sense) than indefinite commitment.
B.

Goals of State Commitment Codes

In the preceding section, I have suggested various "alternatives"
to hospitalization without acknowledging that none of them can
properly be labeled an alternative to hospitalization for purposes of
this article except by serving one or more of the functions state
legislatures have prescribed for their commitment codes. What are
those functions? Speaking broadly, states expect hospitalization to
protect the patient from himself, protect the public from the patient,
and treat the patient for his illness. Unfortunately the states have
articulated these purposes through statutory language5 5 murkier
than the riddles of the witches of Macbeth.
Commitment statutes often authorize or require judges to commit persons who are "dangerous to others," without any legislative
guidance on the sorts of conduct to consider "dangerous" or the
degree of likelihood that must be shown of the conduct occurring.
They also frequently authorize the commitment of those who are
"dangerous to themselves," without statutory hint, beyond the obvious cases of imminent suicide or self-mutilation, of what sorts of
more attenuated dangers to self are to be prevented. All of us human
beings may, after all, be thought somewhat dangerous to ourselves
in the sense that we take risks we would be wiser to avoid. A further
common statutory authorization to commit ill persons who are "in
need of care or treatment" similarly obscures more than it reveals,
for the concept of treatment may incorporate many divergent notions: interrupting the disease process (by, for example, separating
the alcoholic from alcohol), helping a patient acquire skills for living,
helping him to modify unacceptable behavior, helping him develop
an understanding of his problems, or even "curing" the disease.
These three functions of commitment, however crudely conveyed,
are at least frequently stated. A fourth function, which may be viewed
as an extension of the function of protecting the community, is one
that legislatures would be embarrassed to express in statutory language and state courts unwilling to acknowledge: commitment serves
55. For the best compilation and review of commitment codes and their various
formulations, see S. BRAKEL & R. RocK, supra note 2, at 36-37. For excellent discussions
of the difficulties posed by the statutory standards, see Livermore, Malmquist & Meehi,
On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. Rtv. 75 (1968); Note, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures; 79 HARv. L. REv. 1288

(1966).
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to remove from sight those who make us feel uncomfortable. An
ill person may pose no physical threat to our person or property yet
unsettle us when we encounter him. Even if silent and withdrawn,
he may cause us to worry about our own stability and create anxieties
about our own sanity. For members of his family, the impact of his
presence can be even more unsettling." One study of commitments
found, for example, that bizarre behavior, rather than dangerous
behavior or "inadequate role-playing," was most likely to lead to the
rehospitalization of former mental-hospital patients.58
Several implications flow from the multiple, ill-defined purposes
that commitment may be intended to serve. First, to the extent that
there are disputes about the functions of commitment, the principle
of the least restrictive alternative, if accepted by courts, would offer
no aid in their resolution. A committing judge would have to decide first what functions his code requires him to serve and what
limits, if any, the state or federal constitution places on his power to
commit in order to serve those functions. Only then could he turn
to an inquiry into the adequacy of alternatives to serve the functions.
Second, in any given case, he would have to recognize that
several different functions might be served by assuming control over
an ill person. Most commonly, as we have seen, there will be a complex of functions relating to the protection of the ill person and
the public and another complex of functions relating to treatment.
In a particular case, for example, a judge might wish to find a disposition that protects the ill person from his propensity to wander
and become lost and at the same time helps treat his condition so
that it is less likely to recur. The judge will frequently find in practice that the two goals conflict-that any setting (such as hospitalization) that ensures protection will, by its isolation, impede efforts
to treat, and that every setting that maximizes opportunities to treat
poses risks for the protection of the patient or the public. Thus, the
56. There should be serious doubts about the constitutionality of locking someone

up for merely being sick and unsettling. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611
(1971) (Ohio statute prohibiting "annoying" assembly by three or more people on
sidewalk held unconstitutionally vague and violative of rights of free assembly and
association).

57. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
58. See Smith, Pumphrey g-Hall, The "Last Straw": The Decisive Incidents Resulting in the Request for Hospitalization in 100 Schizophrenic Patients, 120 Amr. J.
PsYCHIATRY 228 (1963) (commitment of thirty-eight of one hundred closely studied was
precipitated by socially unacceptable behavior, such as walking nude in a public park
and eating raw chicken). See also H. F!-mAN & 0. SraxoNs, Tm MENTAL PATIENT
Cozaas HOME 197 (1963).
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judge must decide the relative importance of the differing functions
he wishes to serve. He may have to choose not the alternative that
best serves all goals but the one that provides the optimum balance
among competing goals. Only after he has made such judgments
about goals can he make sensible judgments about the comparative
effectiveness of alternatives. 9
C.

The Effectiveness of Alternatives to Hospitalization in Serving
State Goals

Every year more studies report on the effectiveness of community
mental health programs. Other studies add to the already impressive
body of literature on the impact and efficacy of hospitalization.
Though social scientists have been understandably halting in their
efforts to develop acceptable measurements of success in community
mental health60 and though controlled research into the compara59. The dangers of failing to examine the goals of hospitalization are illustrated by
the first decision of an American court requiring an examination of alternatives. In
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (1966), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded to the committing court the case of Ms. Catherine Lake, a woman
of sixty-one who was suffering brain damage associated with senility, for a consideration of alternatives to hospitalization. See further discussion at text accompanying notes
143-48 infra. On remand, the district court surveyed a broad range of alternatives but
did so with its compass fixed to a single point-protecting Ms. Lake from her propensity to wander and to become confused and subject to a variety of perils. Lake v.
Cameron, 267 F. Supp. 155 (D.D.C. 1967). The court correctly concluded that incarcerating Ms. Lake provided the maximum insurance against her wandering. "Constant
supervision is required," the court believed, "for the safety of the patient." 267 F.
Supp. at 158.
The judge seemed to have been expressing genuine concern for Ms. Lake, but
it was the concern that might be expressed for preserving an object-the corpus of a
trust or the remains of the last passenger pigeon. Little concern was expressed for how
the object liked the way she was being preserved. Moreover, supervision and protection
were not the only goals of the District's legislation; treatment was an equal, if not
more important, goal. D.C. CODE § 21-562 (1967) provides that any person committed to a hospital "shall . . . be entitled to mental and phychiatric care and
treatment." No form of therapy or elixir of youth could, of course, have repaired Ms.
Lake's brain damage, but no inquiry was made about whether it would have been
possible for Ms. Lake to learn to guard against her tendencies to wander and, if such
learning were possible, in what setting it could best have occurred. Nor did the judge
inquire whether the District's statute itself gave independent value to preserving freedom or how substantial a risk of self-destruction must be proved before the court
should lock someone up, possibly for life, against her will. If it had looked at these
other concerns, the court might have given fuller attention to other possible dispositions-including the suggestion of Judge Bazelon that Ms. Lake merely be required to
carry an identification card (364 F.2d at 661)-to decide whether, on balance, some
sacrifice in the degree of immediate protection was desirable to give more adequate
service to other legislative values.
60. In May 1966, the National Institute of Mental Health sponsored a three-day
conference for seventy-five persons from seventeen countries largely devoted to discussing methods for evaluating community mental health programs. The conference
led to the publication of a helpful collection of essays: COUNIUNIrY MENTAL HEALTH:
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (R. Williams & L. Ozarin ed. 1968). A second volume
of essays on the same theme was published in the same year: CoMsP'RHEsivE MENTAL
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tive efficacy of hospitalization and community alternatives is slight,"1
enough studies now exist to provide some guidance to judges and
others concerned with making decisions about appropriate placements for mentally ill persons. The studies by no means reach precisely the same conclusions. They do, however, suggest as a body
that the acceptance by courts of an obligation to search for less
restrictive alternatives to hospitalization would not be a hollow
gesture. Indeed, the evidence is sufficiently strong that committing
judges might wisely consider as a rule of thumb ordering some form
of treatment other than hospitalization first and imposing hospitalization only if community treatment fails.6 2
Let us look a little at what is known. As is stated above, in disposing of any given case a judge is likely to wish to serve one cluster
of goals revolving around the protection of the individual and society
and a second cluster revolving around the treatment of the patient
so that protection will not be needed in the future. It is the tension
between these goals-the difficulty of providing treatment and protection simultaneously-that will often make a judge's task of deciding among alternatives so perplexing.
Viewed solely in terms of the goal of protection, hospitalization
offers many obvious benefits. When an ill person poses a physical
danger to himself or others, hospitalization erects more effective
protections than any other form of disposition. It provides immediate respite to family members worn out by his disturbing behavior.03
Removed to a place distant from his family and from population
centers," the ill person can find total shelter from relationships he
HEALTH: THE CHALLENGE OF EVALUATION (L. Roberts, N. Greenfield & M. Miller ed.
1968). See also Flanagan, Evaluation and Validation of Research Data in Primary
Prevention, 41 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 117 (1971).
61. See, e.g., the complaint of Freyhan, Clinical Aspects of the Revolution in
Mental Health Services, Coleam Enslv PsYcHIATRY, Vol. 11, No. 1, Jan. 1970, at 1, 2.
Some of the few controlled studies are discussed at text accompanying notes 105-10
infra.
62. See B. PIAsAmIc, F. Sc prrTn & S. DINrrz, supra note 46, at 107, who found
that their study, discussed at text accompanying note 105 infra, gave support to the
"contention of the proponents of community mental health care that the function of
the mental hospital should be to treat only those patients for whom community care,
even when continuous and intensive, fails, and greater supervision is required."
63. Some professionals have stressed the benefits to the family as a real value of
hospitalization. See, e.g., CoAnrE OF THE A7EmCAN NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE INVESTIGATION OiF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION: A REORIENTA-

TION OF TIIE PROBLEM 57-58 (1936): "Itis safe to say that when a patient is placed in
an institution, the social order is enhanced and that the family can go about their
life business with more effectiveness and greater comfort."
64. "Another common characteristic [of twenty-two representative public hospitals
examined in an American Bar Foundation study] is that in most states the hospitals
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had found impossible to manage. He can live on a locked ward with
staff alerted to the control problems he may pose and empowered to
administer whatever tranquilizing medication seems desirable.
The very reliability of these benefits of hospitalization may imperil the success of efforts to encourage judges to order less restrictive
dispositions. A judge impressed by the advantages hospitalization
offers for protection and isolation may overlook or devalue the more
intangible prospects for serving the second range of goals relating
to treatment, for which other dispositions may offer substantial advantages. Just as the more easily grasped financial savings from various highway routes may overshadow the more elusive considerations
regarding their probable impact on the environment, just as male
judges may find that Miss Montana's bust overwhelms the runnerup's more considerable musical talents, so the protection offered by
locked wards may seem more certain and easily measured-and thus
more compelling-than the care and treatment provided through a
community mental health center."5 The danger that the interests
of treatment will be overlooked in favor of those of protection redoubles in the face of pressures a judge may feel to err on the side
of caution. Little acclaim will come to him for ten aggressive patients
successfully treated in the community and little condemnation for
ten harmless patients needlessly confined, but condemnation (and
guilt) may hound him for one ill person released to the community
who commits a serious assault.
For these reasons, before some judges will be likely to try less
restrictive alternatives to hospitalization they may demand convincing assurances along three lines directly relating to the state's goals
in imposing compulsory care: first, that, in many cases, the mentally
ill person will need no protection from himself and society will need
no protection from him; second, that, even to the extent that a judge
finds that protection must be assured, forms of supervision short of
round-the-clock hospitalization may be adequate; and, finally, that,
for purposes of treatment, hospitalization is hobbled by many inare located away from the population centers where most of their patients resided."
R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, supra note 2, at 69.
65. A colleague, Yale Kamisar, has suggested that another tragic example of the
triumph of the concrete over the intangible is provided by the decision-making processes leading up to the Bay of Pigs, as described by Arthur Schlesinger:
rhe advocates of the adventure had a rhetorical advantage. They could strike
virile poses and talk of tangible things-fire power, air strikes, landing craft and
so on. To oppose the plan, one had to invoke intangibles-the moral position of
the United States, the reputation of the President, the response of the United
Nations, 'world public opinion' and other such odious concepts.
A THOUSAND DAYS 255-56 (Houghton Miffiin Co. ed. 1965).
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herent shortcomings while community-based programs may offer
much hope.
As to the first of these assurances, judges (and the community
at large) need to understand that only a small portion of the mentally ill are overtly and imminently suicidal and that even fewer
pose dangers to the persons or property of others."' Indeed, as a
group, persons labeled mentally ill may be less likely to engage in
aggressive conduct than the rest of the community who are considered sane.6 7 Of course, a judge who conducts a hearing for a sullen
patient and learns from a seemingly well-informed psychiatrist that
the man is dangerous may believe himself ill-placed to decide that
this man is not one of the dangerous few. He should nonetheless
consider just how sullen he himself would feel under comparable
circumstances and insist on a rigorous demonstration by the doctor
of the bases for his prediction.
Even when the judge finds protection mandatory, he may find
that community resources can provide the protection. He should be
especially receptive to community programs when the danger posed
is not assault or suicide but the more typical case of an ill person's
inability to care for himself adequately. The ill person who needs
protection because he cannot prepare food for himself or cannot be
relied upon to dress sufficiently warmly may well be able to receive
such protection through dispositions short of confinement. Social
workers placed in single occupancy buildings,68 visiting nurses, systems of telephone contact, day or night hospitalization programs, or
foster-home care may all serve to provide protection and to detect
when a person has become so incapacitated that full-time inpatient
care may be necessary.
Even if judges can be brought to recognize, at an intellectual
level, that fewer ill people need custodial protection than is com66. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 321 (1970) (statement of Dr. Sherman
Kieffer, Director, National Center for Mental Health Services, Training, and Research,
St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D.C.): "A number of studies conducted or sup.
ported by the [National Institute of Mental Health] have demonstrated that an extremely small percentage of civilly committed patients meet the statutory standard of

danger to themselves or others to an extent that in our judgment necessitates inpatient
care."
67. See H. Brill 8: B. Malzberg, Statistical Report on the Arrest Record of Male
Ex-Patients, Age 16 or Over, Released from New York State Hospitals During the
Period 1946-48 (N.Y. Dept. of Mental Hygiene (undated)), referred to in Conley, Con.
well & Arrill, An Approach to Measuring the Costs of Mental Illness, 124 Am.J. PsycdUATRY 755, 759 (1967): "If only the more serious forms of mental disorder are accepted, then there is some evidence that the disease may inhibit criminal tendencies."
68. See J.SHAPIRO, supra note 50.
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monly believed and that outpatient care can often provide the necessary protection, the key to fundamental change in judicial attitudes
toward hospitalization may lie in infusing in judges an understanding of the dangers of hospitalization and the hopes for outpatient
treatment. When examining the capacity of their state hospitals for
offering treatment, judges may, of course, find some encouraging
aspects. Many hospitals have reorganized to provide intensive care
to the newly admitted and have reduced their total patient population and the average length of patient stays. 69 "Therapeutic communities" in which the patients play a role in decision-making have
in some hospitals provided patients new senses of self-reliance and
self-respect. 70 Much effort has been made to brighten the atmosphere
of hospital wards-through handicrafts, holiday parties, fresh paint,
and more attractive clothing. Wards once locked have now been
opened.
In many respects, however, much of this new programming seems
a beguiling coat of varnish over the intractable obstacles to successful treatment of persons in large public mental hospitals. Though
hospitals may appear worse than they are because they become the
repository for many whom other health programs reject as too difficult to treat,71 most hospitals are in fact ill-suited today to provide
adequate care. They remain distant from the communities they serve,
which standing alone seems to exert an influence on a patient's
chances for recovery.72 With few exceptions, they suffer from woeful
69. In 1971, for the sixteenth consecutive year, population in state and county
mental hospitals declined. Since 1964 the rate has been accelerating. Total population

on June 50, 1971, was 308,024. See H. Bethel and R. Redick, supra note 1, at 1. According to the Bethel and Redick study, the reasons for the decline include
increased availability and utilization of alternate care facilities for the aged; in-

creased availability and utilization of outpatient and aftercare facilities; gradual
reduction in the length of stay of admissions; introduction of community mental

health centers; affiliation of community mental health centers with State mental
hospitals; introduction of more effective screening procedures to prevent inappropriate admissions, administrative changes such as the introduction of the geographic unit system; and deliberate administrative efforts to reduce the resident
population.
Id. at 2.

70. See Wedge, supra note 20.
71. Glass, Philosophies, Not Laws, Determine Admissions Practice, 18 HosPrrAL &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 234, 285 (1967) (Dr. Glass was the director of Oklahoma's

Department of Mental Hygiene).
72. One study of two state hospitals in Wisconsin found a direct relation between
the distance of a patient from his home and the length of his stay in a mental hospital,
due in substantial part to the hospital's desire for certainty increasing with the

geographic distance from the patient's home. Weiss, Macauley & Pincus, Geographic
Factors and the Release of Patients from State Mental Hospitals, 123 Am. J.

PSYCHIATRY

408 (1966).

HeinOnline -- 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1125 1971-1972

1126

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1107

understaffing, overcrowding, and physical decay. 78 All classes of
professionals are in short supply.7 4 In virtually all hospitals, psychiatrists control admission, treatment, and release of patients, 76 but
few doctors graduating from American medical schools today are
willing to work in such hospitals. 76 As a result, a high proportion
of psychiatrists in the state hospitals are foreigners who are trained
-and apparently trained inadequately-in foreign medical schools
and who possess only a halting command of the language of their
patients and an even dimmer understanding of the communities to
which their patients will return. 77 Individual psychotherapy is nearly
nonexistent, group therapy limited. 78 Heavy reliance rests on medication (which, of course, can generally be administered out of the
hospital) and on creating a rehabilitative "milieu," a supportive and
curative environment.7 9 A warm atmosphere is, of course, highly
desirable simply to render the lives of patients more nearly bearable.
Such an atmosphere may indeed be an indispensable predicate to
successful inpatient therapy. Unfortunately, however, almost no data
73. See note 18 supra. See also Presidential Address of H. Solomon to the American
Psychiatric Association in 1958, quoted in Freedman, supra note 22, at 492: "'The
large mental hospital is antiquated, outmoded, and rapidly becoming obsolete. We can
still build them but we cannot staff them. Therefore we cannot make true hospitals
of them.'"
74. No standards for staffing levels have been widely accepted. The American Psychiatric Association last published its position on patient-staff ratios in 1958. AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC AssN., STANDARDS FOR HOSPITALS AND CLINICS (1958). More recent editions
of their positions on standards have eschewed specific minimum ratios. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSN., STANDARDS FOR PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES vii (1969). On the

other hand, by their own later publications, it is clear that most state hospitals still
do not meet their earlier standards. Compare, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSN., ELEVEN
INDicEs, Table 3, at 15 (1971), with AMEmuCAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSN., STANDARDS FOR HogPrrALs ANm CrNICS, Appendix B, at 44 (rev. ed. 1958).
75. That psychiatrists intend to keep it that way can be inferred from AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSN., STANDARDS FOR PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES 7 (1969): "It must be realized

that physicians have the ultimate responsibility for patient care and that they are
trained to assume that responsibility."
76. See H. Rome, Barriers to the Establishment of Comprehensive Community
Mental Health Centers, in CoimmuNiTy PSYCHIATRY, supra note 21, at 31, 37. Dr. Rome
saw the low salaries and heavy case loads that account in part for the unattractiveness
to young doctors of working in the large public hospitals also likely to discourage
the best young doctors from working for public outpatient clinics.
77. See Lavin, The ForeignDoctor Influx, MEDICAL ECONOMICS, Feb. 17, 1969, at 263.
78. In the American Bar Foundation study, the authors commented that "[i]n no
hospital visited did the number of patients undergoing active treatment exceed 10 to
15 per cent of the total patient population." R. RocK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANoPAuL,
supra note 2, at 70.
79. See M. GREENBLATr, R. YORK & E. BRowN, FROM CUSTODIAL TO THERAPEUTIC
PATIENT CARE IN MENTAL HOSPITALS (1955); Murphy &-Hunt, Milieu Therapy: Theoretical and Practical Considerations in Its Application, in THE PSYCHIATRUC HOSPITAL
AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 176-84 (A. Wessen ed. 1964); Cameron, Nonmedical Judgment of
Medical Matters,57 GEo. L.J. 716, 731-33 (1969).
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exist to support the claims for any lasting therapeutic impact of
milieu therapy standing alone,80 and in many cases the term seems
no more than a dangerous euphemism to justify inactivity. The
hospital locks bedroom doors during the day to bring patients out
into healthy contact with each other; instead of sleeping in their own
beds, the patients sleep on benches or under pool tables in the day
room.
Even if states devoted greater resources to improving hospital
care, there are certain dangers to the isolation of hospitals that improved staffing probably cannot cure. Nearly all long-term hospital
patients exhibit flatness of response, withdrawal, muteness, and loss
of motivation.81 Once believed to be part of the degenerative process
of mental illness, these phenomena are now universally acceptedeven by public hospital administrators8 2-as responses to hospitalization itself superimposed on the difficulties of illness.8 3 These observable attributes of the long-term patient reflect his sadly altered view
of himself, for he often loses even more fully than he had before
hospitalization his sense of self and self-esteem, his feeling of control
over his own life, and his capacity to love. (Picture yourself, if you
can, already upset, suddenly placed in baggy, hospital-issue clothing
in a noisy dormitory with dozens of strangers and with a staff, neatly
dressed, before whom you must line up to be given your cup of
medicine. Then picture yourself in the same setting for five years.)
Institutions also have a dehumanizing impact on staff, which
aggravates the position of the patient, for the temptation becomes
almost irresistible for staff to subvert individual-treatment goals to
80. R. Stuart, Critical Reappraisal and Reformulation of Selected "Mental Health"
Programs 12-13 (paper delivered at First BanfE International Conference on Behavior
Modification, Banff, Canada, April 3-5, 1969 (mimeo)). Cf. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d
4512 459 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (suggesting doubts about the extent to which "milieu therapy"
alone may fulfill a patient's right to treatment).
81. Visit any hospital yourself or see, e.g., Mendel, On the Abolition of the Psychiatric Hospital, in CoMPREHENS-vE MENTAL HEALTH: THE CHALLENGE OF EVALUATION,
supranote 60, at 237, 239.40.
82. See, e.g., D. VAIL, DEHUMANIZATION AND THE INSTTrrUTIONAL CAREER (1966) (Dr.
Vail was the Medical Director of the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare);
Glass, supra note 71, at 235 (Dr. Glass was Director of the Oklahoma Department of
Mental Hygiene).
83. The literature on the harmful impacts of long-term hospitalization is now vast.
Books dealing in whole or substantial part with the subject include R. BARTON, INSTITUTONAL NEUROSIS (2d ed. 1966); R. CANcRo, THE SCHIZOPHRENIC REACTIONS: A
CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT, HOSPITAL TREATMENT, AND CURRENT RESEARCH (1970); E.
GoFFmAN, AsYLUMS (Aldine ed. 1962); MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 1957, AN APPROACH TO THE PREVENTION OF DISABiLITY FfOM
CHRONIC PsYCHOSES (1958); D. VAIL, supra note 82; J. WING & G. BROWN, INSTITUTIONALSm AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (1970).
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meet the demands of institutional management.8 4 Patients will often
be forced to line up before an office door once an hour to receive
a cigarette, or fed when they are not hungry, or denied the opportunity to decorate their own rooms.8 5
Such staff and patient responses to hospitalization greatly hamper
efforts to equip persons in that setting to cope more effectively with
the world they left. In the view of one state medical director of
public welfare, treatment in the large public hospital is like "rescuing a drowning man, teaching him to ride a bicycle, and then putting
him back in the water."8 16 Adapting to a choiceless environment may
indeed prove crippling in the world of choice. A public hospital
director testified recently about a patient who, after a long period of
hospitalization, made a visit outside the hospital and literally could
87
no longer bring himself to choose what he would have for lunch.
The longer the patient stays in the hospital the more pronounced
the likely impact of isolation on him 88 and the less likely his family
is to welcome his return.8 9 One possible-though not certain-indication of the dependency created by extended hospitalization is the
extremely high rehospitalization rate for persons released. In 1969,
the most recent year for which figures are available, nearly half of
those admitted to state and county mental hospitals in the United
States had previously been patients in the same sort of hospitals, the
majority of them within the previous twelve months. 0 All the haz84. See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 83, at 74-83.
85. D. VAIL, supra note 82, at 118. Dr. Vail, then Medical Director of the Minnesota
Department of Public Welfare, collected these and many other examples of dehumanizing and dehumanized staff behavior within his hospitals.
More recently, Stephen Cain, a reporter for the Detroit News, posed as a patient

for a few days at a large state mental hospital in Michigan. He acknowledged the
difficulties of administering hospitals but reported several incidents of insensitivity of
hospital staff. Among them was being awakened on the first night of his stay by a staff
member who asked him the color of his eyes, a fact apparently needed for the files.
Inside the Mental Ward, Detroit News, June 28, 1971, IA, col. 2, at 15A, col. 2.
86. D. VAIL, supra note 82, at 67.
87. Deposition of Dr. Walter Fox, Superintendent and Area Director of Mental
Health at the Mental Health Institute, Mount Pleasant, Iowa, filed in Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), quoted in Pretrial Memorandum of Amid
Curiae, American Psychological Association, American Orthopsychiatric Association,
and American Civil Liberties Union, at 18-19 n.8 [hereinafter Pretrial Memorandum].
88. Mendel, On the Abolition of the PsychiatricHospital,in COMPREHENSIVE MENTAL
HEALTH: THE CHALLENGE OF EvALUATiON, supra note 60, at 237, 242.
89. See Pokorny & Bentinck, A Study of Relatives' Views of State Mental Hospital
'Patients,50 SoctAL CAsEWORK 519, 525 (1969) (a questionnaire administered to the families of 1537 patients in Texa mental hospitals found, among other things, that families
were more favorably disposed toward the release of a recently admitted patient than
a long-term patient).
90. See C. Taube, Admissions to State and County Mental Hospitals by Previous
Care in These Hospitals, United States 1969, Statistical Note 33, Survey and Reports
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ards of hospitalization thus far mentioned apply to both the voluntarily and involuntarily committed. For those involuntarily confined,
the process of commitment itself further hampers any efforts to treat,
for many doctors believe that compulsory confinement greatly impedes any effort to establish a therapeutic relationship. 91
Warning doctors about these many dangers of hospitalization,
Dr. Stanley Yolles, for many years the Director of the National
Institute of Mental Health, once stated, "Let the doctor beware,
who does not now realize the amount of mental illness he helped
'92
either to cause or to intensify by institutionalizing mental patients.
If brought to appreciate these facts, judges might become more
wary of placing mentally ill persons in hospitals. Even if a judge
decides in a given case that he is interested solely in protection, he
should recognize that the benefits of the temporary protection provided by hospitalization may well be outweighed by the danger that
the stay will only serve to make the patient less able to cope with
the outside world and render him more dangerous to himself or
others if the hospital releases him. 93 Such fears have been repeatedly
and justifiably raised with respect to prisons94 and juvenile facilities 9 5
Section, National Institute of Mental Health (1970). For additional earlier data, see
Zolik, Lantz & Sommers, Hospital Return Rates and Prerelease Referrals, 18 ARcH.
GEN.PSYCHIATRY 712 (1968).

91. See, e.g., R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, supra note 2, at 61. In a recent
deposition, Dr. Israel Zwerdling, Executive Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry,
Albert Einstein College of Medicine, and Director of Bronx State Hospital, Bronx,
New York, described some of the difficulties of treating the involuntarily committed
patient:
The great bulk of the treatment effort becomes an effort, really, to clarify for the
patient that his behavior is a manifestation of illness and that he needs treatment.
He questions and resists every suggestion. . . . He feels himself put upon and
resent[s] being in the hospital and the great bulk of the transactions between
staff and patient are around the issue of does he really need treatment, rather
than around the issues of the illness itself and its treatment.
Quoted in Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 87, at 16.
92. Yolles, Mental Health's Homoeostatic State: A New Territory, 7 INTL. J. PsyCHIATRY 327, 328 (1969).
93. See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 625-26 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, J.)
94. See Levin, Crime and punishment and social science, THE PUBLIC INrmmsr,
Spring 1972, at 96, 97 (summarizing fifteen studies of recidivism) (emphasis omitted):
Offenders who receive probation have significantly lower rates of recidivism than
those who have been incarcerated, and incarcerated offenders receiving shorter
sentences generally have a somewhat lower recidivism rate than those receiving
longer sentences. With a few exceptions, these differences persist when one controls for type of offense, type of community, and offender's age, race, or numbers
of previous convictions.
95. See Levin, Policy Evaluation and Recidivism, 6 L. & Soc. Rxv. 17 (1971) (discussing California random placement experiment finding much lower recidivism rate
for group assigned to probation with intensive counselling than for group assigned to
institution); Empey & Rabow, The Provo Experiment in Delinquency Rehabilitation,
in L. RADziNowicz - M. WOLFGANG, CRIME AND JusTIcE 266, 280-82 (1971) (comparable
experiment in Utah).
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and many of the same considerations-the stigma, the isolation, the
dependency, the development of unconstructive habits of livingapply as fully to mental hospitals.
Little of the writing on the impacts of hospitalization has dealt
with short-term stays96-an unfortunate gap in research, since, to
an increasing extent, judges are committing ill persons for shorter
stays and hospitals are retaining patients for shorter periods. 97 Even
short compelled hospitalization probably does pose dangers. Without
adequate aftercare programs, readmission to the hospital even after
a short stay is highly likely.9 8 Moreover, the process of adjusting to
a hospital by withdrawal or by other defenses undermining the individual's capacity to perform in the outside world occurs rapidly in
many patients,9 9 and thus for them any hospitalization, however brief
it is planned, may stretch into long-term residence. To the extent a
patient needs a rest and a place to calm down, there is substantial
doubt whether the rest (on a forced basis) needs to be nearly as long
as the typical two or three months of initial commitment or whether
it is best provided in the vast, threatening, and often distantly removed state hospital, rather than in a general hospital or community
clinic nearer home. 100
Community-based care not merely avoids the nearly inevitable
deleterious effects of hospitalization but also may offer positive values
of its own. For the schizophrenic and the senile, who constitute a
substantial majority-over sixty per cent-of patients in mental
hospitals, 10 1 and for the suicidal and the assaultive, who probably
96. For a few exceptions, see authorities cited in note 100 infra.
97. See, e.g., Raskin & Dyson, Treatment Problems Leading to Readmission of
Schizophrenic Patients, 19 Axcxs. GEN. PsycATRY 356 (1968).
98. Id. See also Miller, Retrospective Analysis of Posthospital Mental Patients'
World, 8 J. HEALTH & SocL. BEHAVIOR 136 (1967); Friedman, Von Mering & Hink,
Intermittent Patienthood, 14 AacH. GEN. PSCmATRY 886-29 (1966); Wing, Morbidity
in the Community of Schizophrenic Patients Discharged from London Mental Hospitals in 1959, 110 BRrr. J. PsYCHIATRY 10-12 (1964).
99. See E. GoFImAN, supra note 83, at 14-71 (describing the immediate undermining
of an individual's self-image that institutionalization often entails).
100. Mendel, On the Abolition of the Psychiatric Hospital, in COMPREHENSIVE
MENTAL HEALTH: THE CHALLENGE OF EVALUATION, supra note 60, at 242-48 (average

stay on a "S0-day" ward went down to 10.2 days and then lower as staff attitude adjusted to viewing hospitalization "as a crisis intervention rather than as a definite treatment." The shorter the patient's stay the more likely he was to succeed on the outside.)
See also Weisman, Feirstein & Thomas, Three-Day Hospitalization: A Model for
Intensive Intervention, 21 ARCH. GEN. PsYcHATRY 620 (1969).

101. In 1967, 49.2% of the resident patients in public hospitals were diagnosed as
suffering from one of the schizophrenic reactions and an additional 12.4% were
diagnosed as suffering from "diseases of the senium." G. Koons, Projected Age.

Diagnostic Composition of the Resident Patient Population in State and County
Mental Hospitals-1973, Statistical Note 8, Survey and Reports Section, National
Institute of Mental Health, Figure 1, at 5 (1969).
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stir the greatest public concern, sufficient research exists to serve as
generally encouraging guides to the effectiveness of community-based
therapy.
Persons diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia °2 fill half the
beds in the nation's public mental hospitals. 10 3 Persons so diagnosed
often face lives of acceleratingly frequent episodes of hospitalization
ending in permanent residence. 04 Of several studies of efforts to
break this cycle, the most thorough and balanced is probably the
study by Benjamin Pasamanick and others conducted in Louisville
in 1961 and 1962.105 It is a study of sufficient significance to justify
slightly extended discussion. In Pasamanick's study, all patients
brought to a state hospital in Louisville, diagnosed as schizophrenic,
and found by the staff to be in need of hospitalization were referred
instead to a clinic operated by Dr. Pasamanick. Screening out only
the small number whom the clinic staff feared suicidal or assaultive
or whose families refused to provide supervision at home, the clinic
staff randomly divided the referred patients into three groups. One
group returned to their homes on medication, a second returned
home on placebos, and a third returned to the state hospital where
all of them had been initially approved for admission. On a periodic
basis, a nurse visited those sent home.'0 6 The clinic handled 152
patients over an eighteen-month period.
Despite the fact that the average patient in the study had undergone two prior periods of hospitalization, the results of the study
were quite encouraging. Over seventy-seven per cent of those returned home on drugs succeeded in remaining out of the hospital
throughout the period of the study. Thirty-four per cent of those on
placebos also succeeded. Nearly all who failed did so right away. The
results are even more encouraging in light of the experience of
the randomly hospitalized patients. The hospital to which these
patients were sent was considered moderately progressive. Treated
like other patients in the hospital, all returned to their homes dur102. No universally accepted chemical criteria exist for the diagnosis of "schizophrenia"; so far as I have ever been able to perceive, the label of "schizophrenia" is
applied to persons whose views of themselves or external facts differ from the view
of others and who often behave in a manner frightening to others but consistent with
their "distorted" view of reality. See generally R. LAiNG, THE Divr[nz SErL (1965).
103. See note 101 supra.
104. Average total stay for hospitalized schizophrenic patients in the United States
in the mid-1960's was eleven years. B. PAsAMANicm, F. ScARzrrr & S. Diurrz, supra
note 46, at vii.
105. See id., a long book devoted to describing the study.
106. Neither the nurse nor any other staff member was aware which patients were
receiving medication, though all were aware that some patients who thought they
were were not.
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ing the course of the study after an average stay of eighty-three days.
The hospital group, despite the care received in the hospital, had a
failure rate after release that was higher by a statistically significant
margin than that of either of the two groups left in the community.
In short, hospitalization seems to have worsened rather than improved these patients' chances of remaining in the community.
Though some ethical doubts can be raised about the experimenters'
methods, 10 7 the Pasamanick study demonstrates the potential for
community treatment for the schizophrenic, since it found that by
all measures of success, including subjective judgment about domestic functioning and social participation, 0 s persons in home care performed as well or better than the hospital control group. 10 9
What is most encouraging is that the results of the Pasamanick
study are supported by more recent studies"°0 -even by studies of
107. The staff lied to participants and their families in two significant ways that
were probably indispensable to the success of their experiment: First, they lied at

the time of initial placement in saying that the staff of the clinic had decided that a
certain form of placement had been selected as appropriate for the patient, implying
something more than the random placement decision that in fact occurred; second,
they permitted one of the groups to believe it was receiving medication when it was
receiving a placebo and continued the charade even after it became clear that persons
on medication were succeeding better in the community.
108. As with the penal system, where recidivism (in terms of either new arrests
or convictions) has been used as the principal measure of success, so in the field of
mental health, especially when dealing with schizophrenics, the principal measure has
been the rate of rehospitalization. Of course, rehospitalization does not indicate with
any certainty the quality ,of life for a person between hospitalizations; even less does
the avoidance of rehospitalization indicate that the once-ill person is functioning to his
own satisfaction or the satisfaction of others. Assuming continuation of the trend
away from hospitalization (and imprisonment), more and more need exists for developing more subtle measures of success. See R. GLAsscoT-, J. GUDEMAN, & R.
ELPERS, HALFWAY HoUsEs FOR THE MENTALLY ILL 27-28 (1971); D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PaISON AND PAROLE SYSTvr 5 (1964).
109. I have only one major doubt about the accuracy of the study's findings. The
authors point to the higher failure rate of those who were randomly assigned to
the hospital and later released. This group apparently did not receive the same
medication and nurses' visits after release that one group of the clinic's patients did.
See B. PASAmSAicK, F. SCAi'rm & S. DINrrz, supra note 46, at 107-08, 254. The apparent
absence of aftercare for most of these patients may fairly reflect mental hospital pro.
grams in most states but does not provide an accurate indication whether this group
might conceivably have performed even better than Pasamanick's medicated group if
provided the same care after release from the hospital.
110. See the following studies:
(1) J. HOENIG & M. HAMILTON, THE DESEGREGATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1969)
(British study finding high success rate in treating mentally ill persons in the community; when inpatient care necessary, short stays at inpatient units of general hospital
fully served).
(2) Claghorn & Kinross-Wright, Reduction in Hospitalization of Schizophrenics, 128
Ar. J. PsYcHiARTY 344 (1971) (high success rate when hospital-released patients followed
closely by after-care center but not when not followed at all);
(3) Driemen & Minard, Prerelease Planning, 24 ARcH. GEN. PsycsrATRY 87 (1970)
(high success rate when follow-up care provided for patients released from hospital);
(4) Wilder, Levin & Zwerling, A Two-Year Follow-Up Evaluation of Acute Psychotic
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persons released from hospitals after fifteen and twenty years of
residence."" Summarizing recent research, one scholar has said: "'With
drug treatment most psychiatrists feel that the great majority of patients can be managed on an outpatient basis or with only a very
brief hospitalization." 112 To be sure, community-based treatment of
the schizophrenic is not wholly free of danger. Distressing evidence
does exist in some cases that the treatment of an ill person in the
community succeeds for that person but contributes to mental health
problems of other family members."13 Recognition of this danger has
led to greater efforts to work with families as a unit to prevent someone else in the family having to take over the family illness., 4 Moreover, especially for the schizophrenic, it is important not to expect
too much. Given the current resources devoted to mental health
programs, the limited attainments of even lavishly funded programs,
and the late stage in their lives (and illnesses) when many persons
come to a court's attention, the court must not assume that it has
failed when patients placed in the community return intermittently
Patients Treated in a Day Hospital, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1095 (1966) (patients randomly assigned to inpatient hospitalization or to day-patient care; nonhospitalized group

performed better after two years); and
(5) Zolik, Lantz & Sommers, Hospital Return Rates and Prerelease Referrals, 18
ARCH. GEN. PsYcmATRY 712, 713 (1968) (study in large city found 56% return rate

within one year for persons released from hospitals who were not referred to community
mental health service, 33% rate for those who were so referred, and 18% rate for
those placed in foster home or foster care).
111. Herjanic, Stewart S. Hales, The Chronic Patient in the Community: A TwoYear Follow Up of 338 Chronic Patients, 13 CANADIAN PsYcmnAuC ASSN. J. 231 (1968).
On the other hand, one study found that some long-term patients who succeed in the
community do so at the cost of placing an enormous burden on community resources
because of their need for so much help. Kraft, Binner 8, Dickey, The Community
Mental Health Program and the Longer-Stay Patient, 16 ARcsr. Gm. PSYCHIATRY 64
(1967).
112. Letter to the author from John M. Davis, Feb. 14, 1972, on file with the
Michigan Law Review. Dr. Davis is the co-author of a review of the literature on the
effectiveness of drugs in treating persons suffering from mental illness. D. KLEIN &
J. DAvis, DIAGNOSIS AND DRUG TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY (1969).
113. See Grad, A Two-Year Followup, in ComrieuNrry MENTAL HEALTH: AN INTERNATIONAL PERsP'xrvE 429-54 (R. Williams & L. Ozarin ed. 1968). The Grad study involved a comparison over a two-year period of the mental health programs in two
neighboring English cities, one relying much more than the other on hospital-based
treatment. The patients in the city relying on outpatient care were able to survive
fairly well in the community and, to that extent, the conductors of the study were
encouraged. On the other hand, the heavy reliance on outpatient care was found to
have had a deleterious impact on the mental health of other family members. Id. at
433 (Table 4) and at 451-52. See also M. Hamilton, The Hospital and the Household,
id. at 416. (A second British study finding that community placement placed a variety
of burdens on families of the mentally ill; burdens were heavier in cases in which the
patient had been hospitalized for substantial periods (id. at 419, 422, 426-27).)
114. On the family rather than the individual as the appropriate unit for understanding the process of schizophrenia, see generally R. LAMNG & A. EsrmuON, SANITY,
MADNESS AND THE FAMILY

(1964).
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to its attention or, though remaining in the community, do not be.
come wage-earning contributors to the public purse.
Aged persons also may suffer from a complex range of problems
labeled as mental disorders. 1115 Large numbers of them l0 have been
forced to spend their last years, idle and unhappy,"1 7 on the wards of
public mental hospitals. Today, few defenders of compulsory mental
hospitalization for the aged remain. In most states, persons committed to a public mental hospital for the first time late in life are
there largely by default, not by medical preference." 8 Often state
legislatures have responded to their needs only with provision for
warehousing. If nursing homes and foster homes were built and adequately staffed, they would probably be filled without any need for
prompting from a principle of less restrictive alternatives. Indeed,
as alternatives have developed the rate of mental hospitalization of
the aged has steadily declined. 119
Even without adequate nursing facilities, courts may find good
reason to resist ordering indeterminate commitment for the aged.
When, as in the case of the aged, treatment to reverse the disease
process is impossible and the patient poses no risk to the lives of
others, the only sensible (if not uniformly commendable) purposes
to attribute to the legislature in permitting compulsory care are that
it wishes to spare the individual from suffering, his family from the
burden of caring for him, and the community from the pain of
watching him die before its eyes. Judges too often believe that
forced hospitalization well serves all three goals. But at least its
service of the first-sparing the individual from suffering, the only
goal most judges (and relatives) would comfortably acknowledge-is
highly dubious: courts that claim to be concerned with the aged
115. GRoup FOR TnE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, THE COArnr
ON AGING, PSYTHE AOm: AN INTRODUCroRY APPROACH, RiT. No. 59, at 545-59 (1965)
(listing and discussing the range of psychiatric diagnoses).
116. As recently as 1967, slightly more than 80% of patients in public mental hospitals were 65 and over. Only about 40% of the 65-and-over group, however, carried
principal diagnoses of "diseases of the senium." G. Koons, Projected Age-Diagnostic
Composition of the Resident Patient Population in State and County Mental Hospitals-1973, Statistical Note 8, Survey and Reports Section, National Institute of
Mental Health, Table 1, at 3,Fignre 2, at 6 (1969).
117. I recently encountered an eloquent understatement:
I asked a 69-year old geriatric patient, who had 5V years earlier been admitted
to the Ypsilanti State Hospital, how she felt about being a patient in a state
mental institution. She responded soberly and unhesitatingly, "well, it's not what
I had planned for my retirement."
Paper by J. Doersch, graduate student in Social Work, quoted on cover of Annual
Report, Project Transition (March 1971). See also note 120 infTa.
118. R. RocK, M. JAcOBSON & R. JANOpAUL, supra note 2, at 70-71.
119. See Redick, State Trends in First Admission and Resident Patients, State and
County Mental Hospitals 1966-1968, Statistical Note 14, Survey and Reports Section,
National Institute of Mental Health, at 2, 10 (Table 2D) (1970).
CHIATRY AND
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person's happiness need to be more careful than they have been in
comparing the suffering (including starvation, if you will) that may
be risked through freedom with the suffering produced by the boredom of confinement and by the label, affixed just in time to die with,
of being crazy. 2 0
Of the efficacy of community treatment for mentally ill persons
who are believed suicidal or assaultive, little can be said with assurance. Pasamanick and others studying community therapy have
excluded such persons because they had no special mission to include
them and because such persons might injure themselves and others,
as well as the goodwill surrounding the researcher's project. Most
writing about the treatment (as opposed to the characteristics) of
the suicidal seems to take the form of psychiatrist's insights and anecdotes rather than statistics.' 21 Judges may or may not find such
information helpful guidance in making decisions, depending on
whether they prefer the false assurance of statistics or the false assurance of a psychiatrist's clinical impressions expressed as immutable truths. About one facet of the care of the imminently suicidal
almost all writers agree: some period of hospitalization appears almost
always appropriate.

22

Judges dealing with such patients need to be

quite discriminating, however, for there appear to be some patients
who fare better in a general hospital or clinic than in a large state
hospital and others whose hospitalization stays, whatever the setting,
should be kept brief because of their hostile reaction to them. 12
Avoidance of hospitalization for the suicidal may, until treatment
methods improve, come less frequently from judges' finding an
alternative adequate than from legislatures, judges, and doctors concluding that it is inhumane to preserve life at the cost of depriving
it of dignity. California's legislature has wisely imposed a fixed limit
of twenty-eight days on commitments of the suicidal, arbitrary in
almost every sense but its responsiveness to human dignity. 24
As I have indicated, mentally ill persons believed dangerous to
120. Writing of persons, many of them old, who live in single resident occupancy
housing in New York City, Joan Shapiro found that some regarded institutionalization
as "an unsatisfactory alternative to suffering, deterioration, and death." J. SmAPImo,
supra note 50, at 124. See also id. at 141.
121. See, e.g., Seale & McNichol, Treatment of the Suicidal Patient: Community
Psychiatry Approach, 58 S. MED. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1965). See also note 123 infra.
122.

GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT or

PsYCHIATRY, CRisIs IN PsYcHIATIuc HosprrALzA-

RPT. No. 72, at 53, 67 (1969) ("Few would disagree that psychiatric hospitalization is the treatment of choice for an individual who is actively suicidal.').
123. See, e.g., E. Schneidman, N. Farberow & C. Leonard, Suicide-Evaluation and
Treatment of Suicidal Risk Among Schizophrenic Patients in Psychiatric Hospitals,
Dept. of Medicine & Surgery Medical Bulletin, Veterans Administration (Feb. 1, 1962).
124. CAl.. WELx. : INsTs. CODE §§ 5250, 5260 (West Supp. 1972).
ToN,
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others probably are not.125 Even when a particular ill person is believed dangerous, courts should not on that ground alone conclude
hospitalization is the most satisfactory disposition. Although apparently no one has conducted a controlled study specifically evaluating
community alternatives to civil commitment for mentally ill persons
believed dangerous, judges need not approach the question of community placement for such persons in a vacuum. The greatest inspiration for reliance on community-based treatment should spring
from the vastly developed, if understaffed, probation system of our
criminal courts. In many states today, most convicted felons return
to the community on probation. In 1970, in Michigan, for example,
sixty-one per cent of those convicted of felonious larceny and thirtytwo per cent of those convicted of manslaughter were granted probation. 126 A principal reason for the widespread reliance on probation
applies as well to the use of alternatives to civil commitment: not
merely the unavailability of institutional space, but also the belief
that the community is better protected in the long-run by treating
the subject in his home setting than by removing him from it and
that this long-run protection is more important than any immediate
protection that might result from incarceration.
Most, if not all, civil commitment judges sadly lack any staff
comparable to the probation officers attached to their states' criminal
courts, and the problems of supervising the acutely ill, dangerous
person may be far different from those of supervising most persons
convicted of crime. On the other hand, to the extent that we have
specific information about mentally ill persons believed dangerous it
indicates that states have been employing unnecessarily restrictive
forms of confinement for them.
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court 127 had the
effect of forcing the state of New York to transfer 992 patients from
Matteawan, an especially secure hospital for the criminally insane,
to regular mental hospitals elsewhere in the state. Researchers followed all 992 patients for a year.128 They found that all but seven of
125. See notes 66-67 supra.See also Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right [to Treat.
ment], 57 Gao. LJ. 752, 767 (1969).
126. See Michigan Dept. of Corrections, Criminal Statistics (1970), Tables ASA,
A3B, Bl. Accord, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Crime and Delinquency in California1969, at 37 (1970) (of those convicted of felonies in California in 1969, 39.8% were
placed directly on probation and an additional 27.8% given short, fixed jail terms
followed by probation).
127. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
128. Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, in AssOCIATION OF TIlE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORE, MENTAL ILLNEss, DuE PRocEss AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENmANT 221 (1968); Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of
the Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction of the
State of New York, 17 BuFFALO L. Rav. 651 (1968).
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the 992 had fared well enough in less secure, often unlocked facilities
that the new hospitals had not seen a need to seek their return to
more secure facilities. Indeed, 147 were discharged to the community,
far more than would have been released from Matteawan in an
average year, and those who remained in regular hospitals seemed
indistinguishable to the staffs from the general hospital population.
The study may provide little firm indication of how the same men
would have fared if never hospitalized at all or if placed initially in a
minimum-security hospital, but it should increase courts' skepticism
both about claims that a person is dangerous and about claims that
1 29
hospitalization is necessary.
We have now examined several classes of mentally ill persons
and seen that, for most of them, community-based treatment offers
substantial promise. If courts accept an obligation to explore alternatives to hospitalization, they will have to bring these generally
encouraging findings to bear on the facts of specific cases. They will
have to worry whether a particular patient will voluntarily come to
a clinic for the medication prescribed for him and whether the
patient's family, though nodding repeatedly that they "want whatever is best," will unconsciously undercut the patient's attempts at
community survival.8 0 They can in short rarely be confident of
success when making decisions about community placement. They
can, on the other hand, be confident of a high risk of failure-at
least in terms of treatment-when they order hospitalization. Thus,
like judges in criminal cases who now rely on probation for persons
much more likely than those facing civil commitment to be dangerous to the community, civil commitment judges could wisely
adopt a policy of community placement and treatment except when
confronted with overwhelming evidence of an immediate need for
highly secure, protective custody.
III. TiHE

LEGAL OBLIGATION

To SEARCH FOR

ALTERNATIVES TO HOSPITALIZATION

Even if alternatives to hospitalization seem promising, their desirability will not alone, of course, create the legal handles for ap129. See generally P. Scm EANDEL & C. KANNO, THm MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERA SURVEY OF TREATMENT PROGRAM (1969). A nonevaluative review of current treatment
programs, this study found a high reliance on custodial care but a desire on the part
of many professionals working in them for additional treatment modalities. Id. at 58-59.
180. On techniques for handling the uncooperative patient, see Coleman, Therapy
of the "Inaccessible Mentally Ill Patient, 48 MENTAL HYGIENE 581 (1965). For examples
of the complex family pathologies involved in cases in which one family member has
been hospitalized as schizophrenic, see the case studies in R. LAING & H. EsranoN,
SANrY, M.DNESs, AND T=E FAcm.Y (1964).
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pellate courts to compel or even permit their use by committing
courts. The notion that government should not constrict the freedom
of its citizens to any greater degree than the community needs require may seem so elementary in a nation prizing individual freedom
as barely to require discussion. The excess, if truly excess and believed by the legislators to be excess, is a form of tyranny. Jeremy
Bentham,' 3 1 Vice-President Spiro Agnew, 8 2 and the American Civil
Liberties Union 33 have each regarded such restraint on governmental action a premise of decent government. The charge of American courts, however, is neither to vindicate basic political principles
nor even to thwart tyranny. When interpreting statutes, including
commitment statutes, courts may find maxims of good government
a helpful guide in determining the legislature's probable purposes,
but the legislature may quite simply desire or condone the unnecessary. In determining the constitutionality of regulations or government action, courts must find a specific constitutional provision that
permits them to strike down the legislation or invalidate the government's acts.
A.

The Undetected Flexibility of Existing State Codes'84

Every American jurisdiction authorizes the involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill persons. The states place the power to confine
in judges or commissions3l' charged with applying widely varying
wAaA,
Tim PMNCIPLM OF MORA S AND LEGmATION 170-71 (Hafrer ed.
131. J. Ba
1948):
. . . But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the
principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought to be admitted in
as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.
. .. It is plain, therefore, that in the following [case] punishment ought not to
be inflicted.
:
iVhere
W
it is needless: where the mischief may be prevented or cease of itself,
without it: that is, at a cheaper rate.
(Emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
132. Speaking recently before the Illinois Farm Bureau, Mr. Agnew quoted, with
approval, James Fenimore Cooper- "'Individuality is the aim of political freedom. By
leaving its citizens as much freedom of action as comports with order and the rights
of others, the institutions render him truly a free man."' Speech reprinted in Agnew's
Blast at Behaviorism, PsYCHOLoGY TODAY, Jan. 1972, at 4.

133. See Neier & Fabricant, Legislative Memorandum No. 1 of N.Y. Civil Liberties
Union, Subject: S. 5227, at 12 (1970) (urging New York legislature to adopt civil commitment bill using least restrictive means).
134. For aid in researching this section and other sections dealing with state codes,
I am grateful to Paul Russell, a student at the University of Michigan Law School.
135. Nine states rely on nonjudicial forms of commitment in all cases. Twenty-six
others permit nonjudicial commitment in some cases. See S. BRaKr.L & R. RocK, supra

note 2, at 55. Typically, nonjudicial commitment is handled by a mental health board
or commission. Id. at 55-57. (For a study of the workings of such a commission, see
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and generally inexplicit statutory criteria and with following complex timetables of notice, examinations, and hearings. Considerable
diversity exists among the states in these procedures, 136 but the pattern of involuntary-commitment codes having congealed in this
country before the recent movement toward community-based programs, painful uniformity appears in the limited dispositional tools
other than hospitalization with which legislatures have explicitly
equipped their courts. 137 Several state codes do permit commitment
to the care of relatives or friends' 38 and all provide for the appointment of guardians for ill persons' property, which may serve in some
cases as an alternative to commitment. 39 Only about nine jurisdictions, however, explicitly empower their committing authorities to
prescribe treatment through facilities other than inpatient hospitals. 40 Most of these nine are of recent date and several are well
Note, Contemporary Studies Project: Facts and Fallacies About Iowa Civil Commitment, 55 IowA L. REv. 895 (1970)). In a few states open-ended commitment is possible

simply on the basis of a physician's certificate reviewed almost solely for form by a
judge without a full hearing automatically provided. See S. BEARM & R. ROCK, supra,
at 57-59. See also R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, supra note 2, at 41. The latter
form of commitment may well be infirm (see State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo.
858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1964)), and offers little opportunity for an effective examination
and review of alternatives. In any event, I have in this paper referred to the committing authority generally as a court and only rarely made reference to special problems
under other systems for commitment.
136. See S. BRAxm 8&
R. ROCK, supra note 2, Tables 3.2-3.6, at 72-97; R. RoCK, M.
supra note 2, chs. 2, 5, 8.
137. See Bleicher, Compulsory Community Care for the Mentally Ill, 16 CEV.MAR. L. REv. 93 (1967).
138. See, eg., IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911, §§ 8-12, 9-61 (Smith-Hurd 1966); ORE. Rnv.
STAT. § 426.130 (1963); WAsH. R-v. CODE § 71.02.240(4) (1959).
139. See S. BRA.
&cR. RoCK, supra note 2, at 250-302.
140. See CAL. WELT. SclsrNs. CODE § 5358 (West Supp. 1972); COLO. R-v. STAT.
ANN. § 71-1-11(2) (1963) (power to commit to "any suitable place'); D.C. CODE § 21-545
(Supp. 1971) (power to commit to hospital or order "any other alternative course of
treatment which the court believes will be in the best interest of the person or the
public"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 , § 9-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971) (court directed to
"consider the alternative forms of treatment which are desirable for and available to
JACOBSON &cR. JANOPAUL,

the patient, including but not limited to hospitalization); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-

2917(D), -2902(9) (Supp. 1971) (court may place person in care of mental health
clinic, nursing home, physician, "or any other institution or individual authorized or
licensed by law to give care or treatment to patients'); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-13
(Supp. 1971) (permitting court to use hospital or other suitable clinical facilities);
N.C. STAT. ANN. § 122-63 (1964), § 122.63-1 (Supp. 1971) (permitting orders for outpatient care or treatment at local facilities, including community mental health
centers); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (1970) (as drafted, the best of all: specifically
authorizes use of community mental health clinics and private psychiatric care); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4406(h) (1969) (permitting partial hospitalization or outpatient
treatment). See also "Appendix A. Examples of Less Drastic Means Statutes," Wexler,

Scoville, et al., The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in
Arizona, 13 ARIz. L. Rxv. 1, 243-49 (1971).
In addition, Massachusetts, while not empowering courts to employ alternatives,
does order periodic review by the hospital, at which time explicit consideration of
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drafted and worthy of emulation at least if altered to require the use
of alternatives in appropriate cases.
Despite the antiquity of many codes and their failure to charge
committing courts explicitly to employ community alternatives, virtually all state codes do invite a reading that their judges should
avoid unnecessary hospitalization. Many individual judges, eager to
spare ill persons avoidable suffering, no doubt find ways to reduce
commitments by dismissing proceedings when a satisfactory alternative plan has been suggested by an attorney or family member or by
committing the person to the hospital with the understanding that
release will soon follow on a status similar to parole. 4 1 Only a few
state courts have, however, considered whether their codes impose
an affirmative obligation to seek to avoid unnecessary commitment,
and only courts in the District of Columbia and New Mexico 4 2
have given answers of more than a sentence or two in length. Though
the experience in these two jurisdictions has not been encouraging,
it does indicate what imaginative courts could do within the confines
of existing codes.
The most innovative court in the nation in dealing with mental
health issues has been the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. It is thus unsurprising that this court,
guided by its Chief Judge, David Bazelon, decided en banc in 1966
the first case finding committing courts obligated to explore alternatives. The District of Columbia code provides that, if a court finds a
person mentally ill and "likely to injure himself or others if allowed
to remain at liberty," it may order "his hospitalization for an indeterminate period or order any other alternative course of treatment
which the court believes will be in the best interest of the person or
of the public."'143 In 1966 on the basis of this language, the court in
alternatives, including community resources, is to occur. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 123,
§ 4 (Supp. 1970). See also CAL. WkL.

& INSTNS. CODE § 10053.5 (West Supp. 1971)

(setting up system to provide aftercare social services for persons released from hospitals to prevent "unnecessary" readmission). I can find no reported constructions on
the scope of courts' powers under these statutes, nor do I have information, except in
the District of Columbia and Ohio, concerning the extent of court reliance upon them.
See text accompanying notes 276-80 infra.
141. See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.827(1) (1969) (providing for release from hospital on "convalescent status," which under Michigan law permits the hospital to
reincarcerate an ill person without hearing if the convalescent release proves unsatisfactory).
142. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438,
457 P.2d 370 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1969); Fhagen v. Miller, 65 Misc.
2d 163, 173, 317 N.Y.S.2d 128, 139 (Sup. Ct. 1970), affd. per curiam as modified, 36 App.
Div. 2d 926, 321 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1971), affid., 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615, 328 N.Y.S.2d
393 (1972).
143. D.C. CoDE § 21-545 (1967).
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Lake v. Cameron 44 found that the committing court not merely had
an obligation to consider the range of "other alternative course[s] of
treatment"' 45 but also to place the patient in the least restrictive of
the alternative courses found suitable.
After adopting this expansive view of the statute, the court then
suggested a dazzling array of specific alternatives the government and
committing court might consider for Ms. Lake, a doughty sixty-one
year old woman suffering from brain damage associated with senility,
who was alleged to have a tendency to wander and become confused. 46 Suggested alternatives included dispositions as mild as requiring Ms. Lake to carry an identification card on her person as well
as more substantial programs of nursing care, home health services,
foster care, and private care through welfare payments. The court
recommended seeking information and services from a whole telephone book full of agencies, including the local departments of
public health, public welfare, vocational rehabilitation, and police
as well as private family service organizations and social workers.1'4
The very range of the alternatives appears to have alarmed several judges into dissenting. "A United States [district court] in our
legal system," complained then Circuit Judge Warren Burger in
dissent, "is not set up to initiate inquiries and direct studies of social
welfare facilities or other social problems."' 48 Rather, according to
the dissenters, the court is set up to deal with facts "adduced by
parties" and to resolve legal issues "raised by them in pleadings."' 49
In passing the statute, Congress did not intend to transmute the
court into an administrative agency for proceedings involving the
mentally ill. The dissenters appear to have forgotten that the same
district courts are involved daily in complex social inquiries of almost
precisely the same sort in making the decisions whether to place persons convicted of crime on probation and, if on probation, under
what sorts of conditions.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico agreed with Judge Burger
when essentially the same issue came before it two years later in
State v. Sanchez. 50 It first found the language of New Mexico's
144. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
145. 364 F.2d at 660.
146. See the discussion at note 59 supra and text accompanying notes 358-61 infra.
147. 364 F.2d at 661-62. For further discussion of the Lake case, see note 59 supra.
148. 364 F.2d at 663. One critic has agreed with Judge Burger's reasoning with
regard to the inadequacy of courts and suggested removing courts from the commitment process. Parker, Lake v. Cameron, Involuntary Civil Commitment-Storm Warnings, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 81, 84, 86 (1970).
149. 364 F.2d at 663.
150. 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1969).
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statute different from the District of Columbia's and then, pointing
to Judge Burger's dissent, observed that New Mexico's district courts
were no better suited than the federal courts in the District of Columbia to undertake complex inquiries into alternatives to commitment.
Much about the New Mexico decision is disheartening. The case
involved inordinately compelling circumstances for seizing an alternative: No one claimed that Sanchez posed threats to others but
simply that he was unable to care for himself; and his niece indicated
" Even
to the court her willingness to provide the necessary care. 51
more distressing was the court's interpretation of the New Mexico
statute, especially since so many other states have commitment cri15 2
teria closely similar to New Mexico's.
Like many states, New Mexico permits the involuntary commitment of two classes of mentally ill persons: those who are "likely to
injure [themselves] or others if allowed to remain at liberty," and
those who are "in need of custody, care or treatment in a mental
hospital and lack sufficient capacity to make responsible decisions
with respect to [their] hospitalization."'153 Interpreting this language,
the New Mexico court might sensibly have held-and other courts
might sensibly still hold-that in order to decide whether a person
is likely to be dangerous "if allowed to remain at liberty," the committing court must determine whether community resources exist
that will permit him to remain at liberty without being dangerous.15 4
If such resources exist, then the person can be "allowed to remain
151. The New Mexico supreme court omitted in Sanchez any discussion of the facts.
Simply referring to Sanchez as a person found "dangerous to himself," the court
invited visions of a man seeking to slash off his ears or jump off bridges. Apparently
Mr. Sanchez was a mild, forty-two-year old Mexican-American who had become ill
while serving in the Army during the Korean War. (Interview with William S. Dixon,
counsel to Sanchez, May 19, 1972.) Suffering from schizophrenia characterized by
elaborate delusions, Sanchez did appear to Veterans Administration psychiatrists to be
dangerous to himself, but only in the narrow sense of being unable to care for himself.
The state district court ordered him committed despite the fact that at his hearing a
Veterans Administration psychiatrist testified that Sanchez was not dangerous to others
and, more strangely, despite the testimony of his niece that she and the rest of his
family would be willing to assume responsibility for his care. Exactly why the court
committed him or the Veterans Administration wanted him committed is unclear. The
trial court, like most courts in these cases, made no findings and the psychiatrist
apparently gave no opinion on the adequacy of the care the niece and others in his
family could provide. Sad to say, despite his niece's willingness to care for him, Sanchez
was then transferred from a Veterans Administration hospital in New Mexico to another
in Colorado.
152.,See S. BRAKL & R. RocK, supra note 2, at 86, Tables 3.2, 3.4, 3.6, at 72-97.
153. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-5(G) (Supp. 1971).
154. This position was, in substance, adopted in Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095,
1100 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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at liberty" without being dangerous. Similarly, the court might
sensibly have held that before concluding that a person is "inneed
of custody, care or treatment in a mental hospital," the committing
court must determine whether the person's needs can be as well or
better served through other available forms of care. If they can be,
the person is not in need of care or treatment "in a mental hospital." 15 5 Furthermore, in requiring a finding that the ill person
lacks capacity to decide responsibly about his need for hospitalization, the New Mexico statute can be seen as evincing concern for
what a rational person would wish for himself if he contemplated
that he might someday suffer a comparable illness. Among equally
effective treatment modes, most rational persons would probably pick
the one that preserved a maximum degree of freedom of movement.
As stated above, many other states have commitment criteria
closely comparable to New Mexico's and their courts could wisely
take the broader view suggested here. Even a state that permits
commitment merely on a finding that a person is ill and "should be
committed"'15 6 could wisely find that the "should" implies an inquiry
into current sound medical practice and calls for hospitalization
only when necessary to serve the state's goals. In short, no state requires the commitment of all ill persons, and the definition of those
ill persons who are appropriate for commitment could in almost all
jurisdictions be found to contemplate some inquiry into the necessity
for hospitalization in order to serve the state's purposes. Such an
inquiry may have been superfluous in an era when hospitalization
was thought necessary for treatment of nearly all mental illnesses,
but could appropriately be seen as mandatory under the expansive
language of most acts in an era such as today when the desirability
of hospitalization for serving the state's own interests is gravely in
question.
Nevertheless, other state appellate courts may well prove as unwilling as New Mexico to scrape the barnacles off their statutes.
155. A section of the New Mexico commitment code unmentioned by the court
permitted its courts to use "hospitals or other suitable clinical facilities," thus making
clear the legislature's recognition of the possible acceptability of forms of treatment

outside the hospital. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-13 (Supp. 1971). More recently enacted
than the basic commitment section, this provision seems in mild conflict with the
provision that all those fitting the criteria for compulsory treatment "shall" be
hospitalized.
156. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-328 (1958) ("mentally ill and should be admitted
to a hospital"); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 28, § 55 (West 1969) (if "the judge believes that the
patient should be committed') and tit. 28, § 53(A) (West 1969) (commitment when
"in the best interest of the patient and the community'); Wis. STAT. § 51.05(1) (1967)
("mentally ill or infirm and should be sent to a hospital for the mentally ill or
infirm'). See generally S. BRARm & R. Rocn, supra note 2, Table 32, at 72-76.
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Apart from wishing to shield their courts from the added burden
of the exploration, most state appellate courts in opinions dealing
with other commitment issues have found broad discretion in their
committing judges under the elusive criteria provided by statute. 1"7
Courts seem rarely to have been pressed by litigants to read substantive limits into their commitment codes and rarely to have inquired
on their own. Although language stressing the necessity for careful
review of commitments does abound in appellate decisions, 58 the
concern expresses itself in most cases primarily through ensuring
that the committing court complied with all the procedural niceties
-the right number of examining physicians, the proper notice, the
proper timetable-and not through defining the criteria the committing judges are to apply or reviewing the committing judges'
application of the criteria. 59
Such appellate court devotion to process might be acceptable if
the committing judges themselves deserved broad discretion over
substance like administrative agencies charged with a complex area
of regulation1oo Unfortunately, few committing judges deserve such
deference. Most have time-consuming responsibilities other than
civil commitments-probating wills or trying criminal and civil cases
-and, like the appellate judges, concern themselves primarily with
form rather than substance. 16' As in many human relations, committing judges, frightened perhaps by the prospect of what they might
find if they looked beneath the surface, convince themselves that the
patient rests in good hands if the proper rituals have been observedthe legal how-are-yous, thank-yous, and goodbyes.
Of course, even if states did find that their codes required that
alternatives be examined, grave problems would remain in assuring
157. See, e.g., In re Hobart, 76 Ohio Abs. 80, 81, 145 N.E.2d 205, 206 (Ohio Ct. App.
1956), appeal dismissed, 355 US. 21 (1957); In re Nagle's Estate, 418 Pa. 170, 172, 210
A.2d 262, 264 (1965). There are, of course, exceptions. See, e.g., Dodd v. Hughes, 81
Nev. 43, 398 P.2d 540 (1965) (discussing symptoms and behavior that justify commitment).
158. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 440, 457 P.2d 370, 372 (1968), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1969) (the court stated, "If there is any class of cases which
should be conducted with the utmost care to observe all the requirements of the
statute, it is those cases conducted for the purpose of determining the sanity of a
citizen." 80 N.M. at 440, 457 P.2d at 372. It then went on to review only the procedure
and none of the substance of the commitment.); In re Wojtisiak, 375 Mich. 540, 184
N.W.2d 741 (1965).
159. See cases cited in note 158 supra.
160. Cf. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947). Perhaps the hospital
doctors should be the ones treated as having the skills of a regulatory agency; it is
before the court, however, and not the doctors that a patient has a right to a hearing.
161. See Pfrender, Probate Court Attitudes Toward Involuntary Hospitalization:
A Field Study, 5 J. F~Amury L. 139 (1965).
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that judges receive adequate information about the alternatives and
possess adequate powers, not merely to explore alternatives, but also
to require the staffs of the alternative facilities to cooperate. 162 To
what extent state constitutions or the United States Constitution can
supply the force to compel the search for alternatives and to assure
the adequacy of the processes for carrying out the search forms the
core of the remainder of this article. But the Constitution, even
more than statutes, requires a receptive court to bring it into new
territory. The peculiarly constricted posture that state appellate
courts have adopted in reviewing decisions under their own commitment codes may foreshadow a similar posture when they deal
with arguments based on the Constitution.
B.

Constitutional Obligation

1. The Principle of the Least Restrictive Alternative
in Constitutional Adjudication
Stated succinctly, the principle of the least restrictive alternative
would require courts to hold that, under state constitutions and the
Constitution of the United States, committing courts and agencies
must refrain from ordering hospitalization whenever a less restrictive alternative will serve as well or better the state's purposes. The
appropriateness of insisting on the exploration of alternatives to
hospitalization can be best understood by a brief exposition of the
range of occasions when courts have insisted on the use of alternatives in other settings.
The United States Supreme Court has confronted hundreds of
cases in which a party complains that the government has reached
farther than it needed to achieve its purposes. 6 3 The Court has
responded variously-sometimes overturning legislation when convinced a less restrictive alternative existed and should have been
used,0 4 sometimes refusing to listen at all to arguments about alternatives, 6 5 and sometimes mentioning less restrictive alternatives
without making clear their relation to the decision rendered. 66
162. See pts. IV. A. & B. infra.
163. So far as I can find, the only general survey of the Supreme Court's use of
the principle is Wormuth g- Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternatives, 9
UTAH L. Rxv. 254 (1964). The article is a most helpful review of the cases up through
1963.
164. See note 173 infra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 171 & 177 infra.
166. Sometimes the Court has mentioned alternatives the state could easily have
used simply to demonstrate (in race cases, for example) the disingenuousness of the
reasons the state advanced for having a rule, but without implying that it was be-
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At least in this century, the Justices have not regarded the principle that government should intrude as little as necessary into the
167
lives of citizens as a principle independently worthy of veneration.
In recent decades, when the Court has insisted on the use of a less
restrictive alternative, it has done so because of its concern for a
constitutionally protected interest at stake (for example, free expression), not because of loyalty to a view (sanctified in the Constitution, if at all, only in the little-used ninth and tenth amendments)
that that government governs best which governs least. With their
eyes focused on a particular social concern-public safety, free expression, free exercise of religion-the Justices have used the principle as simply one of several useful tools available to them to
accommodate important constitutional and legislative interests when
they conflict. When a consistent pattern of reliance on the principle
appears, it reflects more a period of consistency in the Court's attitude toward a particular constitutional guarantee than an adherence
to the principle itself.
In first amendment cases, particularly first amendment cases in
which expression is commingled with conduct, the Court has on a
few occasions upheld state and federal legislation curtailing free
expression when it found no reasonable alternative available for
serving the legislature's goal. It thus recently upheld criminal sanctions for the burning of draft cards, finding "the incidental restriction on free speech . . . no greater than essential" for serving the
federal government's needs in raising armies.0 8 More frequently,
however, particularly when the expression at issue involved words
rather than conduct, it has done just the reverse, striking down laws,
even though the alternatives available to the state were plainly less
adequate than the regulation chosen.10 9 The constitutional interest
cause of the alternative that it struck down the statute. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 892 (1969). In cases dealing with evidence obtained through objectionable

police practices, the Court has sometimes mentioned alternatives that the police could
have used seemingly in part to soften the blow of its holding a practice unconstitutional, but again without implying that it was because of the alternatives that the
Court had held the practice unconstitutional. See United States v. Wade, 888 U.S. 218,
289 (1967) (police line-ups); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436, 467 (1966) (confessions).
167. For an early statement of the principle stated generally, see Anderson v. Dunn,

19 US. (6 Wheat.) 204, 281 (1821).
168. O'Brien v. United States, 891 US. 367, 377 (1968). See also United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 30 US. 75, 100-01 (1947), in which the Supreme Court upheld Hatch

Act restrictions on political activities of federal employees despite availability of less
restrictive (though probably somewhat less effective) alternatives. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner,
874 US. 898, 407 (196a) (state must "demonstrate that no alternative form of regula.
tion would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights" (decision

based on the free exercise clause)).
169. See discussion in Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
YA=E L.J. 464 (1968). The Note is critical of the application of the principle in first
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in preserving a greater level of free expression simply outweighed
the legislative interest in having any regulation stronger than the
weaker alternative available to it. In Butler v. Michigan,170 for example, the Court held unconstitutional a statute forbidding the sale
of books "tending to the corruption of the morals of minors," since
it prevented adults from access to the same reading matter. The law
was stricken even though a narrower statute-one forbidding the
sale of such materials to minors-was almost certain to be less effective in keeping pornography and gore from coming before the
eyes of youths.
In commerce clause cases, the Court has been more solicitous of
171
the state's interests, but has still insisted in most, but not all,
cases that the state protect its local interests by the means that interfere to the least extent necessary with the flow of interstate commerce.
South Carolina's stringent limitations on the width and net weights
of trucks were upheld, despite a substantial impact on commerce,
because the Court found that the state had no less restrictive means
available to ensure safety on its old and narrow roads.'72 Conversely,
in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison 7 8 an ordinance in Madison,
Wisconsin, forbidding the sale of milk not processed within a few
miles of town was held unconstitutional in substantial part because
the Court found that there were "reasonable" and "adequate" alternative means to protect the health of Madison's citizens without
the city's totally banning the sale of outside milk.
In "substantive" or "economic" due process cases, the doctrine
of reasonable alternatives has died, of course, with substantive due
process itself. 7 4 Whereas the Court in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century struck down many state regulations of business
amendment cases: "A precise evaluation of less drastic means is an uncommonly diffi-

cult task and with respect to the first amendment it is fair to say that the Supreme
Court has never attempted it." Id. at 468-69.
170. 352 US. 380, 383-84 (1957). See also Schnieder v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.. 147,
162 (1939); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-49 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
US. 296, 311 (1940).
171. Wormuth 8:Mirkin, supra note 163, at 260, found that the Court sometimes
left to the state legislature the judgment whether a regulation affecting commerce
was the least restrictive regulation available.
172. South Carolina St. Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). More
recently, the Court upheld an Arkansas statute requiring large crews on freight trains,
despite claims that some of the crew members were unnecessary for safety or any other
function, on the ground that the evidence regarding need was equivocal and was thus
properly resolved through the legislative process. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 US. 129, 133-40 (1968).
173. 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951).
174. Death came, after many serious wounds, in Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 US. 236,
246 (1941). See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Cburt:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 34.
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on the ground that they constituted illegitimate and unnecessary
intrusions on legitimate activities--for example, the business of running a private employment service 1 5 or a railroad17 01-the Court in
recent decades has affirmed the legislature's prerogative to use any
rational means it chooses to reach permissible state ends regardless
of the asserted availability of lesser alternatives. In 1946, for example,
the Court rejected out of hand a landlord's suggestion that the
Court should strike down the application to his building of a New
York law requiring automatic sprinkler systems in certain apartment
houses because the landlord had installed a fully adequate fire alarm
system: "Little need be said of the due process question. We are not
'17
concerned with the wisdom of the legislation or the need for it."
As new concerns have caught the attention of the Court, the
principle continues to serve as an aid in the resolution of conflict.
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,178 the Court relied on the federal
right to travel to strike down an act of Congress that denied passports for travel outside the Western Hemisphere to members of
organizations identified as subversive by the Subversive Activities
Control Board. The Court found that the act swept unnecessarily
broadly in that the passport denial did not turn on a finding of the
degree of the members' participation in the subversive organization
or on the purposes or place of the proposed travel. Similarly, in
Shelton v. Tucker, 79 the Court relied on the federal right of free
association to invalidate an Arkansas law requiring school teachers
to list all organizations to which they belonged. The Court, striving
175. See Adams v. Tanner, 244 US. 590 (1917). In Adams the Court struck down a
Washington statute banning private employment agencies that exacted fees from persons they placed in jobs. The Court found that sanctions imposed on particular abuses
of the agency would be adequate to protect the state's interests. 244 U.S. at 594. To
my mind, Justice Brandeis convincingly demonstrated in dissent that the defects of
the private employment services were most unlikely to be controlled through narrow
regulations. 244 U.S. at 603-07.
176. Hannibal & St. J.R.R. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878).
177. Queenside Hill Realty Co. v. Saxi, 828 U.S. 80, 83 (1946). The Court did not
act consistently. In several earlier cases that might have been handled like Adams v.
Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), discussed in note 175 supra, the Court refused to examine
alternatives and stated that the determination of the need for a particular form of
commercial regulation lay with the legislature. See, e.g., Jacob Ruppert v. Caffrey, 251
U.S. 264, 297-98 (1920); Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 204 (1912),
New York ex rel. Selz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 40 (1908). Interestingly to me, the
Court in each of these cases, except perhaps Selz, seems in fact to have been convinced
through its tone that there were in fact no effective alternatives.
178. 378 U.S. 500, 512-14 (1964). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-38
(1969).
In a recent decision holding unconstitutional under the equal protection clause
Tennessee's durational residency requirement for voting, the Court again relied on
the principle. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269, 4276-77 (U.S. March 21, 1972).
179. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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ardently to find a ground to invalidate legislation enacted as part of
an effort to cripple the NAACP,sO again claimed that there were
"less drastic means" for protecting the state's "legitimate and substantial" interests.' 8 '
State appellate courts, though by no means uniform in their approach, have also found the principle of the least restrictive alternative useful in reaching accommodations between state legislative
concerns and a federal or state constitutional interest. California's
supreme court has struck down many state laws when alternatives
existed that it believed would avoid injury to threatened federal
and state constitutional interests, such as freedom of speech. 8 2 The
Supreme Court of Illinois has on several compelling occasions invalidated state legislation regulating purely commercial practices
when the legislation seemed unnecessary or unduly broad to protect
the state's interests. 8 3 Other state courts, in other settings, have also
180. See H. KALvEN, THE NEGRO AND Tm Fiasr Am mlrr
99-103 (1965).
181. In reaching his decision, Justice Stewart made a statement regarding lesser alternatives that has been frequently cited in more recent decisions:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in light
of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
364 U.S. at 488. In both Aptheker and Shelton, as the dissents in each case point out
acidly, the Court was probably wrong as a matter of fact in asserting that the government could have achieved its purposes more narrowly. 378 U.S. at 521, 527 (Clark, J.
dissenting); 364 U.S. at 490, 494-95 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In each, the Court's
real objection was that the statute would reach persons the government had no legitimate interest in reaching. But the fact that legislation may reach too many people
does not necessarily mean that the legislature's ends could have been more narrowly
achieved. It may be that only by reaching too many can the legislature be reasonably
confident of reaching those it needs to. The Court's results in these two cases may
still be justifiable but not on the basis of the principle it purported to apply. What
the Court was doing in fact was weighing a federal constitutional interest in each
case against the asserted legislative interest and deciding that the federal interest was
more deserving of protection. Like many fat persons, several justices of the Court
do not like to reveal what they weigh.
182. See, e.g., City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (election disclosure law held, in part, an unnecessary intrusion
on privacy); Fort v. Civil Serv. Commn., 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr.
625 (1964) (restriction on political activities of county officers infringed unnecessarily
broadly on first amendment rights); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Commn., 66 Cal. 2d
260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1961) (early morning raid intruded unnecessarily
broadly on fourth amendment rights of welfare recipients); Wollam v. City of Palm
Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963) (right of free speech unnecessarily curtailed by ordinance greatly restricting use of sound trucks).
183. See Schroeder v. Binks, 415 Ill. 192, 195-201, 113 N.E.2d 169, 170-73 (1953), and
other cases discussed in Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HAuv. L. Rlv. 1463, 1471-73 (1967). Struve applauds the Illinois
courts' pattern of invalidating unnecessarily broad economic legislation. The Schroeder
case, for example, dealt with a state statute, no doubt passed under pressure from the
plumbers' unions, providing that a person could become a master plumber only
through apprenticeship to a currently licensed plumber.
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insisted on the use of alternatives.18 4 On the other hand, a few state
supreme courts have rejected the principle altogether. The Indiana
supreme court, in upholding its state's Anti-Communism Act, stated
angrily that testing the validity of a law, any law, by "a standard
that 'less drastic means' might have been used" would be "a blatant
assumption of a legislative function."'" 5
A review of the many cases decided by the Supreme Court and
by state courts yields many unfortunate and ill-analyzed opinions, 80
but a solid core of sense endures. Particularly in a federal system
such as ours, courts must often resolve conflicts between compelling,
but competing, governmental and constitutional interests. When the
legislative interest seems meager in relation to an impaired constitutional interest, the legislation may fall altogether, even when there
is no acceptable available alternative. Conversely, when the interest
advanced by the individual seems insubstantial in relation to a pressing state or federal legislative interest-for example, the legislature's
concern for preserving lives as seen in the case of the landlord and
his sprinklers-the legislation will often simply be upheld, with, at
most, a statement that in this area it is for the legislature to decide
what regulation is necessary. 8 7 But when the Court feels it critical to
protect both interests, the inquiry into alternatives and their effect
on each of the competing interests may reveal different forms of

regulation that permit the legislature's interest to be served either
fully or substantially while removing or reducing the harmful impact to a constitutionally protected freedom.

The claim of the Indiana supreme court that inquiries by courts
into alternatives involve a usurpation of the legislature's function is
understandable but unsound. The legislature has, of course, an independent obligation to seek ways to minimize the impairment of
constitutionally protected liberties, and courts ought to accord great
weight to a legislature's assessment of the effectiveness of an alterna184. See, e.g., State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, -,

483 P.2d

608, 613 (1971) (court order prohibiting newspaper publication of trial testimony that
judge had ruled inadmissible held unnecessarily broad to prevent unsequestered jury
from viewing prejudicial material); One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Division
of Alcoholic Beverages Control, 50 NJ. 329, 341, 235 A-.2d 12, 19 (1967) (suspension of
liquor license of bar permitting congregation of apparent homosexuals unnecessary
to the protection of any legitimate state interest); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New
York, 290 N.Y. 312, 319, 49 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1943) (prohibition on street peddling an
unnecessarily drastic method for regulating abuses).
185. State v. Levitt, 246 Ind. 275, 285, 203 N.E.2d 821, 826 (1965).
186. See the discussion in notes 175 and 181 supra.
187. See note 177 supra and accompanying text.
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tive, when it has in fact undertaken such an assessment.188 Too often,
however, no evidence exists that the legislature has given even a
moment's thought to alternatives that might protect the threatened
freedom and, even when it has considered alternatives, it often resolves the conflict in the end simply by yielding to political expediency. Courts are not above political expediency, but they may serve,
at a minimum, as a second line of protection for endangered freedoms.
The Few Civil Commitment Cases on Point
The principle of the least restrictive alternative offers an obvious
possible application to civil commitment. Through commitment, the
state seeks to serve its traditional functions of protecting its citizens
from injury and providing care and treatment for the ill. However
compelling these concerns may be, commitment also intrudes on
equally compelling constitutionally based interests of the individual:
freedom of movement, freedom of association, and, as I will demonstrate at some length, freedom from physical confinement. The
search for alternatives to hospitalization may reveal in individual
cases ways that the state's interests can be fully served with little or
no constraint on the individual's freedom-that is, in ways that protect almost fully both sets of interests.
Despite the obvious place for the principle in the context of civil
commitment and despite the numerous cases above that might support its application, the United States Supreme Court, in a recent
decision, may conceivably have foreclosed its application as a requirement of federal constitutional law. In Sanchez v. State, the New
Mexico decision discussed earlier, 8 9 the New Mexico supreme court
abruptly rejected a constitutional argument for application of the
principle, distinguishing without comprehensible explanation 9 0 the
Supreme Court decisions cited by Sanchez's lawyer. Sanchez appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, relying on Shelton and numer2.

188. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 US.
129, 133-40 (1968).
189. See notes 150-55 supra and accompanying text.
190. 80 N.M. at 441, 457 P.2d at 373. The reasoning of the New Mexico court is
somewhat obscure. Referring to first amendment cases such as Shelton and Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.. 444 (1939), the court said: "[Tjhe cases cited by appellant are distinguishable and involve situations where a statute is found unconstitutional because
the legitimate purposes of the statute involved could be accomplished by a different
statute, which would not violate constitutional liberties." 80 N.M. at 441, 457 P.2d at
373. Then after listing the Supreme Court cases cited by appellant, the court simply
stated, "The policy which counsel has denominated as that of 'Least Abridgement'
has no application to the case before us." 80 N.M. at 441, 457 P.2d at 373.
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ous first amendment cases. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
in a single sentence "for want of a substantial federal question."' 91
The dismissal constituted a disposition on the merits and thus may
have obliterated any chance of establishing a federal constitutional
obligation to search for alternatives.
Hope need not, however, be abandoned. As an understandable
concession to its swollen docket, the Court has in recent decades
summarily upheld lower court decisions by affirmance or dismissal,
simply on the jurisdictional papers and without oral argument, in
well over half the appeals that have come before it.192 To some observers, its practice in dismissing appeals now parallels closely its
practice in denying petitions for writs of certiorari and should be
accorded little more significance. 193 On more than one occasion, the
Court has dismissed an appeal for want of a substantial federal question and then within a few years dealt with the same issue at great
length without citing its earlier dismissal as precedent. 194
The Supreme Court of California in its recent decision holding
unconstitutional its state's scheme of school financing found itself in
somewhat the position I find myself here: it had to contend with a
United States Supreme Court affirmance by order, without opinion,
of a lower court decision reaching the opposite conclusion than the
California court thought proper.195 The California court pointed to
the Supreme Court's handling of appeals generally and to the inartful handling of the earlier case by its plaintiffs, both of which factors
created a likelihood that the Supreme Court had not adequately appreciated the substantiality of the questions before it.10
191. 896 U.S. 276 (1969).
192. See R. STERN & E. GREssmAN, SuPRmEM CouRT PRAcTCE 194 (4th ed. 1969).
193. See Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 82
U. Cm. L. Rxv. 1, 74 n.365 (1964) ("It has often been observed that the dismissal of
an appeal, technically an adjudication on the merits, is in practice often the substantial
equivalent of a denial of certiorari.').
194. One recent example is McGowan v. Maryland, 866 U.S. 420 (1961), in which
the Court dealt at enormous length with the issue of the constitutionality of Sunday
closing laws, ignoring six of its earlier decisions dismissing appeals from lower courts
raising the identical issue. See, e.g., Grochowiak v. Pennsylvania, 858 U.S. 47 (1958)
(dismissing appeal for want of a substantial federal question). A more recent example
is Walz v. Tax Commr., 897 US. 664 (1970), in which the Court dealt with the merits
of an attack on the exemption from the property tax of church-owned property, despite
two prior dismissals for want of a substantial federal question of cases raising the
same issue. General Fin. Corp. v. Archetto, 369 U.S. 423 (1962); Heisey v. County of
Alameda, 852 U.S. 921 (1956).
195. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 8d 584, 615-17, 487 P.2d 1241, 1263-65, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601, 623-25 (1971). The case the court had to contend with was McInnis v. Ogilvie,
394 US. 822 (1969), afig. mem. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. IMI.1968).
196. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 8d at 616-17, 487 P.2d at 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
624-25.
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Courts could appropriately treat the Sanchez decision in a similar
manner. Though the issue of requiring a search for alternatives was
the only issue the Supreme Court was asked to address in Sanchez,
the dismissal should not be seen as fully indicative of the Court's
probable response to the question of alternatives if the issue is
squarely before it again, fully briefed and argued. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico had, it is to be remembered, accorded the issue
brief and hasty treatment, and the Supreme Court of the United
States had never decided any case challenging the traditional mechanisms for committing the mentally ill. Moreover, the jurisdictional
papers for Sanchez, though citing several first amendment and commerce clause cases requiring the use of alternatives, appear in the
light of hindsight to have devoted insufficient attention to demonstrating to the Court that civil commitment involved constraints on
liberties of comparable importance. 197
That the federal constitutional questions loom much larger than
the Supreme Court implied is indicated by the fact that, since
Sanchez, two federal courts (probably unaware of Sanchez) have
indicated that the Constitution requires that alternatives to civil
commitment be employed whenever effective for the state's needs.
In 1969, in Covington v. Harris,198 Judge Bazelon, writing for the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reaffirmed
the court's holding in the Lake case' 99 and went on to imply strongly
that the Lake holding had roots in the Constitution:
The principle of the least restrictive alternative consistent with
the legitimate purposes of a commitment inheres in the very nature
of civil commitment, which entails an extraordinary deprivation of
liberty .... A statute sanctioning such a drastic curtailment of the
rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly, construed in
order to avoid deprivations of liberty without due process of law.2 00
20
Except for a footnote citing Aptheker and quoting from Shelton, '
this passage was the sum of Judge Bazelon's analysis-understandable
197. The jurisdictional statement filed by Sanchez's counsel mentions at two points
the impact of civil commitment on basic constitutional rights (Appellants Jurisdictional
Statement, Sanchez v. New Mexico, 396 U.S. 276 (1969), at 4, 9-10), once listing some
of the rights in summarizing the arguments briefed in the state court and once again
in summarizing his argument at the end. At neither point does he fully develop his
arguments. The scantiness of the argument can in part be attributed to the length
limits on jurisdictional statements, but, whatever the reason, the Court did not have
before it the full arguments that can be made.
198. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
199. See text accompanying notes 143-46 supra.
200. 419 F.2d at 623.
201. 419 F.2d at 623 n.17.
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since the court had previously found a statutory basis for requiring
the search for alternatives and had no need to develop a constitutional foundation.

A three-judge federal district court in Pennsylvania also appears
to have concluded that the search for alternatives is constitutionally
required. In Dixon v. Attorney General,20 2 Circuit Judge Biggs found
unconstitutional Pennsylvania's procedure for committing persons
to mental hospitals after they had served prison sentences. After a
brief discussion of the constitutional infirmities, the court entered
an order, with the consent of the parties, that not merely provided
for elaborate procedural protections for those facing commitment,
but also required the hospital involved to explore alternatives before
commitment. It further enjoined courts from committing an ill
person except upon "a specific finding based on a preponderance of
the evidence that placement at [the] Hospital is necessary.203
Whether this part of the consent order is supported by the court's
finding that the Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional is unclear.
Unlike many cases involving consent decrees, the court here did
make its own findings of unconstitutionality. 0 4 On the other hand,
though the failure of the state courts to determine the need for
inpatient hospitalization was one of the inadequacies alleged in the
complaint,2 0 5 the issue is not one of those dealt with by the court
in its brief discussion of the merits.
So far as I can find, no state court has been asked to decide
whether a search for less restrictive alternatives to civil commitment
is mandated under its own constitution. Moreover, the only state
other than New Mexico asked to address the issue as a federal constitutional question has reached the same result as Sanchez even more
abruptly. Counsel for an ill person in New York brought many
Supreme Court decisions, as well as Covington, to a trial court's
attention. The trial court dismissed the argument in a single sentence: "Plaintiff's contention as to alternative courses of treatment
... does not state a constitutional claim (cf. Lake v. Cameron ... ).,,2oo
202. 825 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
203. 325 F. Supp. at 974.

204. 325 F. Supp. at 972-78.
205. See 825 F. Supp. at 968.
206. Fhagen v. Miller, 65 Misc. 2d 163, 178, 817 N.Y.S.2d 128, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1970),
affd. as modified per curiam, 36 App. Div. 2d 926, 821 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1971), affd., 29
N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615, 828 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1972).
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Civil Commitment Involves So Severe an Infringement of
FundamentalLiberties that Alternatives Must Be Explored

In 1960, in Shelton the Supreme Court stated that whenever
"fundamental personal liberties may be stifled" by a state regulation,
states must use "less drastic means for achieving the same basic purposes."2-0 7 As we have seen, the Court's actions in other cases before
and since have been largely consistent with this general precept.
Thus, its action in the Sanchez case, dismissing out of hand an appeal
contending that state courts must explore less restrictive alternatives
to commitment, may rest on a judgment, however hastily formed,
that civil commitment endangers no "fundamental personal liberties."
A liberty is "fundamental" in the Court's view not because of
its subjective importance to the individual, but rather because it
finds a place in the provisions of the Constitution or in the scheme
of social organization the Constitution is believed to have sought
to protect. 0 3 In a recent case, for example, the Supreme Court in-

validated state laws conditioning welfare benefits on residence within
the state, for a substantial period on the ground that the requirements intruded excessively and, for some alleged functions, unneces20 9
sarily on an applicant's constitutionally based right to travel; yet
in another welfare case, in which the recipients stressed as the injured
interest solely their need for food and basic necessities, the Court
refused to listen to arguments that the state regulation was unnecessarily broad.2 10 Although most people, if forced to choose, would
rather eat than travel, the Constitution, according to the Court,
protects travel but is neutral toward sustenance. Some state courts
207. 364 US. at 488. See more extensive quotation in note 181 supra. See also
similar phrasing in NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964).
208. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). See Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations,
Things Fundamentaland Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 Mien. L. RR. 235,
236-40 (1965); Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HtAv. L. R1v. 7, 24 (1969).
209. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The case was based on the equal
protection clause coupled, somewhat inartfully, with the right to travel. The District
of Columbia argued that its one-year residency requirement served as a safeguard
against fraudulent receipt of benefits from two states at once. The Court found that
"less drastic means" were "available"--that is, simply sending a letter of inquiry to
the state from which the applicant had moved. 394 U.S. at 637.
210. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484, 486 (1970). The Court explicitly rejected the applicability of the less restrictive alternative principle announced in the
Shelton case (397 US. at 484), even though there were persuasive arguments raised in
dissent by Justice Marshall that the family grant limits at issue were unnecessarily
broad for the state's purposes. 397 U.S. at 526-27.
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have taken much the same position, requiring the use of alternatives
when constitutionally protected liberties were at stake but not when
the citizen was asserting no more than that a government regulation
-for example, of marijuana-was broader or harsher than necessary.211
Accordingly, though judicial review of the necessity for governmental actions might be wise and justifiable in a far wider range of
cases, 2 12 the question under current law for purposes of this article
is whether civil commitment involves infringements of constitution211. See Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 195-96, 243 N.E.2d 898, 904 (1969)
(recognizing principle of least restrictive alternative in first amendment cases, but rejecting its application in cases attacking constitutionality of marijuana laws).
212. Under the broadest possible standard, courts would review the availability of

less restrictive alternatives for all governmental regulations conceivably on the theory
that an unnecessarily oppressive regulation deprives the person regulated of his liberty
(to act inconsistently with the regulation) without due process of law. This position
is not wholly devoid of merit. Early in this century after all, the Supreme Court did
adopt essentially this position under the due process clause with regard to economic
regulation; and, if the Court had consistently examined the question of necessity with
as much sympathy for the legislatures' concerns for protecting workers and consumers
as it displayed for industry's freedom to act as it pleased, the doctrine might have
served a legitimate and valuable function. It is certainly desirable that the economy
not be dogged by unnecessary regulation. See Struve, supra note 183. The courts,
however, are unlikely to begin searching for alternatives for all regulation-and such
a burden on courts may well make little sense as an efficient allocation of responsibilities
between courts, on the one hand, and legislatures and administrative agencies on the
other. Given the other matters for which a judiciary is necessary, it would be an unwise
use of judicial resources for courts to review whether a stoplight was necessary at the
corner of Elm and Main or whether it is necessary to ban campfires in Central Park.
But is the Supreme Court's apparent requirement that less restrictive alternatives
be used only when regulations imperil "fundamental personal liberties" (or other
constitutionally protected liberties) the only place a line might be drawn short of a
position that courts review the necessity for all regulations? I can suggest two middle
grounds, each of which might lead to a close review of commitment of the mentally ill.
The first, borrowed from the approach suggested in the often-quoted, rather shopworn
Carolene Products footnote (United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938)) would be to require an examination of alternatives for regulations especially
affecting "discrete and insular minorities"--minorities that have unequal access either to
the polls or to the legislature's ear and thus can find only through the courts any
protection from unnecessary regulation. Those confined in mental hospitals stand in
this position.
A second standard that might be coupled with the first is even more imprecise. It
would lead to a judicial search for alternatives whenever the threatened governmental
regulation has important and substantial impact upon the lives of those affected. Cf.
Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 65 Cal. 2d 349,
363 n.10, 420 P.2d 735, 744 n.10, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 32 n.10 (1966) ("[The Shelton] principle has ... no application to a purely economic regulation, impinging in no significant
way upon the dignity or freedom of the individual'). Admittedly fluid, a standard
essentially this fluid has guided the Supreme Court in determining under the due
process clause how elaborate a hearing or other procedural protection the government
must provide before taking various kinds of actions (see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
263 (1970)) and has been suggested by a minority of Justices as a guide for applying
more rigorous review in cases decided under the equal protection clause (Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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ally protected liberties under either state constitutions or the federal
constitution.
Nearly forty state constitutions contain provisions establishing the right of their citizens to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
214
happiness 2 1 3 Some state courts have read this language expansively
21 5
and viewed it as a substantive limit on the legislature's powers.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has, for example, defined the bounds
of protected freedom in broad terms-"the right of men to walk in
the field, in the country or on the streets of a city, to stand under
open sky in a public park and enjoy the fresh air.... to visit a friend
in his home and enjoy an evening together.21 6 Wielding this language, it has stricken more than one state law restricting freedom
of movement when it found the state had gone "further than necessary" to protect a legitimate interest. 2 7 Of course, all the aspects of
freedom for which the Hawaii court expresses concern-walking in
a park or visiting a friend-are constricted or eliminated for persons
who are civilly committed, and, if the Hawaii court is to be consistent with its earlier decisions, it should require the use of less restrictive alternatives to civil commitment whenever they will serve the
state's legitimate needs. Many state appellate courts have indeed
acknowledged the massive constriction of freedom that civil commitment entails.218 Lawyers would be well advised to scour the terms
of their own often little-explored state constitutions as well as the
decisions of their courts to see whether similarly expansive language
lies hidden.
213. The language is typically found in the opening articles of the state's constitution. E.g., ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2; CAL. CONsr. art. 1, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; GA.
CONsT. Preamble; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 1; KAN. CONsT. Bill of Rights, § 1; N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 1; PA. CONsr. art. 1, § 1; VA. CONST. art I, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1.
214. See, e.g., State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D. 565, 9 N.W.2d 914 (1943); Pavesich v.
New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 195, 50 S.E. 68, 70 (1904); Young v.
Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853, 45 S.E. 327 (1903).
215. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Miller, 142 La. 163, 76 S. 596 (1917) (invali.

dating a city ordinance restricting the living area of black prostitutes as an infringement of their "essential right to live in the community').
216. State v. Shigematsu, -

Hawaii -,

483 P.2d 997, 1001 (1971). The relevant

provision of the Hawaii constitution is article I, § 2.
217. State v. Shigematsu, -

Hawaii at -,

483 P.2d at 1001 (invalidating a statute

declaring it a crime to be present "in a room ... difficult of access.., to police officers
where gambling instruments [are] exhibited or exposed to view'); State v. Abellano,
50 Hawaii 384, 395, 441 P.2d 33a, 340 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a statute making

it a crime to be present at a cockfight (concurring opinion)). See also City of Seattle
v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 408, 423 P.2d 522, 525 (1967).
218. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bles v. Merrick, 2 Ohio St. 2d 13, 16, 205 N.E.2d 924,
926 (1965); In re Allison, 336 Mich. 316, 58 N.E.2d 90 (1953).

HeinOnline -- 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1157 1971-1972

1158

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1107

The place of freedom from confinement is more uncertain under
the United States Constitution than under such state constitutions.
Does civil commitment involve intrusions on fundamental personal
liberties protected under the federal constitution? Or does it merely
impinge on interests that, however important they may tower for
the individual, are, like hunger, not a matter of federal constitutional concern? Judge Bazelon in the Covington case felt justified
in requiring exploration of less restrictive alternatives to commitment by pointing to the "extraordinary deprivation of liberty" it
involves. 219 It is indeed hard to accept that there can be any "fundamental personal liberty," to use Shelton's term,220 more fundamental
than personal liberty itself and personal liberty is, of course, what is
at risk in its most literal sense for the mentally ill. Yet, except for
the cruel and unusual punishment clause and the excessive bail
clause, the federal constitution places no explicit substantive limits
on "extraordinary deprivations of liberty," providing by its terms
only procedural protections. Judge Bazelon, however swift his reasoning, was nevertheless correct.
Of rights protected under the federal constitution, those most
obviously constricted by commitment are a person's right to travel
and his right of free association. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized, under a variety of constitutional rubrics, 221 the right of
Americans to move about from place to place within the nation or
the world. "Freedom of movement," the Court has justly found, "is
basic to our scheme of values." 222 Civil commitment does not merely
penalize movement, as do welfare residency requirements, 228 or somewhat curtail it, as do passport limitations. 2 24 It eradicates it altogether. In the same manner, freedom of association-the right of
"the people to gather in public places for social or political purposes, 12 25 their right to associate with people of their choice, protected
219. 419 F.2d at 623.

220. 364 U.S. at 488.
221. Justice Harlan in his dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 665-71

(1969), surveyed the variety of constitutional provisions under which various Justices
at various times have found a basis for a right to travel among the states. These
include the commerce clause, the privileges and immunities clause in article IV, the
privileges and immunities clause in the fourteenth amendment, and the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. The right to travel internationally was found to flow
from the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Kent v. Dulles, 357 US. 116, 125
(1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964).
222. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).
223. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618 (1969). Another invalidated "penalty" was
a tax on crossing the state line. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
224. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
225. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
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under the first amendment-is drastically circumscribed 22M Suddenly
the sphere within which the ill person may travel or associate shrinks
from the globe, or the state, or the city down to a day room of forty,
or sixty, or two hundred others whom he did not choose to know.
Justice Douglas has correctly said of the rights of travel and association that they "make all other rights meaningful-knowing,
studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing and even thinking."227 His points apply as fully when these rights are viewed in
their most commonplace forms. The right to travel is typically disputed in the context of impediments to travel across state or national
borders. The person committed to a hospital is, of course, precluded
from such travel and that barrier alone would justify applying the
principle of the least restrictive alternative to civil commitment.
But it is important to recognize that the travel most valued by the
bulk of civilly committed persons-not travel to Moscow or Cuba,
but travel across the street or through the park-is also protected by
the federal right to travel. In a federal system, travel across state lines
does require special protection, but the reasoning in cases establishing protection for international travel under the due process clause
applies as fully to travel within a state or city as it does to travel
overseas. The Court in the principal cases dealing with international
travel has not attached special significance to the fact that the travel
was international but rather to the fact of travel itself: "Freedom of
movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers
228
as well, was a part of our heritage."
In recent months, in striking down on grounds of vagueness
an ordinance aimed at "common night walkers," a unanimous Court
through Justice Douglas sang hymns of praise to "'wandering and
strolling.' "229 These amenities of American life, though not mentioned in the Constitution, "have been in part responsible for giving
our people [their] feeling of independence and self-confidence" and
"have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating
226. One of the first cases to articulate a separate right of association under the
first amendment was NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Several cases, many of
them also growing out of the southern states' crusades against civil rights organizations, a few out of comparable attacks on the Communist Party, have been decided
since. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (civil rights); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963) (civil rights); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539 (1963) (civil rights and communists); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967) (communists).
227. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US. 500, 520 (concurring opinion).
228. Kent v. Dulles, 357 US. 116, 126 (1958). Accord, Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964). See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1965).
229. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 US. 156, 163-64 (1972).
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silence. '230 Our heritage was probably less solicitous of the traveler
than the Court suggests, 231 but, whatever its lineage, the right to
travel and free movement rests today on reasoning that applies at
least as securely to the eccentric's movements within his community
as to Aptheker's voyages across the sea.
If lawyers characterize the right to travel as providing some
measure of protection for all movement, 232 courts may recoil from
relying on the right as a basis for requiring close review of civil
commitments. Whether courts will find that freedom of association
provides a more manageable analytical framework is unclear. Based
on the first amendment, freedom of association typically evokes
grandiose images of protection for membership and participation in
political organizations. 233 Civil commitment curtails such activities
but, like curtailment of travel, the more painful losses for most
committed persons are probably the more mundane aspects of human
association-the right to keep company with people of one's choice.
This, too, the Supreme Court's decisions make clear, the right of
association protects-not merely the right to join a union or a
political party but the right to stand on a street comer and chew
the fat with old friends. Last Term, for example, the Court struck
down, as a violation of the federal constitutional rights of association and assembly, a city ordinance that prohibited "three or more
persons to assemble" on a sidewalk and "conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to [others]." 23 4 Though the case involved youthful
political demonstrators, Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court,
struck down the statute as unconstitutional on its face and based his
decision on "the right of the people to gather in public places for
' 235
social or political purposes.
In short, the curtailment of the rights of travel and association,
given the broadened view of those rights, is not a mere incidental
side effect of commitment; curtailment of movement and social in230. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. at 164.
231. The Court's recall of history is, as often, shaped by the result it was seeking.
At least as to some classes of people, the poor especially, exercising the right to travel
in the eighteenth century involved the risk of being shipped back forcibly to one's
place of origin. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 11, at 20-25.
232. See, e.g., the expansive view of the right to travel taken by Amsterdam, Federal
Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General
Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 Ciau. L. BuLL.

205, 213-15 (1967).

233. See the cases cited in note 226 supra. See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
2a (1968) (protection of political party participation).
234. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 (1971).
235. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. at 615.
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tercourse is often in fact one of the central purposes of commitment.
And that is not the end of the commitment's curtailment of an ill
person's liberties. His rights peaceably to assemble, 36 to communicate and receive communications from others,2 37 to exercise his
religious belief through ceremonies of his choice,238 and to enjoy his
privacy in the company of his spouse, 239 or even someone not his
spouse, 240 are all but totally ended.
I have sensed, however, in writing the above paragraphs that the
fact that the curtailment of liberty by civil commitment is so total
and that civil-commitment legislation does not by its terms refer to
"travel," to "association," or to sexual relations with one's spouse
may, by some ironic and inappropriate process, appear to make such
rights irrelevant to an analysis of the issues surrounding civil commitment. Much the same problem is posed in discussing the seriousness of a policeman's killing of a fleeing suspect in terms of its
impact on the suspect's right to trial by jury. Perhaps an unconscious
desire to deny the impact of confinement (or killing) leads us to
241
refuse to think seriously about the loss of freedom involved.
In any event, the case for holding that civil commitment encroaches on fundamental rights rests not alone on its impairment of
such rights as travel and association. Though their impairment is
the strongest source of support, the Supreme Court has also indicated
that physical confinement in itself, without reference to other rights,
warrants special scrutiny under the Constitution.
Each of the cases that the Supreme Court has decided touching
236. The first amendment by its terms protects "the right of the people peaceably
to assemble." For an example of a Supreme Court decision resting on the right of
assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 US. 35& (1937).
237. Regarding the right to receive communications from others, see Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
238. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971)
(mental patient who was a Christian Scientist could not be compelled to take tranquilizing medication).
239. This right is protected under "penumbras" of specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
240. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 40 U.S.L.W. 4303 (U.S. March 22, 1972) (holding unconstitutional under the equal protection clause a statute making it a felony to distribute contraceptives to unmarried, but not to married, persons. In reaching this
decision the Court said, "If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusions
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." 40 U.S.L.W. at 4308 (emphasis original)).
241. Once, while working at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C., I raised
the issue of conjugal visits for the patients in a building housing men found not
guilty by reason of insanity. A psychiatrist responded that such visits were unimportant, for the men had more important problems to worry about.
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on aspects of civil commitment makes clear the Court's recognition
that it is dealing with particularly sensitive areas of regulation. For
example, in upholding Minnesota's commitment of sexual psychopaths, the Court acknowledged "the special importance of maintaining the basic interests of liberty in a class of cases where the law...
may be open to serious abuses in administration." 242 In another
decision, the Court mentioned, without elaboration, the impact of
commitment on "fundamental rights." 243 In yet another rendered
in the past few months the Court emphasized that commitment involved "a massive curtailment of freedom. ' 244 These decisions provide strong indications of the Court's concern for freedom from
245
physical confinement.
In three other decisions dealing with somewhat different forms
of confinement, the Court has either explicitly indicated that it was
subjecting a law or procedure to close scrutiny because of its impact
on physical freedoms or reached a result that cannot be explained
except in terms of such close scrutiny having been given. In 1944,
in Korematsu v. United States, 246 the Court upheld the military order
excluding persons of Japanese ancestry from parts of the West Coast
-effectively barring many from their homes. The most remembered,
pernicious aspect of the ban was its ethnic basis, but the Court expressed no less concern for its curtailment of free movement. "Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except
under circumstances of direct emergency and peril, is inconsistent
with our basic governmental institutions. '247 The Court upheld the
exclusion, but only because of the apprehension by military authorities of the "gravest imminent danger to public safety" 248 during time
of war.
242. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 276-77 (1940).
243. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 113 (1966) (holding unconstitutional as a
denial of equal protection New York's system of transferring persons completing prison
terms to mental hospitals upon completion of their sentence.) See also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 711 (1962).
244. Humphrey v. Cady, 40 U.S.L.W. 4324, 4325 (U.S. March 22, 1972) (remanding
for a full hearing a case challenging the constitutionality of Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act
that permitted holding a person beyond maximum term of sentence when found dangerous as a sexual deviant; the Court found the extended commitment essentially
similar in impact to commitment under the state's civil commitment code).
245. As this article went to press, the Court gave yet another indication of its concern
by holding that states may not commit a person indefinitely upon a finding of incompetence to stand trial. Jackson v. Indiana, 40 U.S.L.W. 4615 (U.S. June 7, 1972).
246. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Compare City of New Orleans v. Miller, 142 La. 163, 76
S. 596 (1917), discussed in note 215 supra.
247. 323 U.S. at 219-20.
248. 323 U.S. at 218.
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Over twenty years later, the Court dealt with a second gross restriction on free movement. In 1967, in In re Gault,249 the Court
held that states must accord broad procedural protections to those
facing commitment to juvenile institutions. Without alluding to
abridgment of rights of association or travel, it required these protections in substantial part because a youth adjudged a juvenile "may
be restrained of liberty for years. '250 Indeed, Justice Fortas, writing
for the Court, expressed chagrin that the juvenile judge in the case
before them had not explored alternatives to commitment, 25 ' and
even extended a mild hint (so mild that the other concurring Justices might hardly have noticed in an opinion stretching fifty-seven
pages) that a constitutional obligation might exist to perform the
examination.25 2 Three years later, the Court extended its holding in
Gault to require proof of the juvenile's guilt beyond a reasonable
2 53
doubt, again because of the "loss of... liberty" that was at risk.
The third and most recent decision, Williams v. Illinois,254 arose
in the context of a criminal, rather than civil, commitment, but was
described by Justice Harlan in concurrence as "unquestionably
show[ing] that this court will squint hard at any legislation that
deprives an individual of his liberty-his right to remain free."2 55
At first glance, a reader may perceive little extraordinary squinting.
Williams involved an attack on a practice common in many states
under which misdemeanants unable to pay fines work them off in
jail at the rate of a few dollars each day. Williams had been sentenced to a year's imprisonment coupled with a fine. Unable to pay
at the end of his sentence, he faced an extra 101 days in jail. Speaking for seven Justices, Chief Justice Burger held that the system of
working off fines impermissibly discriminated on the basis of wealth
and that the equal protection clause requires that the statutory
249. 387 U.s. 1 (1967).
250. 287 U.S. at 27.
251. 287 U.S. at 28: "Under traditional notions, one would assume that in a case
like that of Gerald Gault, where the juvenile appears to have a home, a working
mother and father, the juvenile judge would have made a careful inquiry and judg-

ment as to the possibility that the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home."
252. 887 U.S. at 28 n.41: "With respect to the possible duty of a trial court to explore alternatives to involuntary commitment in a civil proceeding, cf., Lake v. Cameron ....which arose under statutes relating to the treatment of the mentally ill."
253. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 558, 266, 268 (1970).
254. 299 U.S. 235 (1970).
255. 299 U.S. at 263. The significance of Williams in this regard has also been

recognized by a recent law review article. Wexler, Scoville, et al., supra note 140, at
142-43.
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ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the
250
same for all defendants without regard to economic class.
Justice Harlan concurred in the result. He pointed out, as he
had in other cases involving de facto discrimination between rich
and poor,257 that analysis under the equal protection clause masks
the real concerns troubling the Court. It is true that the fine structure works differing hardships on rich and poor, but so also do fees
for government publications, sales taxes, and turnpike tolls, none of
which are likely to be held unconstitutional. What is critical in the
cases in which the Court has overturned such de facto discriminations
is the importance under the Constitution of the item or privilege
that the poor cannot afford. 258 Prior to Williams the inaccessible
items had been trial transcripts or other tools of criminal defense. 2 0
In Williams for the first time it was the right to physical freedom
itself. 26 0
Whether the Court will recognize or evade the implications of
its apparent concern for freedom from confinement is another question, for the Court has by no means always "squint[ed] hard at any
legislation that deprives an individual of his liberty." In 1971, for
example, Justice Harlan wrote a decision in one of the death penalty
cases that, though it dealt with procedural rather than substantive
rules, indicated a distressing insensitivity to the very interests he had
sought to protect in Williams. Speaking for the Court he held that
a state need not employ a two-stage trial process that separates the
evidence the jury hears for its decision on guilt from the evidence it
hears for its decision on the sentence, even though such a bifurcadon could fully serve the state's legitimate interests and more fully
protect against the execution of innocent persons. 20 1 A lesser alterna256. 399 US. at 24041.
257. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29, 34-36 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 360, 361-63 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
258. See Professor Michelman's compelling defense of Justice Harlan's rejection of
the majority's equal protection analysis in these cases. Michelman, supra note 208, at 36.
259. See cases cited in note 257 supra.

260. The Williams decision is also important because the Court seemed clearly to
have been influenced by the availability to Illinois of alternative means of serving its
goals. Though it did not rest its opinion on this ground, the Court devoted a paragraph
to the "numerous alternatives," such as installment payment plans, that might permit
the state to satisfy its claim against the defendant without having to jail him. 399 U.S.
at 244-45. See also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1971).
261. McGautha v. California, 402 US. 183, 208-22 (1971). See also Justice Douglas's
dissent, 402 US. at 226-48. The unfortunate result in McGautha was foreshadowed in

another unfortunate opinion of Justice Harlan in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554
(1967). There the Court upheld Texas's equally meritless system of trying defendants

under its habitual offender statute by including in the trial on the merits of a current
charge the evidence of prior convictions necessary to prove him a repeater.
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tive was not required even though state-inflicted death-the ultimate
destroyer of rights-was at issue.
Even more indicative of inconstancy in looking askance at legislation curtailing physical liberty is the Supreme Court's attitude
toward the dozens of criminal convictions that come before it each
year. Although the Court has acknowledged that its concern for the
procedural protection of the criminal defendant derives from the
freedom that is imperiled, 2 2 it has never required-and is unlikely
ever to require-case-by-case inquiries into the suitability of com2 3
munity-based treatment for every person convicted of a crime.
The frequent insensitivity of American courts to the consequences
of imprisonment is no less tragic than their insensitivity to commitment of the mentally ill, but there is at least analytically a significant difference between criminal and civil confinement-not a difference in the degree of the loss of freedom, but rather in the purposes
for confinement and their susceptibility to review for alternatives.
A principal historical function of the criminal sanction, apparently
accepted by the Supreme Court,2 4 is retribution. Not so for civil
commitment.20 5 Civil commitment may in many individual cases
262. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970). In holding that juveniles must be found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Court in Winship first found that adults accused of crime had to be so
found. The Court said: "The requirement of proof beyond doubt has this vital role
in our criminal procedure for cogent reason. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that
he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would
be stigmatized by the conviction." 397 U.S. at 363.
263. In Williams, for example, the Court explicitly assumed as beyond question
that the state could consistently with the constitution have prescribed a flat jail term
for rich and poor alike of one year and 101 days. 399 U.S. at 241.
264. An acceptance of retribution as a permissible goal of criminal statutes is
implicit in the Supreme Court's decision invalidating an Illinois statute that permitted
the prosecution to challenge for cause veniremen who indicated scruples about imposing the death penalty. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) ("[A] jury
that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little
more-and must do nothing less--than express the conscience of the community .... ').
See also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 203-08 (1971) (rejecting arguments that
standards must be given juries in imposing the death sentence in part on the ground
that too many elusive factors, inciuding some that relate solely to retribution, are
involved). Cf. Powell v. Texas, 592 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (approving Texas statute forbidding public drunkenness on the ground that it did not impose a sanction on a mere
status, but rather on public behavior that, among other attributes, "offends the moral
and esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the community').
265. Civil commitment also differs from penal commitment in another way; penal
sanctions are often imposed to scare the defendant and others into refraining from
certain conduct in the future. In terms of the principle of least restrictive alternatives,
however, it is unclear whether criminal courts would find any greater difficulty in
assessing whether an alternative to prison will serve the state's deterrent purposes than
they would in assessing whether alternatives will serve the state's rehabilitation interests.
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be motivated by a desire to punish the ill person for causing the
rest of us discomfort, 266 but I have never seen a judicial opinion or
commitment statute recognizing punishment as a function of commitment. Thus, in criminal cases, if a state legislature has imposed
a mandatory minimum jail term, state courts can do little but defer
to the legislature's essentially political judgment about the length
of punishment needed to satisfy society's need for revenge.2 0 7 When
legislatures have imposed no minimum, state judges could be required to explore whether the community's need for retribution can
be satisfied without incarceration-I would be glad to see them compelled to do so26S-but a judge's conclusions would at least be most
26 9
difficult for another court to review.
Even if courts distinguished criminal from civil confinement, a
holding that commitment of the ill requires scrutiny of lesser alternatives might still carry broad implications. Recognizing the fundamental rights impaired by commitment should all but answer the
question of the right to counsel and other procedural protections in
commitment proceedings-questions that, somewhat surprisingly,
have not been addressed by the Supreme Court.270 Moreover, several
forms of noncriminal incarceration other than that of the mentally
ill might be swept within the reasoning of any case requiring consideration of alternatives of civil commitment. Confinement of the
266. See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
267. But see People v. Anderson, - Cal. 3d -, 493 P.2d 880, 895-97, 100 Cal. Rptr.
152, 167-69 (1972) cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (US. June 7, 1972) (California supreme
court found the death penalty in violation of the state constitution's cruel and unusual
punishment clause. In reaching its decision, the court found that the death penalty
was more onerous than necessary to serve society's need for retribution.).
268. For a study of the use of criminal sanctions at its most absurd-the criminal
punishment of alcoholics for public drunkenness-see R. NarbfE, Two MILLION UNNECEssARY ARRS: REMOVING A SOCIAL CONCERN FROM THE CRIMINAL SYSTM (1971).
269. Former Justice Goldberg and Professor Alan Dershowitz have recently suggested that a criminal punishment should be held cruel and unusual unless it serves
"some other end besides retribution more effectively than any other less severe penalty"
-and argue for applying the least restrictive alternative principle to hold the death
penalty unconstitutional. Goldberg &Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. Ray. 1773, 1797 (1970). I fear that, despite their arguments and
despite the fact that the Supreme Court of California seems to have accepted them in
large part (see note 267 supra), the Supreme Court of the United States will hold that
the eighth amendment permits criminal punishments even if they are intended to
serve (and in fact serve) nothing other than a retributive function, so long as the
particular form of punishment inflicted is not in itself or in relation to the offense
found particularly uncivilized or inhumane. In any event, the constitutionality of the
death penalty under the eighth amendment is pending before the Court now in Furman
v. Georgia, No. 69-5003 (1971 Term). In the unlikely event that the Justices adopt
the Goldberg and Dershowitz reasoning and apply it to all criminal commitments,
similar examination of alternatives to civil commitment should almost certainly follow.
If they reject it, civil commitment will remain distinguishable.
270. I trust Gault settles this question, but the Supreme Court itself has not an-
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tubercular, the epileptic, the defective delinquent, the retarded, 271
and the juvenile delinquent27 2 involve the same curtailments of
liberty. As to all of these, I can offer no sensible distinctions to
the Court. They require no less attention than commitment of the
mentally ill.
The potential reach of a holding that civil commitment involves
intrusions on fundamental liberties stretches even farther. Rent
controls, speed limits, zoning laws, licensing requirements, divorce
laws, all curtail the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they
please. Involuntary incarceration marks merely the end point of a
vast continuum of government restrictions on human conduct. If
incarceration differs only in degree and not in kind, the Court might
fear that any intervention to protect freedom from confinement
would resurrect the bogeyman of substantive due process. 27 3 In the
heyday of substantive due process, the Supreme Court, in Meyer v.
Nebraska2 7 4 had listed "freedom from bodily restraint" as the most
fundamental of freedoms but, as Justice Black took delight in pointing out,2 7 5 had also included freedom of contract among the great
rights. It is language like that in Meyer that threatens to give freedom
a bad name.
Here I think the Court can draw sensible lines. It need not
resist a close examination of civil commitment or other commitments
for fear of rejuvenating substantive due process. Civil commitment's
direct intrusion on the freedoms of travel, association, free exercise
of religion, and other freedoms sufficiently distinguishes commitment
from most other forms of government regulation. Courts can rely
on these other rights without relying on the language of the due
process clause alone. In the unlikely event that courts would wish
to consider a citizen's interest in freedom from incarceration without
swered it. See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968) (relying on Gault
to require Wyoming to provide counsel before commitment).
271. A federal district judge in Alabama has recently ordered massive changes in
the treatment facilities and programs at a state institution for the retarded. Wyatt v.
Stickney, Civil Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala.), Order of April 13, 1972, implementing
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
272. For a slight suggestion by the Supreme Court that inquiry into alternatives is
required in juvenile commitment, see In re Gault, 881 U.S. 1, 28 nA1 (1967).
273. The Court has gone out of its way in the past three decades to avoid basing
decisions on substantive due process, leading to a stretching of other constitutional
rubrics. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479 (1965); Robinson v. California,
870 U.S. 660 (1962). The growth, flourishing, and demise of substantive due process
is well traced in the cases and notes in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAZISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSrITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMiENTS-QuESIONS 441-504 (1970).
274. 262 U.S. 390, 899 (1923).
275. Griswold v. Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479, 507, 516 n.7 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
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resting in any way on these well-developed freedoms, they can draw
on thirty years of Supreme Court decisions such as Korematsu and

Williams, which, without explicitly distinguishing other forms of
governmental regulation, nevertheless carve out a special place for
freedom from incarceration that now seems justified by judicial
history, even if not by the literal language of the Constitution.
IV.

ENSURING THAT A MEANINGFUL SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES

OccURs
If other jurisdictions join the District of Columbia in requiring
a search for less restrictive alternatives to commitment, the experience in the District warns that such decisions alone will not ensure
that a meaningful search occurs. At least three further steps must be
taken: (1) an adequate professional staff must be available to perform the inquiry into alternatives; (2) the court must have the power
to compel the cooperation of community facilities the staff locates;
and (3) the search must occur before, rather than after, commitment.
A.

The Appropriate System To Ensure That Alternatives Are
Examined

In the District of Columbia, one of the few jurisdictions currently requiring its trial judges to explore alternatives in all civil
commitment proceedings, most judges are simply failing to do so.
The government, according to the United States Court of Appeals,
bears the initial obligation to search out and assess alternatives,2 70
but, in the vast bulk of cases, neither the staffs of the District's public
mental hospital nor any other governmental agency performs anything that can be even generously labeled a search. 277 Moreover,
neither the initial committing agency, the Commission on Mental
Health nor the reviewing agency, a federal district court, though
charged with making the final decisions regarding alternatives, receives testimony on alternatives or makes findings based on materials
in the record.
Of course, the patient in the District of Columbia may have a
remedy for the failure of the Commission and the court by appeal
to the court of appeals, but the appellate court cannot cure the
problem in the District of Columbia by simply ordering judges to
276. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
277. This and the next several points about the operation of the commitment
process in the District derive from telephone interviews with Robert Golten, of the
District of Columbia Public Defender Service. The Public Defender Service represents
nearly all persons for whom commitment is sought.
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meet their statutory obligations. It is true that many committing
judges across the country seem to ignore their statutory obligations
and accept an occasional reversal as the easy price to pay for swift
commitment processes, 2 78 but even the most conscientious judge or
commission needs more than the traditional clash of adversarial
testimony to make sensible judgments about alternatives.
As has been shown, the task of assessing alternatives to hospitalization bristles with difficulties. It demands continuing familiarity with
the range and capacity of the treatment approaches available in
the community as well as complex judgments about a particular
patient's suitability for treatment through them. Judges and committing agencies, if unaided by staffs of their own or by advice from
the hospital, are unlikely to make sensible decisions about community alternatives. In the District, the Commission on Mental
Health has no staff assigned to exploring alternatives; and the public
hospital is inadequately staffed to provide advice. In Ohio, where
courts are also explicitly permitted to draw on community alternatives, 79 the courts, at least in Cleveland, almost never do.28 0
If the principle of the least restrictive alternative were accepted
now, most other jurisdictions would find themselves in the same
unpromising position as the District and Ohio. To give the principle teeth-or even dentures-courts will need continuing professional advice about available alternatives. Generally in this country
when states require judges or administrative agencies to reach complex judgments outside their normal spheres of competence, they are
assisted by experts. Judges engaged in civil commitment do not
decide whether a person is ill solely on the basis of their own observations or the testimony of lay witnesses. Rather, state statutes almost
invariably require an examination by a physician or psychiatrist 281
282
and judges rely quite heavily on their advice.
Procedures in adult felony courts and juvenile courts offer an
even closer parallel. Judges in courts handling such cases generally arrive at decisions on sentencing with the aid of probation officers who
278. See, e.g., Pfrender, supra note 161, at 150-51 (reporting a study of 221 consecutive petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by patients at a public hospital in Michigan. Of the 221 petitions 198 were granted, 188 for defects in the initial commitment
process that the initial committing judge might have prevented or corrected.).
279. OHio RaV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (Page 1970).
280. Telephone interview with David Strand, Legal Aid Society, Cleveland, Ohio,
March 20, 1972. The Legal Aid Society has attorneys and law students working in the
public hospitals in Cleveland.
281. See statutes compiled in S. BRAKL & R. ROCK, supra note 2, Table 3.2, at
72-79.
282. See Pfrender, supra note 161, at 147.
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gather information and examine and assess community-based alternatives to imprisonment.8 3 The judge, swamped by dozens of responsibilities, can rarely keep abreast of the range and current capacity of
available facilities or assemble for himself the data necessary to
assess the convicted person's suitability for any of the facilities. Critics, it is true, complain about the adequacy of information that
probation officers today provide to juvenile and criminal judges, but
the solutions proposed generally call for an improvement in the
quality of information,284 not a return to a system in which judges
make decisions about probation aided only by the oral blandishments
of counsel.
Given the complexity of medical judgments that may be involved
in assessing community alternatives, as well as the fears and misconceptions of lay persons, including judges, about the mentally ill, a
functionally comparable system for exploring alternatives seems even
more desirable in civil commitment proceedings than in criminal or
juvenile cases. If states will not establish such systems voluntarily,
the Constitution can provide a basis for requiring their development. The obligation to establish such a system derives from the
principle of the least restrictive alternative: the Constitution, we
have concluded, imposes an obligation on states to explore less
restrictive alternatives before committing an ill person; merely relying on the parties to bring information about alternatives to the
court's attention will not assure the necessary exploration in most
cases; therefore, in order to protect the constitutional right-to assure it is not a right foundering for want of a remedy-the state must
establish a system that will adequately guarantee that the exploration occurs.
Many precedents exist for requiring the development of adequate
systems to protect constitutional rights. For example, the Supreme
Court compelled New York and sixteen other states to replace a
procedure in criminal trials that left the determination of the voluntariness of a confession primarily to the jury with a new procedure
283. For a description of the information-gathering process of probation officers in
criminal courts, see R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: TuE DECISION AS TO TYPE, I,_NGTH, AND
CONDrrIoNs OF SmrrENcE 11-55 (1969).
284. See, e.g., Tappan & Nicolle, An Appraisal of Juvenile Courts, in P. DRESSLER,
READINGS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 466 (1964):

The value of probation as a treatment measure is generally accepted. Nonetheless,
its ill-advised use has sometimes made it a synonym for leniency. The cardinal
elements of sound probation are careful selection of offenders and adequate supervision of probationers. Too often, however, untrained and overburdened staffs have
made a travesty of the selection and supervision processes.

HeinOnline -- 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1170 1971-1972

May 1972]

Alternatives to Civil Commitment

1171

that required the judge to make a preliminary finding of voluntariness and exclude confessions he found involuntary.28 5 Although New
York had long recognized an obligation to protect the defendant's
constitutional right not to incriminate himself, the method it had
chosen inadequately protected that right and therefore required replacement. Similarly, the Court has held that states must assure black
children the equal protection of the laws not merely by schools that
are separate but equal but, beyond this, by integrating the children
in the schools.28 6 Although not all Justices have agreed that federal
courts have a responsibility to prescribe remedies for the vindication
of federal constitutional rights,28 7 a majority of the Court nonetheless recognizes that the function of courts is not merely to articulate
such rights but also to ensure that they are protected. (To be sure,
what is suggested here pushes one step farther than the Court has
trod thus far: it asks courts to force the creation of effective systems
for exploring alternatives without waiting to observe whether merely
articulating the right will lead to an adequate search. The District
of Columbia's experience and a moment's reflection should lead
courts to act forcefully from the outset.)
Long-standing precepts of procedural due process add further
support. The Supreme Court has held that, before government takes
action against an individual bearing potentially serious consequences
for him, procedural due process requires that he be afforded a hearing, the format, scope, and participants of which will vary with the
nature of the interests at risk and the questions to be answered. 28 8
The demands of due process are generally considered satisfied if the
state extends to the affected person a "meaningful" opportunity to
be heard on each significant issue-"meaningfulness" in most cases
being considered assured by providing the opportunity to appear
285. Jackson v. Denno, 878 U.S. 368 (1964).
286. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also United States v. Wade,
888 U.S. 218 (1967), Miranda v. Arizona, 884 US. 436 (1966), and Mapp v. Ohio, 867

U.S. 643 (1961), which required governments to establish more substantial protections
for the constitutional rights of defendants in criminal cases.
287. For example, rejecting the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment,

Justice Harlan would have left entirely to the states the decision of the appropriate
remedies to protect against unreasonable searches (see Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)) and Justice Black believed that

unless the Constitution explicitly prescribes a remedy (as the fifth amendment does
but the fourth does not), no constitutionally compelled remedies exist (see 403 U.S. at
496-500 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)).
288. Stanley v. Illinois, 40 U.S.L.W. 4371, 4378 (U.S. April 3, 1972); Goldberg v.

Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63, 267 (1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 867 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
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personally, to call witnesses in one's own behalf, and to cross-examine opposing witnesses2 8 9 Perhaps courts would require no more
than this under state and federal due process clauses with regard to
the exploration of alternatives to civil commitment-that is, merely
require that the allegedly ill person be given an opportunity to be
heard regarding alternatives; but the Court has poured more into
the content of "meaningfulness" when the occasion has demanded
it.290

The issue of alternatives to commitment is unlike most of the
issues in dispute in cases that have provoked decisions regarding
adequate procedures under the due process clause. Most decisions
have wrestled with the minimum process that the state must offer
to assure an airing of reasonably straightforward factual questions
(Was Ms. Kelly eligible for public assistance? Are Mr. Sniadach's
wages subject to garnishment?) 91 In these cases merely giving the
affected person an opportunity to tell his version of the story (aided,
perhaps, by counsel) and interrogate the witnesses against him should
provide adequate protection. By contrast, when the issue is the range
of possible alternatives to commitment, affording an ill person or his
counsel the opportunity to speak his piece or call his own witnesses
will rarely provide a sufficient exploration and assessment. If, as
seems probable, providing staff to explore alternatives is the only
method of assuring a meaningful examination, then such a system
should be considered constitutionally required. 292 I understand, of
course, that there are limits on the costs that courts can reasonably
ask the public to bear in the name of due process; but, as we have
seen, governments have long borne the costs of systems for exploring
alternatives to penal or juvenile commitment. That fact alone seems
persuasive evidence that requiring the establishment of a comparable
system to explore alternatives to civil commitment would inflict no
intolerable burden.
If the Constitution does require some sort of institutionalized
system to ensure the examination of alternatives, it surely does not
compel the adoption of any specific system-so long as the system
adopted assures a reasonable likelihood that alternatives can be identified and evaluated. At least three models exist that states might be
289. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (welfare benefits); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 394 U.S. 337, 339.40 (1969) (wage garnishment).
290. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding, in a rather strained

use of the due process clause, that in order to provide a "meaningful" hearing to indigents seeking divorce, Connecticut must waive a requirement of a filing fee).
291. See note 289 supra.
292. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-77 (1971).
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likely to consider. None is free of problems. Like the problem of
choosing alternatives to commitment, each is less satisfactory than
one of the others in at least one aspect. Under the first model, to
me the most attractive, the responsibility for the search would rest
in the hands of trained personnel employed by the court itself. Such
a staff, probably best composed primarily of social workers, would
be comparable in purpose to the probation officers employed by
most juvenile and criminal courts and would be attuned to the
functions that the particular judge serves through commitment. A
court-based staff might also be able to clothe itself with some of the
awesomeness of the judge's office and bedazzle those administering
local programs and agencies into cooperation. And, perhaps most
important, with the staff under the direction of the judge, the likelihood seems great, given the experience in the area of probation
in criminal cases,29 3 that he will rely upon and trust their recommendations and equally important, that he will become personally,
involved in the development of new community-based programs.
One difference between criminal and civil commitment, however,
does complicate the matter: the central role in civil commitment
of the diagnosing psychiatrists. Psychiatrists dominate the commitment process in almost all states. Their suggestions regarding commitment have been followed in the vast bulk of cases 29 4 It would
therefore be highly desirable for the diagnosing psychiatrists to be
in a position to work closely with the staff within the court engaged
in exploring alternatives. On the other hand, since few well-qualified psychiatrists are likely to be interested in performing diagnostic
work only, placing full-time psychiatrists on the court staff may be
ill advised. One possible approach would be for the state to assign
the entire task of diagnosing and exploring alternatives to a community mental health center. 95 Such a center might be less firmly
in touch with the judge's wishes but would have the advantage of
combining in one setting the range of mental health professionals
who should contribute to the decision on placement. Operating in
293. See R. DAWSON, supra note 283, at 76-79 (1969) (indicating that probation reports are generally followed but often shaped by the probation officer's knowledge
of the judge's predispositions).
294. See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally I1, 44 TmXus L. REv. 424, 449 (1966).
295. Community mental health centers are required, under federal regulations, to

provide diagnostic services to other agencies including courts. See note 37 supra. One
early survey of centers found some centers reluctant to examine court cases on an in-

patient basis because wards were open and security could not be guaranteed. Ozarin &
Brown, New Directions in Community Mental Health Programs, 35 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 10 (1965).
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a closely analogous manner, at least one community mental health
center has saved large numbers of persons from hospitalization by
placing two of its social workers in the reception center of the state
hospital and diverting to the center "a considerable majority" of
26
those who live in the area it serves.
A second alternative open to the states would be to place the
burden of exploring alternatives on the staff of the state hospital to
which the patient is to be committed. Most hospitals already employ
social workers whose functions include the exploration of community
resources.2 17 States could thus, without the cost of adding an entirely
new staff within the courthouse, expand their existing hospital staffs
to ensure the exploration of alternatives for all patients. Because of
the appearance of efficiency here, many states, if forced to adopt
some system, would probably select this approach. And much can
be said for it. Hospital social workers may well be able to work more
closely with staff psychiatrists in arranging for the return of the patient to the community and thus avoid altogether the need for a
final commitment hearing. On the other hand, there are several
great drawbacks to placing sole responsibility in the hospitals. Unless the hospital is equipped to examine patients on an outpatient
basis-which many hospitals far from cities are not 2 s-it either will
be unable to perform the exploration for patients well enough to
remain at home pending a hearing or will have to seek the temporary commitment of everyone for diagnosis. How sadly ironic to
lock someone in a hospital, even on a short-term basis, simply to
permit staff to decide whether hospitalization is necessary.
Even if the hospital staff can examine the allegedly ill person as
an outpatient, the hospital is still objectionable as the search instrument because it is caught in a disquieting conflict of interest in providing advice, 299 a conflict that may raise doubts of constitutional
296. See R. GLAsscoT, J. SussEx, E. CUMMING & L. SAnTH, THE COMMUNITY MENTAL
HIEALH CENTER: AN INTman APPRAISAL 29 (1969) (discussing Mid-Houston Community
Mental Health Center).
297. In January 1970 there were 14,400 social workers employed in public and pri.
vate mental health; over 4700 of these were employed in state and county mental
hospitals. A. Jones, Staff and Manhours in Mental Health Facilities in the United
States, Statistical Note 51, Survey and Reports Section, National Institute of Mental
Health, Table 11, at 10-11 (1971).
298. The large public mental hospitals are frequently at great distances from the
cities they serve. See R. RocK, M. JAcoBsoN & R. JANoPAUL, Supra note 2, at 69. On the
other band, though generally not staffed today to perform searches into alternatives,
receiving hospitals in large cities, which serve the distantly located hospitals, might
perform the search. See id. at 66-69.
299. In a case in which a United States district court in the District of Columbia
requested a public hospital to examine an alleged sexual psychopath, Dr. Winfred
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dimensions about the fairness of a hearing in which the judge relies
on the hospital's recommendation. 00 Asked to advise about community care for a particular person, hospital staff may well feel consciously or unconsciously the need to justify inpatient care and
overstate its probable values. They are certainly likely to appear to
do so.301 Hospitals may also in general attract as staff those with the
greatest confidence in the efficacy of inpatient care.
A third possible approach is to make available to the ill person
himself the resources to examine alternatives. In New York City,
for example, the Mental Health Information Service, a governmentally funded agency, provides counsel to persons facing commitment
and hires psychiatric social workers to aid the attorneys in searching
for alternatives. 0 2 Although New York courts neither acknowledge
an obligation to employ the least restrictive alternative nor possess
broad enough powers over other agencies to compel their cooperation, if the courts were so equipped, the model of the Information
Service might provide a constitutionally acceptable structure for exploring alternatives. The experience in New York indicates that the
Information Service has brought about a decrease in hospitalizations
and an increase in out-of-court agreements between counsel and
hospital staff for community placement and treatment of the patient 303 In the District of Columbia the new Public Defender
Overholser, then superintendent of the hospital, responded by letter to the court, inquiring
whether it is proper that physicians on the staff of St. Elizabeths Hospital should
be called upon to determine whether a person not now in the Hospital as a patient
should be examined by them to determine whether he should be sent to the Hospital. In civil cases I am sure that a question of this sort would be raised and I
wonder whether it is entirely proper, whether legal or not, to make such an arrangement in a criminal case.
From the record in United States v. Allen, Crim. No. 438-60 (D.D.C. 1960), quoted in
PL ARENs,MAKE MAD THE GuLTny 72 (1969).
300. For cases in which judgments have been reversed because the judge or other
decision-maker was unlikely to render an impartial judgment, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927) (deprivation of property without due process when judge received a
percentage of the fines he levied); Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(Chairman of FTC who had, before joining Commission taken a public stand on a
case pending before the Commission found not in position to make impartial judgment).
301. See In re Murchison, 349 US. 133, 136 (1955) (due process requires not merely
the prevention of "actual bias," but beyond this, the prevention of "even the probability" of bias).
302. A dated description of the Mental Health Information Service can be found
in Note, The New York Mental Health Information Service: A New Approach to the
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 67 CoLurm. L. REv. 672 (1967). The addition of
psychiatric social workers has been more recent. See S. BRAxxL & R. Roca, supra note
2, at 156.
303. Zitrin, Herman & Kumasaka, New York's Mental Hygiene Law-A Preliminary

Evaluation, 54

MENTAL HYGIENE

28, 31-34 (1970).
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Agency is developing its staff along essentially the same lines and
seems to be experiencing similar success. 304 Many states, however,
do not now provide counsel to persons facing civil commitment. 30°
Those that do generally use a system of court appointments from
the regular bar.306 The abysmal records of such court-appointment
systems (under which lawyers are almost uniformly reported to spend
little, if any, time preparing for hearings)3 07 makes abundantly clear
that such systems should be held constitutionally inadequate to ensure that alternatives are explored.
Even with a promising model such as the Mental Health Information Service, a danger exists, somewhat like the danger of
leaving the task to the hospital, that the agency cannot serve adequately as both advocate for the patient and adviser to the court.
If its recommendations are regarded as simply an advocate's posturing, judges might understandably discount them. Perhaps the best
system-more elaborate than the Constitution may require-would
combine the three models: employing court and hospital personnel
for those hospitalized prior to a hearing; employing court and mental-health-clinic personnel for those remaining in the community
prior to the hearing; and providing to all persons counsel who are
aided by psychiatric social workers.
Juvenile court systems now typically carry out the search for
alternatives to incarceration through all three approaches suggested
here. Judges receive advice on community placement from their own
probation staff; whenever possible, juvenile institutions retain social
804. Interview with Robert Golten, Public Defender Agency, Aug. 10, 1971.

An instructive example of the valuable services that legal service agencies can perform in locating alternatives was, by happenstance, precipitated by the preparation of

this article. In checking for me in the spring of 1972 on the last years of the life of
Catherine Lake, the protagonist in the District of Columbia case discussed at several
points in this article (see, e.g., text accompanying notes 143-46), the Public Defender

Agency came upon Ms. Lake's sister, an aged, blind woman, confined in the same hospital that had held Ms. Lake. The sister had been a patient for six years and was
eager to leave. In May 1972 a social worker working with the agency found a place
for her in a local foster home (conversation with Jane Comerford).
305. As of 1970, "only twenty-four (states] provide for the appointment of counsel
in all hospitalization cases in which the person alleged to be mentally ill has none."
S. BaAxm,.& R. RocK, supra note 2, at 54. On the constitutional obligation to provide
counsel, see note 270 supra.
306. See S. BRAcx.r & R. Rocx, supra note 2, Table 3.12, at 125-27.
307. See R. RocK, M. JAcoBsoN & R. JANOPAUL, supra note 2, at 195-99 (describing
commitment in Kansas); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment
of the Mentally lll, 44 TmxAs L. Ra,. 424, 428 (1966) (describing commitment proceedings in Texas); Gilboy & Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill,
66 Nw. U. L. Ray. 429, 447-49 (1971) (describing the commitment process in Chicago,

where public defender office represents persons facing hospitalization); Wexler, Scoville,
et al., supra note 140, at 33-35, 51-60 (commitments in Arizona); Note, supra note
135, at 913-16 (commitments in Iowa).
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workers and other staff to explore community resources that would
permit the youth to return home; and the juvenile is provided with
counsel who, at the time of commitment, also advances arguments
for leaving him in the community.3 08
B.

The Power of Committing Courts To Compel Alternative
Facilities To Cooperate

The preceding section argues that the principle of the least restrictive alternative requires that states establish systems to ensure
an adequate exploration of community-treatment opportunities for
persons facing commitment. Even if states establish such systems,
the principle can be undercut if community-based treatment programs are free to refuse court-referred patients. As a way of inducing
legislatures to require community programs to cooperate, appellate
courts might hold that committing courts may not commit a person
to a hospital if a suitable community facility exists, whether or not
the community facility is willing to accept him. 0 9
Whether the principle should be held to reach so far poses a
puzzling question. If courts do not have the power to compel the
cooperation of publicly funded community clinics and the clinics
can simply refuse to accept patients from the courts, ill persons may
languish unnecessarily in the state hospital. Some clinics currently
do receive cases through the courts 310 but may resist large numbers
of referrals fearing that such patients will in general pose serious
behavioral problems or that the clinic itself will be held to a higher
level of accountability than usual. 311 On the other hand, empowering
courts to force clinics to accept patients may compromise the maximum effectiveness of the clinics. Clinics might receive so many
court referrals that they would be compelled to curtail their services
to those who come to them voluntarily. Such a state of affairs in
either the clinics or the hospitals would be deeply unfortunate. It
penalizes those who come for help voluntarily at a time when most
mental-health authorities wish to encourage voluntary treatment,
308. See, e.g., Hickey, A Guide to Utilizing Juvenile Dispositional Facilities, in
101 (1971) (held in Washington, D.C.,
Nov. 5-6, 1971).
309. Courts could reach such a holding on essentially the same reasoning that would
be used to compel the creation of systems for exploring alternatives: that it is necessary
in order to protect the patient's right to avoid hospitalization when less restrictive
alternatives are available. See text accompanying notes 285-87 supra.
310. C. Taube, Caseload of Federally Funded Community Mental Health Centers,
1969, Statistical Note 38, Survey and Reports Section, National Institute of Mental
Health, Table C, at 5 (1971).
SECOND ANNUAL JUVENME PRAcricE INsrrEr

311. See note 295 supra.
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and leads to placement by a scheme bearing no necessary relation to
the maximum efficacy of the clinic as an instrument of therapy.
Despite these dangers, I believe on balance it would be wise to
give judges the power to compel the cooperation of public facilities
in much the same way that they exercise such power over the public
hospital. Judges probably will rarely wish to place a person in a
facility or program that claims to be ill-suited to receive him. Moreover, judges should be permitted to take into account the manifold
goals the state is seeking to serve through its community-based pro.
grams in deciding whether placing a particular individual there
would permit the full range of state goals adequately to be served.
It nonetheless does seem wise for the court to hold the club of
compelled cooperation as a guard against unreasonable agency resistance.8

12

Some community facilities that are resolutely determined

not to cooperate will find ways to conceal their improper reasons for
refusing referrals, but others may respond to the judge's power by
greater willingness to cooperate in establishing a close working relation with the court. Such relations will be indispenable to the
success of efforts to deflect persons from involuntary hospitalization
into community-based programs.
C.

The Appropriate Stage in Proceedings for Examining
Alternatives

Another perplexing procedural problem remains: by what stage
in the commitment process must a committing court make a decision
on alternatives? Today, many of the ill persons in hospitals have
been brought there directly by families or police 3l a and held for
several days or even weeks under emergency commitments before
any hearing is conducted. 4 Fraught with dangers of abuse, the
emergency commitment system is under attack, thus far unsuccessfully, in the courts. 16 For persons held under emergency procedures,
312. A difficult question is posed by the case in which hospitalization would be unnecessary for an indigent if certain private care-say a visiting nurse-were provided.
Here is an existing alternative, the staff of which is perhaps willing to cooperate. The
problem for the judge here is not one of power to compel cooperation but of power to
order that compensation be paid to the private agency for its services. The issue here
is essentially the same as that posed in the last section of this article-that is, can
courts compel states to create new, less restrictive alternatives? See discussion in pt.
V. C. infra.
313. Police are involved in about one fourth of all public hospitalization in this
country. See R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, supra note 2, at 87-105.
314. See S. BRAxrx.L g R. Roox, supra note 2, at 42-45.
315. See Lessard v. Schmidt (E.D. Wis. Nov. 1971) (complaint), reported in 5
CLmARNGHOUsE Rnv. 766 (1972); Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E2d 615, 328
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the right to an exploration of less restrictive alternatives may prove
without content. During the time when court staff or others might
conduct the inquiry into alternatives, these patients would suffer
the very trauma and anxiety, particularly severe in the initial days
of commitment 3 16 that the principle of the least restrictive alternative should help avoid ever having to occur. A dilemma clearly
exists. Some people pose such serious dangers to others or are so
imminently suicidal that to delay commitment in order to permit
a thorough inquiry into alternatives might lead to the death of others
or render the question of alternatives moot by the ill person's own
death. Banning precipitous civil commitment may also lead police
to characterize ill persons' behavior as criminal to provide a different
and possibly even less desirable handle for assuming forceable control.3 17
Qualms may exist about the propriety of government preventing
a person from taking his own life and about the capacity of courts
and psychiatrists to identify those who in fact pose dangers to themselves or others, 313 but it seems probable that courts will continue
to permit summary commitment of ill persons thought imminently
likely to commit harm to themselves or others. The Supreme Court
has recently held in several cases that when government takes action
against an individual bearing serious consequences for him, it must,
as a general rule, offer him a hearing before, rather than after, taking
the action. 319 For example, welfare benefits may not be terminated
or wages garnished before providing a hearing. The Court has,
however, recognized the continued vitality of earlier decisions that
permitted summary action in cases in which only an immediate response could prevent irreparable harm to the public and in which
N.Y.S.2d 393 (1972) (upholding constitutionality of New York's emergency admission
procedures).
316. See E. GOFFmAN, supra note 83, at 14-35, 146-69.

317. See Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior, 23 HosPrrAL 9- COMNUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 101 (1972) (raising specter that new California com-

mitment statute that greatly limits occasions permitting civil commitment is leading
police to use the criminal process on patients previously hospitalized).
318. On the difficulties in predicting dangerousness in general and the special
ineptitude of doctors in doing so, see Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil
Commitment: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, PsycHoLoGy TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 43.
319. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (hearing on probability of liability required
before suspending driver's license of uninsured driver involved in accident); Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (hearing required before person considered an
excessive drinker may be barred from taverns); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(hearing required before welfare payments terminated); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969) (hearing required before wages garnished). See also Opp Cotton
Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941) (hearing must be offered before
administratively determined minimum wage is put into effect).
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the value of preventing the harm to the public was viewed as outweighing any harm inflicted on the individual against whom the
summary action was taken.8 20 Thus, the Court has consistently approved the seizure, in advance of hearing, of allegedly spoiled foods
or possibly dangerous medications. 321
The dilemma in civil commitment cases is that both summary
commitment and the failure to commit summarily can in the same
case produce substantial and irreparable harm-it is a human life
that the government is temporarily impounding, not allegedly maggot-infested hams. In any event, state courts seem to have resolved
the dilemma consistently in favor of state power to commit prior
to a hearing.2 The New York court of appeals, for example,
recently upheld a provision of its code permitting persons to be held
for fifteen days without a hearing if simply "alleged to be in need
of immediate observation, care or treatment for mental illness." 828
The New York decision was unsound. Courts might indeed wisely
invalidate even a commitment code that limits emergency commitments to those believed necessary to protect the public safety.
They could do so either on the basis of the woefully inadequate
capacities of psychiatrists and others in the mental health system to
predict dangerousness to self or others,8 24 or, in a manner comparable
to the Supreme Court's actions in some prior-hearing cases,812 because the risk of grave, even irreparable, harm to the public does
not outweigh the interest of the allegedly ill person in his freedom.
This belief that the individual's interest in freedom outweighs the
community's interest in security does, after all, underlie the constitutionally based right to bail in criminal cases, and the considerations in civil commitment, though not identical (because, in theory,
hospitalization offers treatment), are at least in substantial part the
same. Of course, the same argument resting on the individual's interest in his freedom taken to its logical extreme could yield a
320. Goldberg v. Kelly, 897 U.S. 254, 263 n.10 (1970), citing North Am. Cold Storage
Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 US. 306 (1908) (seizure of spoiled food), and Ewing v. My.
tinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.. 594 (1950) (seizure of mislabeled vitamins).
321. See cases cited in note 320 supra.
322. See In re Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 173 N.E.2d 797, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74, appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 34 (1961); Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 80 S.W.2d 76 (1935).
323. Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1972).
324. See note 318 supra.
325. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970), for example, the Court ordered
New York to provide hearings prior to terminating welfare benefits despite its explicit
recognition that the impact of such a requirement would be that New York City would
be irreparably injured by having to continue payments to persons who would be found
ineligible at the hearing and judgment-proof in any efforts at recoupment.
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holding that civil commitment is never permissible whether or not
there has been a full hearing.
If courts do insist on permitting temporary commitments before
a hearing in some cases-and I can easily conceive of cases in which
26
a total ban on summary commitment would be deeply troubling
-the Supreme Court's decision in other areas should probably lead
to the following resolution of the issue: In those cases, but only
those cases, in which immediate and substantial harm is thought
probable for the individual or others, a court may conduct its inquiry
into alternatives-and even into illness-while the individual is held
on a temporary basis.8 27 Nonetheless, the committing court and the
hospital should be required to perform an initial inquiry into alternatives as expeditiously as reasonably possible. Such a rule would
permit the summary commitment not only of the suicidal and the
assaultive but also of those apparently ill persons who, though not in
danger of death, seem likely to deteriorate irretrievably without immediate inpatient care.328 On the other hand, what the rule would
forbid is the common practice today of involuntarily committing in
advance of an inquiry into alternatives those who behave peculiarly
or are simply unable to care well for themselves but will irreparably
harm neither themselves nor others if their commitment is postponed until after a review of alternatives. If hospital doctors would
honor this standard-and it will be difficult to enforce otherwisemost patients should be spared inpatient hospitalization until after
29
an inquiry into alternatives.4
In setting the timetable for exploring alternatives, courts should
insist on explorations not merely before commitment but also after
326. Consider the person in a catatonic state, totally withdrawn into himself, who

will not eat at all.
327. The Supreme Court of Missouri has accepted essentially this position. State
ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954). At the other extreme,
some state courts have approved commitment prior to hearings for all mentally ill
persons. See, e.g., In re Crosswell's Estate, 28 RI. 187, 66 A. 55 (1907); In re Dowell,
169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897).
328. For those believed suiddal, assaultive, or "deteriorating," the dangers that the

confinement while an inquiry into alternatives is going forward will later be found to
have been unnecessary may be less than for other classes of patients: it is less likely
for them that even after examination a court will find lesser alternatives equally

effective for protecting the person or public.
329. Unfortunately, many hospital psychiatrists seem oblivious to legal standards.
Concerned solely with providing treatment (and, by my own observations, with protecting their power to provide the treatment), such psychiatrists may well subvert any
efforts to reduce the number of inessential emergency commitments. Substantial reduction in the number of unnecessary emergency commitments may thus be possible only
by a cumbersome process of subjecting all commitments to immediate and automatic
review.

HeinOnline -- 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1181 1971-1972

1182

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1107

commitment-not merely at the outset of governmental intervention
but even after commitment and an initial thorough inquiry. A later
inquiry may be especially desirable after a hospitalized person has
passed through an acute episode of illness and has entered a more
stable period, because finding an alternative then may intercept his
transfer within the hospital from a moderately well-staffed intensivetreatment ward to the sort of "extended treatment" or "rehabilitation" ward from which too few travelers ever return. 810 Such a
continuing inquiry may be seen as required by the principle of the
least restrictive alternative itself or may be analyzed as part of the
hospital's statutory or constitutional obligation to provide treatment.83l
In those states that provide for periodic judicial review of
commitments by the hospital or by the court,8 32 the reviewer should
be required to include a reexamination of alternatives as part of its
decision on the need for continued confinement. Moreover, the
availability of less restrictive alternatives should also be justiciable
at habeas corpus hearings of the sort traditionally available to the
mentally ill to test whether they remain within the statutory criteria
for commitment. In fact, each of the principal District of Columbia
decisions dealing with the use of alternatives arose in the context
of habeas corpus proceedings, not in the context of appeals from
initial commitments. 88

A.

V. GOING BEYOND
Reaching the Voluntary Patient

The state's constitutional obligation to explore alternatives may
not extend to the large and growing number of persons who commit
themselves to hospitals voluntarily83 4 or to those hospitalized under
special provisions for "nonprotesting" patients. 8 3 5 If, as I have argued, the predicate for finding a constitutional obligation to explore
alternatives is a state's threat to curtail a person's physical freedom,
then the predicate is lacking when the state threatens nothing and
merely responds to the citizen's request for care.
330. On the vast disparities in staffing and treatment between these twro types of
wards, see R. Rocm, M. JACOBSON & R. JANoPAuL, supra note 2, at 70, 223-26.

331. See S. BRAKm & R. RocK, supra note 2, at 165-66.
332. See compilation in id., Table 5.4, at 184-85.
333. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d
657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
334. See S. BRAmm & R. Rocx, supra note 2, at 17-33; R. RocK, M. JACOBsON 8, R.
JAMOPAuL, supra note 2, at 34-38.
335. R. Rocx, M. JAcoBSoN & R. JANOPAtrL, supra note 2, at 38-40.
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The voluntary patient's freedom is, however, often more tenuous
than it appears. First, in most states, hospitals may hold him without
hearing for several days, even weeks, after he has requested his release.33 6 Second, many persons voluntarily commit themselves only
under the implied threat that they will otherwise be committed
against their will.33 7 And, third, patients are often misled about the
nature of the "voluntary" status and further misled into believing
that hospitalization is in their best interest. A patient often rests his
decision to enter or remain in a hospital on a belief, instilled or
nursed by hospital staff, that he "needs" to be hospitalized,388 when
all the staff has any foundation for claiming is that he suffers from
a mental illness and needs some form of help somewhere.
Somewhat tender constitutional arguments can thus be advanced
that, because of the hospital's power to hold the voluntary committee and the threatening circumstances under which many patients
volunteer, states must treat these commitments as involuntary at
least to the extent of searching and providing opportunity for placement in community facilities for the "voluntary" patient in the
same manner that they must for the court-committed patient. 33 9
Short of this position, because of the danger of misimpression about
the necessity for hospitalization conveyed to the voluntary patient
36. In a few states, a voluntary patient may leave whenever he wishes. More
commonly, he must give notice of an intention to leave and then can leave if within
a few days the hospital has not filed initial papers for his commitment with the
appropriate court. See compilation in S. BRAXEL & R. ROCK, supra note 2, at Table
2.1, at 27-33.
527. See the description of the commitment process in Illinois in Gilboy & Schmidt,
supra note 807, at 433, 438-39 (finding that 40% of voluntarily committed patients
have been brought to hospitals by the police who, if voluntary commitment does not
result, will generally sign papers to commit them involuntarily).
338. In viewing commitment proceedings, I have been struck by the fact that
all participants keep trying to assure the patient that they are concerned solely
with his best interests. The Rock, Jacobson and Janopaul book provides a common
example from a commitment hearing in Kansas:
JUDGE [To the patient]: Are there any questions you would like to ask?
PATIENT: No, it's just that I would like to go home.
JUDGE: Rest assured that we are all interested in what is best for you. Thank you
for talking with us. [The patient was then ordered to be committed.]
R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON &R. JANOPAUL, supra note 2, at 197.
339. The arguments for requiring more protective procedures for the voluntarily
committed, based on the coercion that inheres in their decision to commit themselves,
are reviewed in Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 307, at 449-51. The authors conclude
that a recent Supreme Court decision refusing to invalidate a guilty plea even when
induced by the defendant's expectations of leniency (Brady v. United States, 897 U.S.
742, 751 (1970)) reduces the likelihood that courts will accept arguments for greater
protections for the person who voluntarily commits himself fearing involuntary commitment otherwise. In my view, the decision in Brady was so greatly influenced by
the Court's view of the social utility served by guilty pleas (see 397 U.S. at 752)
that the decision should be viewed as having little bearing on the issue of "voluntary"
admissions to hospitals.
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by the hospital's acceptance of him as a patient, courts might require
hospitals to warn him about the limited extent of the exploration
for alternative methods of treatment for him.340 The second remedy
seems of little worth (in many cases, no more likely to dissuade the
ill person than would warning a drowning man that you can offer
him only a frayed rope).
Even if courts found that persons involuntarily committed are
entitled to a full inquiry into less restrictive alternatives, hospitals
would probably be forced to ignore the requirements unless provided with more adequate social service staffs to search for alternatives than most hospitals can currently claim. 41 On the other
hand, if adequately staffed to search out community alternatives,
hospitals would probably provide equally careful searches for the
involuntary and voluntary patients. 42 The Hippocratic oath draws
no distinctions based on a patient's voluntary status, and hospitals,
so far as I have observed, rarely give favored treatment to involuntary patients based on fear of a court's intrusion. Given the comparative efficacy of community facilities, the states would, of course,
be wise, wholly apart from constitutional requirements, to require
searches for alternatives for all classes and equip their hospitals to
carry out these searches.
B.

Requiring the Use of Alternatives Even When
They Are Less Effective Than Hospitalization

The narrowest view of the principle of the least restrictive alternative-and the view generally advanced in this article-leads to
prohibiting inpatient hospitalization only when an alternative permits equal or better service of the state's goals. Under this view, an
individual's involuntary hospitalization would be immune from constitutional attack when alternatives stretch even a millimeter less
far toward serving fully the state's interests.
Such a rigid view of the principle is not inevitable. Courts might
well require the use of alternatives in a much broader range of cases.
In the context of civil commitment, courts might compel the use of
community alternatives, even when they serve the state's goals somewhat less well than hospitalization, on those occasions when the
340. See Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 807, at 441-43.
341. On the limitations on staffing in public hospitals, see text accompanying notes
73-77 supra.

42. A few states provide by statute for equal treatment for all classes of patients.
See, e.g., IowA CoDE ANN. § 226.10 (1969). In these, a holding that involuntarily committed patients have an affirmative right to be treated might also be held to apply
to the voluntarily committed.
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federal constitutional interest in an extra degree of protection for a
person's freedom of movement afforded by the use of the alternative
is believed to outweigh the state's interest in the greater degree of
protection of its goals afforded by hospitalization. Commitment
judges would have to weigh values-protection and freedomthat are related but cannot in fact be quantified absolutely or relatively; he would nevertheless be making the kinds of judgments
that judges must make every day. 43
Ample authority exists in Supreme Court decisions for requiring
the broader view of the principle. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,.3 44 for example, the Court struck down as an undue burden
on commerce an Arizona statute limiting the length of trains to no
more than fourteen passenger cars and seventy freight cars. Arizona
argued that it needed the regulation to reduce the incidence of "slack
action" accidents, exacerbated by longer trains. As a standard for
judgment, the Court did not declare that the regulation was to be
upheld unless the state's goals could be as fully served by permitting
longer trains. Rather, the Court regarded "the decisive question" to
be "whether in the circumstances the total effect of the law as a
safety measure.., is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh
the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from in345
and concluded that the
terferences which seriously impede it"
law, "viewed as a safety measure, affords at most slight and dubious
advantage, if any, over unregulated train lengths." 346
The Court has engaged in similar weighing, with less candor,
in many other cases,847 including cases involving the rights most
843. A judge's decisions in granting bail, granting postponements of proceedings,
admitting certain evidence at trial (such as evidence of a criminal defendant's prior
crimes), and imposing sentence all may involve conflicting values that the judge must
adjust in the "sound exercise of his discretion."
344. 825 US. 761 (1945). See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971) ("[W]here
a statute does not directly abridge free speech, but . . . tends to have the incidental
effect of inhibiting First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute can be
upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct
and the lack of alternative means for doing so.).
345. 825 U.S. at 775-76.
846. 325 U.S. at 779.
347. In first amendment cases, for example, when it has invalidated a regulation on
the ground that the state should have used a less restrictive alternative for achieving
its goals, the Court has sometimes suggested an alternative plainly inadequate for the
state's needs and failed to indicate any recognition of the inadequacy. See, e.g., Baird
v. State Bar, 401 US. 1 (1971) (information already supplied by bar applicant stated
by Court to be fully adequate for state purpose in investigating character though, as
suggested in Justice BIackmun's dissent, 401 U.S. at 11, 21-22, it may not in fact have
revealed all information the state had a legitimate interest in learning); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (signs indicating beliringers unwelcome offered as alter-
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drastically curtailed by civil commitment-travel and association.
The Shelton and Aptheker cases are examples of decisions in which
the alternatives intimated by the Supreme Court were almost certainly less adequate than the challenged regulations to advance the
legislature's legitimate purposes, but the Court believed that the
individual's interest in association and travel outweighed the government's interests in the curtailment of these rights.248 On the
oter hand, even when cases have involved so sacred a right as
freedom of expression, the Court has occasionally upheld a statute
when it believed that no adequate alternatives existed for serving a
governmental purpose, without weighing the value derived from
serving that purpose against the value in protecting free expression.84 9
In short, once courts begin to regard an area of conduct as
constitutionally favored, few natural limits appear either on the
extent of the constraints courts can place on government intrusions
or, conversely, on the constraints they can place on the protected
freedom itself in the name of serving some pressing legislative
interest.350 Freedom from bodily confinement is, I have argued, an
interest of constitutional dimensions under state and federal constitutions 8 1 At a minimum, it-and other freedoms-ought to be
native to ban on door-to-door solicitation); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 808 U.S. 147
(1939) (ban on littering suggested as alternative to ban on distribution of leaflets).
More disingenuously still, the Court has sometimes asserted that effective, narrower
alternatives existed for serving the legislature's goals but has failed either to state
what those goals were or suggest specific alternatives for serving them. See, e.g., United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 884 US. 11 (1966); Louisiana
ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 US. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 864 U.S. 479
(1960). See also Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath, 1966 Sup. Or.
Ray. 193, 218-19.
In still other cases, Justices have disguised their weighing by describing a specific
alternative as "adequate" or claiming that an alternative will "suffice" without acknowledging the value judgments those terms carry about the worthiness of the state's
interests or the comparative strength of the federal constitutional interest. See Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 US. 349, 854 (1951) ("reasonable and adequate
alternatives are available"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 281 (1963) ("IT]he
state acts unconstitutionally if ...it uses religious means to serve secular ends where
secular means would suffice.') (Brennan, J., concurring).
848. See text accompanying notes 178-79 supra.
849. See note 168 supra and accompanying text. See also Adderley v. Florida, 885
US. 89 (1966) (especially Justice Douglas's comments in dissent on the majority's
analysis, 385 US. at 48, 54-55).
850. For a caustic view of the standardless flexibility of the Court's handling of
constitutional doctrines, see Kurland, Foreword, Equal in Origin and Equal in Title
to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HAv.L. REV. 143,
esp. 169-75 (1964). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271, 276 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("Today's balancing act requires a 'pre-ternination evidentiary hearing,' yet
there is nothing that indicates what tomorrow's balance will be." Justice Black then
goes on to list a series of probable extensions.).
351. See pt. III. B. supra.

HeinOnline -- 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1186 1971-1972

May 1972]

Alternatives to Civil Commitment

1187

protected against unnecessary curtailment, but existing case law does
not point ineluctably toward according it any greater level of protection.
With ample precedent either way, I believe a court would be well
warranted, at least initially, in holding the minimum regarding the
required use of alternatives to civil commitment: that is, that commitment is impermissible only if the state's goals can be served fully
as effectively by the lesser alternative. I reach this conclusion relctantly. It may not merely lead to, but approve, locking people up
solely for protection without requiring weight to be attached to their
interest in freedom. Under this standard, the state may with impunity
confine aged persons such as Catherine Lake who are believed likely
to wander confusedly, 2 if a court finds protection the only goal to
be served and no alternatives equally protective.35 3 I nonetheless
believe this narrow view justified for two practical reasons.
First, it must be remembered that in civil commitment proceedings, if the principle of the least restrictive alternative is accepted,
state committing courts or agencies will have to begin considering
alternatives on a case-by-case basis. If only alternatives that are fully
as effective as hospitalization must be ordered, the task for the committing courts will be complex but manageable-essentially like the
task of criminal courts when making probation decisions. However,
appellate courts will seriously ravel the lines of reasoning state committing courts must undertake if they require courts to go beyond
assessing the effectiveness of alternatives and decide in each case
whether the Constitution requires that a somewhat less effective
alternative be used because of the greater interest in permitting
freedom. Although a judge can be aided by hospital doctors and
others in making factual assessments of the likely effectiveness of
various treatment modes, no one but the judge can determine the
weight the Constitution requires be attached to freedom.3 54 The
852. See text accompanying notes 143-49 supra.
353. The danger that some judges might rarely find alternative dispositions acceptable is increased by the multiplicity of purposes commitment is expected to serve.
See pt. II.B. supra. When a state or federal legislative purpose is legitimate but
trivial, denying liberty to serve the purpose may seem particularly galling. In United
States v. O'Brien, 891 U.S. 367 (1968), the Supreme Court upheld a statute imposing
substantial criminal sanctions for the burning of draft cards, finding no other
alternative suited to achieve Congress's legitimate purposes (which I personally consider trivial in relation to the first amendment interest) of easing the administrative
burdens on the Selective Service System, facilitating communication by the registrant
with his board, serving as a reminder to the registrant of his obligation, and reducing
the use of mutilated cards for deception. 891 U.S. at 378-80.
854. The requirement of a case-by-case inquiry into what the Constitution demands
would be especially troublesome in those states in which some committing judges are
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Supreme Court has on several occasions, it is true, remitted legislatures to alternatives that, if adopted, would have required trial
judges to perform case-by-case inquiries of a kind previously
avoided. 35 5 In none of these cases, however, would the required
determinations have involved trial judges in repeated acts of balancing federal constitutional interests against state interests. Though
some judges might develop workable rules of thumb for taking into
account the constitutional interests, others might justifiably resist
being placed every day in the position of performing delicate constitutional balancings of a sort that generally divides the Supreme
Court on the few occasions each term that it engages in such
weighing.
A second justification-also pragmatic-for requiring that a less
restrictive alternative to hospitalization be accepted only if fully as
effective as hospitalization is that, if the states did establish adequate
mechanisms and staff for exploring alternatives, this limited relief
would probably produce as high a level of reliance on alternatives
as would any standard appearing to require broader use. In many
cases under the narrow standard, judges are likely to find the alternatives to commitment fully as effective.3 0 Moreover, once courts
begin making inquiries into alternatives as a matter of course, the
inquiries may breathe a life of their own. Many judges may begin
to embrace less restrictive alternatives that bristle with risks, simply
because they begin to recognize the shortcomings of hospitalization
or the glimmers of hope for success in largely untested communitybased programs. They may, like some juvenile and family court
judges, begin to immerse themselves in the development of new
alternatives. 57 Conversely, for those judges who strongly resist emnonlawyers and in those states in which mental health boards or commissions composed solely or primarily of nonlawyers perform the commitments. See note 135 supra.
555. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 40 U.S.L.W. 4371 (U.S. April 3, 1972) (proceeding
to take custody of his child away from unwed father unconstitutional without case-bycase determination of parental fitness); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
(system of warrantless health-inspection searches of residential dwellings without owner's consent must be replaced by searches, with warrants, obtained from judge or other
impartial official on showing of "probable cause" for search); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959) (conviction of bookseller for purveying pornography unconstitutional
without proof that bookseller was in fact aware of book's pornographic content).
356. See pt. 11. C. supra.
357. Judge Justine Wise Poller of the Family Court of New York City is a justly
celebrated example of a judge who has strived to develop alternatives to confinement.
A recent example of her efforts is the report of a committee she co-chaired with Judge
Phillip D. Roache of the same court. COMMrIT EE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERvxrS INSIDE
AND OUTrsmE OF NEw YORK, JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDa: PRETEN IONs AND REALITIES
OF TRFATMENT SERVICES (1972).
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ploying alternatives, imposing a broader obligation to employ them
is unlikely to alter their conduct. Unless appellate courts intervened
with fixed rules--an unlikely prospect-a commitment judge reluctant to employ alternatives would probably make findings in every
case that community alternatives are unsatisfactory by whatever
margin he feels he must in order to be safe in refusing to use them.
C. Forcing the State To Create Less Restrictive Alternatives
Catherine Lake, the senile petitioner in the District of Columbia
case establishing the obligation of courts there to examine less restrictive alternatives, spent the remaining five years of her life in a
public mental hospital. 5 8 She.died in April 1971, having received
no visitors in the last year of her life. She did not need to be in a
hospital. In the committing judge's view, a nursing home or similar
residential facility providing some substantial measure of supervision, but not totally preventing access to the outside world, would
have been sufficient.352 Such facilities-even ones of the sort the
Nader study exposed36°---were simply unavailable in the District of
Columbia for most aged people as poor as Ms. Lake. 61
For her, the principle of the least restrictive alternative proved a
mirage, beckoning with hope and dissolving in disappointment. In
many states, the principle would breed similar disappointment for
many kinds of patients. 6 2 In a commitment proceeding in Detroit,
a judge told me that there was little point in requiring a search for
community alternatives in most mental health cases because alternatives simply do not exist. 3 3 Across the country, the development in
the last decade of community-based residential and outpatient programs for the mentally ill has been rapid but has simply not kept
pace with the demand. 64 Nor has it kept pace with the research
indicating their potential.
The failure to develop more extensive community-based pro358. Letter to the author from Harry Fulton of the District of Columbia Public
Defender Agency, Dec. 13, 1971, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
359. See Lake v. Cameron, 267 F. Supp. 155, 159 (D.D.C. 1967) (case on remand).
860. See C. TOWNSEND, OLD AGE: THsE LAST SEGREGATION (1971).
361. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 319, 324-25 (1970) (testimony of Dr.

Sherman Kieffer, Director, National Center for Mental Health Services, Training and
Research of St. Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, D.C.).
862. See note 38 supra.
863. In re Heard (Wayne County, Mich., P. Ct., hearing on Feb. 11, 1972).
364. See R. GLAsscorE, J. SussEx, E. CUMMING & L. SMITH, supra note 296, at 31-32.
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grams poses a simple but perplexing question: For how much longer
shall government be permitted to deny people their freedom, when
it might easily develop programs and facilities that would permit
both freedom and the service of the government's legitimate goals?
Recall the simplicity of the alternative to incarceration found so
successful in Pasamanick's experimental program in Louisville:
seriously psychotic patients lived at home on medication with
periodic visits from nurses. 3 5 If such a home-based program really
would serve the state's interests, should the state nevertheless
be permitted to continue indefinitely to hospitalize such people
against their will by simply refusing to develop such programs? I am
certain that the tone of my questions conveys my belief that the state
should not be permitted to do so. But I do have a less rhetorical
question more difficult to answer: By what process can citizens
compel their states to reshape their mental health programs?
The obvious and traditional route for change has been the
political process-through the ballot and pleas to the legislature..
In the past few years, however, many legislatures, facing costs rising
faster than revenues, have either pared the budgets of mental health
programs or cut back on their rate of expansion.3 00 The mentalhealth lobby, though ardent, is neither rich nor widely feared. In
some states, courts may be able to prompt legislatures to act. Two
theories for judicial intervention can be offered: the developing right
to treatment and the principle of the least restrictive alternative.
Each may be instrumental in forcing change, yet at the same time
responsive to the appropriate interests of the states.
Courts that have shaped a justiciable right to treatment for
patients in hospitals have reasoned that, under the due process clause,
states cannot be permitted to lock people up for their care and treatment and then fail to provide-or make a bona fide effort to provide
-a decent level of care. 3 7 Applied until recently only in suits
365. See text accompanying notes 105-09 supra.
366. In 1971, as to their public mental hospitals, four states decreased per patient
expenditures; twenty-four others increased expenditures but increased them at a
lesser rate than they had increased them over the period 1967-1970. H. Bethel ?, R.
Redick, supra note 1, Table 7, at 11. See also Ciurman, The Patients Can Walk Out

at Any Time at Bronx State Hospital, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 14,
20 (describing the funding squeeze in New York).
367. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (decided on statutory grounds but indicating a constitutional basis); Nason v. Commonwealth, 353
Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968) (implying a constitutional basis); People v. Bargy, No.
32784 (Wayne County, Mich., Cir. Ct., Jan. 19, 1970) (Gilmore, J.).
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brought by individual patients to secure their own treatment or
release, the right has excited considerable interest within the legal
profession 8 8 and alarm among many psychiatrists, 69 but has spurred
little, if any, improvement in the quality of care provided in institutions.70
In the past year, however, a right-to-treatment suit with spurs
and considerable promise has been flourishing in a federal district
court in Alabama. In this case, Wyatt v. Stickney, 71 patients involuntarily committed to two large state hospitals brought a class
action against the hospital administrators alleging a violation of their
constitutionally protected right to treatment. Two prestigious national mental organizations and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare joined them as amici curiae.372 After an extensive
trial, Chief Judge Frank M. Johnson found that many patients received no treatment whatever and others only treatment that fell
well below any standard of minimal adequacyY 3 He then ordered the
state to move rapidly to provide "such individual treatment as will
give each [patient] a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve
his or her mental condition;"3 74 subsequently he entered a further
order fixing detailed standards by which the adequacy of the care
at these hospitals will be judged. 7 He expressly warned that he will
868. See, e.g., Symposium on the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673-890 (1969)
(ten articles).
369. See Council of the American Psychiatric Assn., Position Statement on the
Question of Adequacy of Treatment, 123 Am. J. PsycATRay 1458 (1967) (implying that
adequacy of treatment is a question for doctors, not for courts).
370. See Halpern, A PracticingLawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J.
782, 784 (1969).
371. One of the many orders in the case can be found at 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.
Ala. 1971). A recent article is Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 Am. CRam. L. REv. 587 (1972). The papers in the case can be obtained through
the counsel for the amid curiae, American Psychological Association, American Orthopsychiatric Association, and American Civil Liberties Union: The Center for Law and
Social Policy, 1600 20th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.
372. For the mental health organizations represented, see note 371 supra. Judge
Johnson invited the participation of the United States as amicus curiae, 325 F. Supp.
at 786. The United States has appeared through the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, filing papers in support of the plaintiff's position.
373. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
374. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
375. The court ordered implementation of a plan covering every facet of hospitalization. Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala.), Order of April
13, 1972, at 4. The order included a list of patient rights, minimum staffing rations and
qualification, required physical facilities, minimum nutritional standards, and requisite individual treatment plans. Id. at 9-21 (Appendix A, "Minimum Constitutional
Standards for Adequate Treatment of the Mentally Ill").
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not consider lack of staff or facilities a justification for providing less
than adequate care.376 Indeed, in a phase of the suit attacking the
particularly inhuman conditions at an institution for the retarded,
he has ordered the state either to close the institution or to hire 300
77
new personnel within four months3
The Wyatt litigants and Judge Johnson have, quite understandably, concerned themselves almost solely with the quality of care
within Alabama's deplorable institutions. And courts in general
might hold that, if a state provides "adequate" care within its institutions, the right to treatment does not require the creation of community-based facilities. 8 78 The implications of the right-to-treatment
cases, however, extend much further. Courts could appropriately
hold that, given the known shortcomings of inpatient hospitalization,
a state can be considered to provide "adequate treatment" for those
whom it seeks to control against their will only by creating community-based programs as a supplement to institutional care.
The principle of the least restrictive alternative can reach as far
as the right to treatment. Far less brittle in its logic, 7 0 the principle,
376. Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 n.3 (M.D. Ala.) (Order of Dec. 10,
1971).
377. Wyatt v. Stickney, Civil Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala.), Order of March 2,
1972.
378. Nearly all writers about the right to treatment have argued solely for improving the quality of care within hospitals, though at least one writer, Morton
Birnbaum, has mentioned the importance of aftercare programs. See Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 741 (1969); Birnbaum, A
Rationale for the Right [to Treatment], 57 Gao. L.J. 752, 770 (1969) (though focusing
largely on the quality of care within hospitals, the author, a psychiatrist, stated: "It
is therefore the hope of this writer that the concept of the right to treatment will
include a requirement that some kind of halfway house be available to accept those
persons who are suitable for discharge from public mental hospitals but lack someone
to accept the responsibility for them."); Halpern, supra note 370.
379. Judge Johnson stated the constitutional argument for a right to treatment as
follows: "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the
confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process." Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781, 785 (MD. Ala. 1971). See similar language in Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453
(D.C. Cir. 1966). He further asserted that the only constitutionally permissible basis for
involuntary commitment is treatment as opposed to "mere custodial care." 325 F. Supp.
at 784.
Despite Judge Johnson's claim, treatment is probably not the only constitutionally
permissible justification government has for incarcerating people who are not criminals.
Government is also probably constitutionally justified in locking up people who are
dangerous to themselves or others. State courts have repeatedly affirmed this power
(see Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 1288 (1966)), and even the plaintiffs in Wyatt appear to concede so. If locking
up people who are ill and dangerous is constitutionally permissible (because it serves
legitimate purposes), I am uncertain why the state has any duty other than to treat
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even in its most simply stated form, can justify a holding that states
must not restrain a person in a mental hospital if fully as effective
programs that are less restrictive of liberty might be employedwhether or not such programs are currently in existence in the state.
In numerous cases arising under the commerce clause,8s0 the first
amendment,38 1 and the rights of travel38 2 and association, 383 the
Supreme Court has done just that-invalidated legislation when persuaded that a less restrictive alternative would protect the government's interests even though no legislation in existence at the time
authorized the alternative. In these cases, the states, if they wished
to continue to protect their legitimate interests, were compelled to
adopt new systems or procedures more protective of the endangered
constitutional liberties.
A broad holding requiring the creation of new alternatives to
commitment under either the right to treatment or the principle of
the least restrictive alternative would communicate to governments
in an appropriate manner the high price they must pay for taking
away people's freedom-that they may do so only when necessary
and only when they are willing to make an effort to provide treatment that may keep the ill person from losing his freedom again.
such persons humanely unless the duty to do more flows from the simple notion that
liberty is important and we are going to insist that the price for taking liberty is a
bona fide effort to restore it as soon as possible. If judges who rely on the right to
treatment would acknowledge that the right flows from just so simple a notion-the
notion of the importance of freedom-their opinions would be more compelling. Cf.
Goodman, Right to Treatment, The Responsibility of the Courts, 57 GEO. LJ. 680, 680
(1969) ("Where deprivations of liberty are concerned, we will no longer justify these
divestments or the flimsiness of the procedures under which they are initiated by
referring to glib, but unfulfilled, legislative promises or purported, but illusory, humane goals.').
880. In the Dean Milk case, for example, the Court struck down a Madison, Wisconsin, ordinance forbidding the sale of milk processed beyond a certain number of
miles from the center of town on the ground that the city had several effective
alternatives it could use to protect against unsafe milk, none of which would involve
as grave an imposition on interstate commerce. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 849 (1951). Most prominent among these alternatives was an elaborate inspection system recommended by the United States Public Health Service, not currently
authorized by Wisconsin legislation. See 340 U.S. at 555-56. See also Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959); Baldwin v. GA.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,
524 (195).
881. See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360

(1964).

382. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), discussed at text accompanying note 178 supra.
383. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), discussed at text accompanying note
179 supra.
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The hardest problem for lawyers interested in bringing suits of this
sort will be to develop acceptable standards for determining just how
high a price governments should be compelled to pay. Few, if any,
of the Supreme Court cases that have insisted on the use of alternatives that were not yet created have compelled the creation of programs nearly so costly as vast new community-based alternatives to
commitment.3 14 Wyatt in its present form may well cost Alabama
annually millions of dollars in scarce revenues; if the suit's scope were
expanded to demand an adequate system of outpatient care, many
more millions might be entailed each year. Even if the state could
offset much of the cost by closing down parts of its hospitals and
rechanneling the savings into the required new programs,38 5 a court
order might still have the impact of taking jobs away from many
current hospital personnel or, at the least, of forcing a massive
relocation and retraining of personnel.
Under either theory, further difficulties exist, wholly apart from
dollar or resource cost, in determining the criteria for judging what
sorts of community-based programs should be required. The right
to treatment, typically held to require "adequate" care,38 6 might be
found to demand an "adequate" system of community care tailored
to aid the ill in avoiding hospitalization or rehospitalization. Unfortunately, even less agreement exists today about the components of
an adequate system of community care than about the components
of adequate hospital care.38 7 Complicating matters even more, the
384. If Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is seen as a case in which
the Court ordered the creation of alternatives not yet in existence in Kansas, the
financial costs implicit in the Court's order might have equalled the cost of vastly
expanded mental health programs. In most other Supreme Court cases costs would
have been slight. See notes 380-83 supra. Even in Dean Milk, where the most elaborate
alternative was suggested, the costs of the inspection system could presumably have
been passed on to the milk producers instead of being borne by the state.
385. It seems clear that the per-patient costs of treating a person on an outpatient
basis or even in halvay houses is significantly less than treating him in a hospital,
where costs of attendants (who serve largely as guards) are so high. See R. GLASSCOTE,
J. GUDEMAN & J. Eu'Ezs, supra note 53, at 24; Wilder, Levin & Zwerling, A Two-Year
Follow-Up Evaluation of Acute Psychotic Patients Treated in a Day Hospital, 122
Am J. oF PsycmATRY 1095 (1966). On the other hand, one phenomenon of the
community mental health movement is that availability of programs based in the
community brings many more people voluntarily into the mental health system than
would otherwise seek its services. Moreover, the present level of expenditures in community-based clinics may not be nearly high enough to provide the quality of service
within those clinics that their founders would like. See R. GLASSCOTE, J. Sus.-x, E.
CUMMinG & L. SMITH, supra note 296, at 7.
386. See cases cited in note 367 supra and articles in note 368 supra.
387. Standards for quality of care in hospitals were until 1958 published at regular
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principle of the least restrictive alternative might seem, at least at
first blush, to demand not merely "adequate" community-based programs, but rather the optimum-those programs, regardless of cost,
that will permit the maximum number of ill persons to avoid hospitalization while serving the goals the states seek through commitment. Citing the principle, courts might conceivably demand dozens
of new outpatient clinics, scores of well-staffed, humane nursing
homes, and troops of trained visiting nurses.
The prospect of such a far-reaching decree might make visions
of sugarplums dance in the heads of advocates of community-based
programs, but is likely to terrify all but the most intrepid judge. A
decree need not, however, extend so far. The right to treatment
demands only treatment that is "adequate," and the concept of adequacy, however fluid and inexact, ought to permit some consideration of the limits of state resources and the other demands on those
resources. 8 8 Even in a suit based on the principle of the least restrictive alternative, the added costs for the state ought not be ignored
by a court. Treatment and protection may be the only goals with
which a committing judge need concern himself in his search for
alternative placements for a specific individual, but the over-all costs
intervals by the American Psychiatric Association. See STANDARDS FoR HosprrArs AND

CLINICS (1958). Only in more recent years has the Association given equal attention to
standards for the full range of community facilities, and as to such facilities, the newer
standards are quite general, whereas the earlier ones were much more specific (including, for example, recommended staff-patient ratios). Compare id. with STANDARDS FOR
PsvycAnuc FACiLiTiES 68-79 (1969). The amid curiae in Wyatt submitted twenty-four

pages of standards for care in the hospitals under attack; a high portion of these
standards have been agreed upon by the defendants. (See Proposed Standards for
Adequate Treatment of the Mentally Ill of Amid Curiae, February 2, 1972, indicating in brackets standards accepted by all parties.) I think it unlikely that any such

agreement could be obtained with regard to community care facilities. See generally
Rowe, Barriers to the Establishment of a Comprehensive Community Mental Health
Center, in CoNMIUNrry PsYcMaTRY, supra note 21, at 47.

388. The financial burden of requiring alternatives may seem more pressing in
light of the fact that any order of a court would place burdens on the state, not the

federal government, and yet it is the federal government that has the massive share
of tax revenues and that has borne much of the cost of developing community-based
mental health programs. The federal government in 1969 bore 34.3% of the costs of
operating 205 community mental health centers across the country (C. Taube, Expenditures and Sources of Funds-Federally Funded Community Mental Health
Centers, Statistical Note 43, Biometry Branch, Survey and Reports Section, National
Institute of Mental Health, Table B, at 4 (1971)), but in 1967 only 4.2% of the costs
of operating public mental hospitals (C. Taube, Provisional Data on Source of Funds
and Expenditures-Mental Health Facilities-1967, Statistical Note 5, Biometry
Branch, Survey and Reports Section, National Institute of Mental Health, Table B,
at 5 (1969)). The state can hardly force the federal government to grant it more
money.

HeinOnline -- 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1195 1971-1972

1196

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1107

of programs and the impact of costs of one program on the ability
of the state to undertake other programs are inevitable and appropriate factors for legislators and other public officials when considering
new mental health programs. One unspoken goal of almost every
governmental program is to achieve certain social aims at minimum
cost. Thus, though the Supreme Court and other courts may ignore,
pretend to ignore, or dismiss the significance of financial costs when
striking down state practices that in themselves violate the Constitution38 9 they cannot appropriately disregard such costs when the unconstitutionality of a practice (here involuntary hospitalization)
turns on the availability of alternatives that permit the state's goals
to continue to be served.
Of course, an obvious danger exists in permitting states openly
to rely on higher costs as justification for refusing to initiate programs
that would permit the avoidance of involuntary hospitalization. If
such a defense is taken to its extreme, a state that placed saving
money above every other value might successfully refuse to undertake
programs that would permit a twenty per cent reduction in involuntary commitments, even if the net cost of the undertaking was only
fifty dollars or even fifty cents per year. On the other hand, not
permitting the state to consider costs could lead to compelling it to
undertake programs costing millions of dollars each year for a net
reduction of a handful of patients in its hospital population. The
appropriate balance lies somewhere between these extremes, and
the important point is that, as we have seen elsewhere in this article,
the principle of the least restrictive alternative is flexible enough to
permit a reasonable mean to be acceptable-flexible enough, that is,
to permit a court to compel the creation of some alternative programs without forcing it to order the best imaginable community
mental health system.310
389. See, e.g., the Court's decisions ordering the provision of counsel to indigents
in felony cases (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963)), transcripts to indigents in

criminal appeals (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955)), and invalidating one-year
residency requirements for welfare applicants (Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 U.S. 618
(1969)). In the residency cases, the Court has expressly rejected the state's claims that
the high costs of new welfare recipients provide justification for the restriction. 394
U.S. at 633. See also Wyman v. Lopez, 404 US. 1055 (1972), and Dunn v. Rivera, 404
U.S. 1054 (1972), affg. mem. Rivera v. Dunn, 229 F. Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1971).

390. As stated earlier, freedom from confinement having been established as a value
with a ruddy constitutional complexion, courts need not permit confinement simply

because a state goal will otherwise not be fully served. See pt. V. B. supra. In the
context of day-to-day individual commitment decisions, I suggested that for practical

reasons a court should be required to place no greater premium on freedom than to
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Even more reassuring to courts entering this territory is that the
task of defining the mean between the extremes can in substantial
part be left to the states. Facing class actions seeking to force the
creation of alternative programs, courts in many states could find
that the state had failed to develop adequate community treatment
programs on the basis of evidence regarding the efficacy of such programs, the well-established dangers of hospitalization, and the neartotal absence of community-based care for large portions of the
state's citizens. The court could then turn to the state and order it
either to close its hospitals or to submit a plan to repair the deficiencies in its programs. The court's order would not specify the details
of a new program but merely its general scope. To the extent that
its order was based on the principle of the least restrictive alternative,
the court might direct the state in its plan (1) to make explicit the
goals the state is seeking to serve through commitment, (2) to assess
in light of those goals the present and future needs of all classes of
persons involved in the commitment process, (3) to assay the range
of programs that might be instituted to meet those needs, and (4) to
reach reasoned conclusions about which programs preserve the maximum level of freedom while serving the state's interests.
The submission demanded may sound more like a presidential
commission's report than a response to a judicial decree, but no more
would be demanded here than has been required under numerous
equitable decrees in the last decade. Consider, for example, decrees
in environmental protection cases ordering a public agency to explore the feasibility of less damaging alternatives to a planned public
project.8 1 Only if the state refuses to perform part or all of the
inquiry or performs it in patent bad faith need a court substitute
its own judgment for the state's. 392
ensure that a person not be hospitalized if there are alternatives that will fully serve
the state's purposes. In the context of a broad-gauged class action, however, those
practical reasons do not apply: it is different to ask a court once in the context of a
class action to attach special weight to the interest in freedom and require the state
to spend funds than it is to ask courts that are engaged every day in commitment
proceedings to make a determination in each case of the weight that ought to be
attached to freedom.
591. See, e.g., Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 US. 402, 420 (1971).

See also J. SAx, DEFENDiNG THE ENvIRoNmENT: A STRATEGY FOR CrrzaN ACriON (1971),
esp. ch. 5, "The Mind-Forged Manacles of Law."
892. Compare the school desegregation and reapportionment cases where the initial
burden for devising new plans has almost invariably been left to the state with the
federal court imposing a specific remedy only upon stalling, bad faith, or repeated
submissions of plainly inadequate plans. Among important decisions dealing with relief
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The enormous complexity and diversity of state interests would
require unusual deference on the part of a judge in considering the
state's submision. Deference seems especially wise in this area,
where so much disagreement persists about the appropriate roles of
the various mental health professions in the treatment process 0 3
and about the comparative efficacy of various community-treatment
approaches. Deference, however, need not be total. Though widely
accepted standards for community mental health do not exist, courts
can use as benchmarks standards suggested by mental health experts
testifying before the court,8 9 4 expenditures and programs in other
jurisdictions,9 5 and standards promulgated by the National Institute
of Mental Health and other organizations.,9 6
Having suggested several ways in this and the preceding sections
for audacious courts to encourage new treatment methods, I nevertheless have little confidence that many courts will respond. However ardently one strives to characterize as modest or traditional the
role of courts in a suit to compel a reallocation and expansion of
resources for mental health care, the fact remains that most courts
will resist entering broad decrees and will search for ways to refer
the litigants to the legislature.
Even in suits for individual relief, the unwillingness of courts in
this country to confront the warts of the mental health system has
been frequently noted. 9 7 Moreover, hospital staff and state adminisin school desegregation cases, see Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968),
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1971), on remand, 328
F. Supp. 1346 (W.D.N.C. 1971). For examples of approaches to relief in reapportionment
cases, see Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533, 585-87
(1964).
393. "The number, complexion and variety of the personnel who must collaborate
in a [community mental health] center will raise the issue of administrative control,
which has for some time plagued the mental health field." Rome, Barriers to the
Establishment of a Comprehensive Mental Health Center, in COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY,
supra note 21, at 53.

394. Compare Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
395. For example, Judge Johnson in Wyatt pointed to Alabama's rank as fiftieth
among the states in per-patient expenditure per day. 325 F. Supp. at 784. The comparative performances of the fifty states and the District of Columbia in a range of
indices of effort in mental health can be found in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,

ELEVN IMICEs (1972).
396. The original President's Commission report, AcYION FOR MENTAL HEALTH
(1961), at xiv recommended, for example, establishing one outpatient clinic for every
50,000 persons in the general population. NIMH has developed detailed standards for
federally aided community mental health standards. 42 C.F.R. § 54.212 (1971). As to
the programs of individual centers, its regulations suggest the desirable services to
be provided.

397. See Halpern, supra note 370, at 790. Persuading the lower courts and his fellow

HeinOnline -- 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1198 1971-1972

May 1972]

Alternatives to Civil Commitment

1199

trative personnel are likely to respond to suits with irritation and
wounded pride. In right-to-treatment cases, hospital personnel have
frequently protested that the complaining patient is in fact receiving
treatment;39 8 and they probably could not live with their consciences
if they did not believe he was. In the context of a suit based on the
principle of the least restrictive alternative, a state mental health
commissioner is similarly likely to protest that, given all the demands
on the state, he and his department are doing the best that can be
expected in order to keep people from being committed unnecessarily. He is unlikely to feel politically comfortable in submitting
to a court a plan that commits the state to new outpatient programs
that have not been cleared with the significant members of his legislature-a body that may well be indifferent to the mentally ill and
hostile to meddlesome federal district courts. Only a strong judge
indeed will be willing to reject the commissioner's best as not good
enough and threaten to forbid most involuntary commitments if by
a date certain new community-based programs are not in operation.
In the end, perhaps only Congress and the legislatures can assure
the development of alternatives to hospitalization. Many states have
made encouraging beginnings. But Congress and the President have
failed to uphold their side of a bargain the federal government
initiated.399 Substantially greater development of alternatives may
circuit judges to bring "our problems" out "into the open for confrontation" has
become a life's work for Judge Bazelon. See, e.g., United States v. Trantham, 448 F.2d
1036, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dissenting from a denial of a petition for rehearing en

banc); United States v. Carter, 436 F.2d 200, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (concurring opinion).
The frequency with which he has repeated his message bespeaks his lack of success in

inducing confrontation.
398. For example, in Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the first

major right-to-treatment decision, a lengthy hearing was held after remand on the
adequacy of care Rouse was receiving. At the hearing, hospital doctors rather angrily
asserted that Rouse had been receiving treatment but could point to little other than
the hospital's efforts to maintain a therapeutic atmosphere. Since Rouse was shortly
thereafter released because of procedural defects in his original commitment, no court
opinion is available summarizing the evidence at the hearing. See Rouse v. Cameron,
387 F.2d 241, 242 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
399. For fiscal 1968, for example, Congress authorized 50 million dollars for constructing community mental health centers, over 20% less than had been authorized
the previous year. Congress then appropriated only 45 million of the 50 million. And
the President withheld the entire 45 million. R. GrAsscoTE, J. SussEx, E. CmmnUNG & L.
SMrrH, supra note 296, at 5. On the other hand, for fiscal year 1972, Congress, though
appropriating only 15 million dollars for the construction of centers, has raised quite
substantially (from 48 million to 90 million to 135 million from 1970 through 1972)
the appropriations for community mental health staff. Letter from P. E. Goody, Chief,
Budget Management Section, National Institute of Mental Health, April 11, 1972, on
file with the Michigan Law Review. Federal funds remain, however, a tiny portion
of the nation's mental health care budget. See note 88 supra.
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come into being only if community mental health proves irresistibly
cheap, which is possible but unlikely, or if legislators accept the
mentally ill as human beings whose self-worth and dignity deserve
as much protection as their own. If that realization ever dawns, of
course, legislators might put an end to involuntary commitment altogether. The issue of court-compelled use of alternatives would
then vanish and with it the need for exhausting articles like this one.
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